Opinion
W2022-01009-CCA-R3-CD
03-25-2024
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANTONIO DEMETRIUS ADKISSON A/K/A ANTONIO DEMETRIUS TURNER, JR.
Claiborne H. Ferguson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Antonio Demetrius Adkisson. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katharine K. Decker, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Frederick Hardy Agee, District Attorney General; and Jason Scott and Scott Kirk, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Session October 3, 2023
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Gibson County No. 19840 Clayburn Peeples, Judge
A Gibson County jury convicted the defendant, Antonio Demetrius Adkisson a/k/a Antonio Demetrius Turner, Jr., of two counts of second-degree murder, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the juvenile court erred in transferring the defendant to circuit court and (2) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the defendant's statement. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed
Claiborne H. Ferguson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Antonio Demetrius Adkisson.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katharine K. Decker, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Frederick Hardy Agee, District Attorney General; and Jason Scott and Scott Kirk, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., joined. CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., dissenting.
OPINION
J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE
Facts and Procedural History
This case arises from the murders of the victims, Dearrious Young and Troy Whitmore, on September 26, 2017. The defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the murders, and the State sought to transfer the case against him to circuit court.
The record in this case is voluminous; thus, we will limit our recitation of the facts to that relevant to the issues on appeal.
I. Juvenile Court Motion to Suppress
Prior to the defendant's arrest, he spoke to Milan Police Department ("MPD") investigators regarding his involvement in the murders. The defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress his statement, and the juvenile court conducted a suppression hearing on October 13, 2017, during which the State presented the following evidence.
The motion to suppress filed in juvenile court is not included in the record on appeal.
Investigator Jason Williams testified that he went to the defendant's house to speak with him, and when he arrived, Investigator Williams discovered that Officer Allen Alexander and Officer Joe Fountain were already there. The defendant was sitting on the front steps, and his mother was standing beside him. Officer Fountain read the defendant his Miranda rights, and the defendant indicated that he understood them. Investigator Williams advised the defendant that he had information regarding the defendant's involvement in the shootings, and because the defendant was quiet and non-responsive, Investigator Williams asked him if he wanted to come to the station and talk. According to the body camera footage, the defendant and his mother were told three times that he was not under arrest and that Investigator Williams simply wanted to have a conversation with the defendant concerning what the defendant knew about a double homicide. The defendant agreed and was driven to the station. The defendant's mother followed a short time later. Once at the station, the defendant was placed in an interview room, and Officer Glenn, the school resource officer at Milan High School, spoke with the defendant for several minutes. However, Investigator Williams did not think the defendant was being honest with Officer Glenn, and he decided to take over the interview. When he entered the interview room, Investigator Williams again advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. The defendant did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs or alcohol at the time of the interview, and Investigator Williams was not aware of any mental disease or defect that the defendant was suffering from at that time. Regarding the defendant's educational background, Investigator Williams testified that the defendant was a senior at Milan High School. Investigator Williams described the defendant as "pretty intelligent" based on the fact that they discussed college during the interview and also because the defendant talked about Spanish class with another investigator. Investigator Williams stated that the defendant showed emotion each time he changed his story and became more emotional when he realized how much trouble he was going to be in. Investigator Williams denied that the defendant asked to have his mother present in the interview room but agreed that the defendant "asked to see her a few times throughout the night." He also stated that the defendant was allowed to take breaks and was given McDonald's and water.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
On cross-examination, Investigator Williams testified that his dispatcher received multiple calls on the night of the shootings, both to the dispatcher's personal cell phone and to the police department, stating that the defendant and Justice Walton were the perpetrators. Although he agreed they were anonymous tips that were unable to be verified, Investigator Williams testified that people in the crowd at the crime scene also told officers to look into the defendant and Mr. Walton. Additionally, hours after the shooting, someone shot at Mr. Walton's grandparents' house, and the defendant's mother told officers that she also expected retaliation on the night of the shootings. Investigator Williams stated that during the defendant's interview he was not handcuffed and was free to leave up until the moment he provided information about his involvement in the shootings. Investigator Williams agreed that he told the defendant that he was facing the death penalty. However, he later learned that because the defendant is a minor he is ineligible for the death penalty, and although his police chief came into the interview room and corrected Investigator Williams' mistake, it was after the defendant admitted to being present at the time of the shootings.
