The January 13, 2000 order for protection prohibited Defendant-Appellant Grant T. Sugihara (Sugihara) from, inter alia, contacting his ex-wife and the two of their minor children (except for visitation) living with her, and coming or passing within one hundred yards of his ex-wife's residence. Relying upon the Hawai`i Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Aganon, 97 Haw. 299, 36 P.3d 1269 (2001), Sugihara argues, for the first time on appeal, that the family court's jury instruction on the offense was erroneous and invites us, by way of purported prejudice, to notice plain error. We decline, and affirm.

Thus, the jury instructions were substantively, if not technically, correct.” (Quoting State v. Aganon, 97 Hawai'i 299, 303, 36 P.3d 1269, 1273 (2001) (alterations in original)). As to Bovee’s argument that the circuit court’s instruction was prejudicial to his defense—that he was not aware that the object he was distributing was methamphetamine— the ICA responded that “[a] reasonable jury would understand that the offense required that Bovee distributed methamphetamine in any amount.”

We note that in its appellate brief, and also at oral argument, the prosecution mentioned that there may be an issue as to whether the manslaughter offense, as codified in HRS § 707-702(1)(a), actually contains an attendant circumstance element. For support, the prosecution relied on our prior statement in State v. Aganon, 97 Hawai'i 299, 303, 36 P.3d 1269, 1273 (2001), that "the two elements of second degree murder in this case are 'conduct' . . . and 'result.'" However, as noted by Justice Levinson in his concurring opinion, Aganon does not properly stand for the proposition that we may abolish the attendant circumstance element from the offense of reckless manslaughter, an element expressly required by the plain language of the HPC.

In the context of jury instructions on the EMED defense, our courts have held that it is the trial court's obligation to provide an EMED instruction when "the record reflects any evidence ... that the defendant acted under a loss of self-control resulting from [EMED]." State v. Aganon, 97 Hawai‘i 299, 304, 36 P.3d 1269, 1274 (2001). See State v. Sawyer, 88 Hawai‘i 325, 333, 966 P.2d 637, 645 (1998) ; State v. Moore, 82 Hawai‘i 202, 921 P.2d 122 (1996) ; State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 509, 525, 778 P.2d 704, 714–15 (1989).

HRS § 701–114 (1993). In State v. Aganon, 97 Hawai‘i 299, 36 P.3d 1269 (2001), this court found that a jury instruction, which instructed a jury that it only needed to find the requisite state of mind as to one of three elements, constituted plain error. The defendant in Aganon was charged with the offense of murder in the second degree under HRS § 702–205 (1993), which required proof that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly with respect to each of the three elements of the offense.

Opinion of the Court by LIM, J. Defendant-Appellant Michael G. Aki (Aki) appeals from the September 12, 2001 judgment of the Family Court of the First Circuit, Judge Michael D. Wilson presiding, that convicted him of abuse of family or household members, a violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 709-906 (1993 Supp. 2002). Aki stakes out four points of error on appeal: (1) that the family court plainly erred in its jury instruction on the material elements of the offense, in light of State v. Aganon, 97 Haw. 299, 36 P.3d 1269 (2001); (2) that the family court plainly erred in failing to either (a) require prosecutorial election of a specific culpable act, or (b) give a specific jury instruction on unanimity, as required by State v. Arceo, 84 Haw. 1, 32-33, 928 P.2d 843, 874-75 (1996); (3) that there was insufficient evidence of mens rea as to the result of his conduct; and (4) that there was insufficient evidence to disprove his justification defense of self-defense. We disagree, and affirm.

Id. at 337, 141 P.3d at 984. The circuit court's instruction in this case was similar to the instruction at issue in State v. Aganon, 97 Hawai'i 299, 36 P.3d 1269 (2001). In Aganon, the defendant, Aganon, was charged with Murder in the Second Degree after a child she was caring for had difficulty breathing and subsequently died.

"Jury instructions to which no objection has been made at trial will be reviewed only for plain error." State v. Aganon, 97 Haw. 299, 302, 36 P.3d 1269, 1272 (2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), reconsideration denied, 97 Haw. 299, 36 P.3d 1269 (2002). C. Plain error

"The standard of review for a circuit court's issuance or refusal of a jury instruction is whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, inconsistent, or misleading." State v. Aganon, 97 Hawai`i 299, 302, 36 P.3d 1269, 1272 (2001), reconsideration denied. "'[E]rroneous instructions are presumptively harmful and are a ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears from the record as a whole that the error was not prejudicial.'"State v. Sua, 92 Hawai`i 61, 69, 987 P.2d 959, 967 (1999).

The defendant-appellant David Lucas appeals from the judgment of the first circuit court, the Honorable Karen Ahn presiding, convicting him of and sentencing him for three counts of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree, in violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1242(1)(c) (1993). On appeal, Lucas contends that the circuit court: (1) erred in denying his motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for judgment of acquittal based on the entrapment defense as a matter of law, pursuant to HRS § 702-237(1)(b) (1993), inasmuch as the police employed methods of persuasion or inducement, which created a substantial risk that he would commit the charged offenses even though he was not ready to commit them; (2) plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury, in accordance with this court's decision in State v. Aganon, 97 Haw. 299, 36 P.3d 1269 (2001), reconsideration denied, 97 Hawai`i 299, 36 P.3d 1269 (2002), that, in order to find Lucas guilty of the charged offenses, it must find that he acted with the relevant state of mind, "knowingly," as to all elements of the offense; and (3) erred in convicting him of the charged offenses, where there was substantial evidence that he was merely acting as a "procuring agent" for the undercover officer during the incidents in connection with which he was charged. Upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we hold that: (1) the circuit court did not err by denying Lucas's pretrial motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for judgment of acquittal as a matter of law, inasmuch as "the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and in full recognition of the province of the trier of fact . . . [was] sufficient to support a prima facie case so