After its review, the juvenile court suppressed the defendant's statement.
I. Transfer Hearing
At the transfer hearing, Quavion Lipscomb testified that he is the defendant's cousin and was a senior at Milan High School with the defendant and Mr. Walton at the time of the shootings. He was also friends with the victims as well as a cousins with Mr. Whitmore. On the night of the shootings, the defendant and Mr. Walton came to Mr. Lipscomb's house between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. and asked the defendant if he wanted to smoke marijuana with them at The Meadows, a nearby apartment complex. Mr. Lipscomb declined but agreed to drop them off at the apartment complex. On cross-examination, Mr. Lipscomb testified that he saw Mr. Walton with a silver gun when Mr. Walton got into his car. He stated that it was in the front of Mr. Walton's shorts "like deep down inside." He agreed that he never saw the defendant with a gun.
J.D., a seventeen-year-old senior at Milan High School, testified that he is a cousin of both the defendant and Mr. Walton and was living in The Meadows apartment complex at the time of the shooting. That night he arrived home from work at 8:00 p.m. and saw his friends, Jacarie, D.J. Stewart, and Mr. Young, talking near some trash cans. J.D. joined them, and at some point, the defendant and Mr. Walton walked past them. Mr. Walton said something to their group, but J.D. did not hear him and replied, "What?" Mr. Walton then "raised up his shirt," and J.D. saw "something silver." Although J.D. agreed that he thought Mr. Walton had a gun, he did not do anything because the defendant and Mr. Walton were walking toward the exit. Instead, J.D., Mr. Stewart, and Jacarie went to J.D.'s apartment and played video games. Around 9:00 p.m. Mr. Young and Mr. Whitmore arrived at J.D.'s apartment and watched them play video games for a few minutes. When Mr. Young and Mr. Whitmore were ready to leave, J.D. testified that he walked them to the front door, and as he walked to his bedroom, he heard gunshots. He and his friends ran outside and saw Mr. Young and Mr. Whitmore on the ground, and J.D. ran upstairs to retrieve his cell phone to call the police. On cross-examination, J.D. denied that there was any bad blood between the defendant and J.D.'s friends. He agreed that he did not tell the officers at the crime scene that the victims had been in his apartment or that he had seen Mr. Walton with a gun.
It is the policy of this Court to refer to minors by their initials. No disrespect intended.
Jacarie's last name does not appear in the record. He is also referred to as Jakari throughout the record.
Mr. Stewart is also referred to as Desmond Stewart in the record.
Officer Dexter Huddleston testified that he was off-duty on the night of the shootings. He lived in the Marshall Gardens apartment complex which was next to The Meadows, and at approximately 9:10 p.m., he was getting into his car to pick up a pizza when he heard a gunshot. Officer Huddleston immediately ran to his apartment to retrieve his firearm and drove his patrol car toward the gunshot. When he arrived in The Meadows, he saw two people standing over two bodies. After exiting his patrol car, Officer Huddleston approached the victims and observed that one of them was still breathing. However, the victim was unable to respond when Officer Huddleston spoke to him. While Officer Huddleston was waiting for additional officers and medical personnel to arrive, additional onlookers approached the scene. However, Officer Huddleston concentrated on comforting the victim who was still alive. On cross-examination, Officer Huddleston testified that he heard four gunshots. However, he stated there may have been more when he was in his apartment retrieving his firearm. He testified that he remained at the scene while it was being processed and did not see any weapons recovered from the victims.
Michael Williams testified that he was preparing to go to his godbrother's house near College Street on the night of the shootings. He was listening to a police scanner app on his phone and heard that someone had been shot in the area. When he arrived at his godbrother's house, he observed two young males "speed walking" through "the cut," which Mr. Williams described as a pathway that the community used to go from one street to another. Mr. Williams asked the people if someone had been shot, and they responded that they did not know. One of the people used their cell phone, but Mr. Williams was unable to hear their conversation, and Mr. Williams left the house soon afterward. Mr. Williams agreed that he gave a statement to police in which he stated that he saw two individuals running down the pathway and that he described them as spooked, scared, and sweaty. He also told police that the individuals told him they were running because they heard gunshots, that they knocked on the door of a nearby house but no one answered, and that he overheard one of the individuals calling someone for a ride. Mr. Williams testified that officers showed him a photo array and asked him if he recognized the two people that he saw in his godbrother's backyard. Although he agreed that he picked out the defendant's and Mr. Walton's photos and signed them, he testified that he only "thought [he] saw" them. He denied that anyone threatened him for testifying against the defendant.
Investigator David Burton testified that he assisted with securing the scene following the shootings. Afterward, he moved throughout the crowd, listening and asking questions about what people had seen and heard. Later in the investigation, Investigator Burton assisted in obtaining statements from J.D. and Mr. Williams. Based on information the MPD had received regarding the defendant's and Mr. Walton's involvement in the shootings, Investigator Burton compiled a photo array using photographs from the Milan High School yearbook. He showed the array to Mr. Williams, who went through each photo one by one before settling on the photographs of the defendant and Mr. Walton. Investigator Burton testified that Mr. Williams was positive about the identifications when he signed, initialed, and dated the array. Mr. Williams told Investigator Burton that he knew one of the individuals and that he recognized the other one from the street, but he did not indicate which individual he knew. Investigator Burton also testified that Mr. Williams indicated he had concerns for his safety over testifying.
Investigator Jason Williams testified that he responded to the scene as Mr. Whitmore was being loaded into an ambulance. Investigator Williams observed Mr. Young on the sidewalk with four bullet wounds, including one to his right temple. Investigator Williams searched the area and located three shell casings; however, he was unable to locate any weapons. While at the crime scene, Investigator Williams was informed that Mr. Whitmore had died at the hospital, and after processing the scene, he went to the hospital to photograph and document Mr. Whitmore's wounds. His preliminary evaluation of Mr. Whitmore's wounds revealed that Mr. Whitmore suffered a gunshot wound to the chest, two gunshot wounds to the back, and a gunshot wound to the right foot. Investigator Williams testified that, although he had not received the medical examiner's official report, the medical examiner confirmed that each victim had four gunshot wounds. Because Investigator Williams only found three shell casings at the scene, he opined that two weapons were used in the shooting, a revolver and a 10-millimeter semiautomatic firearm. On cross-examination, Investigator Williams testified that he executed a search warrant on the defendant's premises and recovered clothing that was sent for gunshot residue testing. He conceded that to the naked eye there did not appear to be any blood on the clothing but stated that he had worked several homicides where there was little or no blood spatter.
The juvenile court found there were reasonable grounds to believe the defendant committed two counts of first-degree murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(a)(4). The juvenile court also found the defendant could not be involuntarily committed for mental illness. In addressing whether the interests of the community required the defendant to be put under legal restraint or discipline, the juvenile court found that the defendant had no prior record of juvenile offenses. See Id. § 37-1-134(b)(1). The juvenile court also found that the second factor, the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response thereto, was inapplicable to the defendant and that this was a violent offense committed against two victims, which is given greater weight than crimes against property. Id. § 37-1-134(b)(2)-(3). Additionally, the juvenile court found the crimes were committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner. As the juvenile court noted, "[t]he very definition of first[-]degree murder is a killing that is done in a premeditated manner. And certainly, murder is an aggressive crime." Id. § 37-1-134(b)(4). In addressing the possible rehabilitation of the defendant through services currently available, the juvenile court concluded that the procedures, services, and facilities available in the juvenile system could not adequately address rehabilitation "based on the nature of the charges that [the defendant was] facing and [his] age." Id. § 37-1-134(b)(5). Although there was some testimony regarding gangs, the juvenile court did not find sufficient evidence to consider the conduct gang-related. Id. § 37-1-134(b)(6).
The juvenile court concluded that based on the totality of all of the factors, and particularly the third, fourth, and fifth factors, that there were reasonable grounds to transfer the defendant to circuit court to be tried for two counts of first-degree murder.
III. Motion to Suppress
Following the defendant's transfer to circuit court, he filed a motion to suppress his statement to investigators. In his motion to suppress, the defendant argued that he was unlawfully coerced into making an involuntary statement to investigators and that he was not permitted to have his mother present during the interrogation. The defendant argued that he was subjected to "psychological coercion including, but not limited to, threats that he would face the death penalty if he did not cooperate and that he would be forced to take lie detector and gunshot residue tests." Body camera footage from officers' initial conversation with the defendant at his house as well as the video of the defendant's interview were entered into evidence, and following argument, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress his statement, finding
that the [d]efendant was seventeen (17) years old at the time of the interview and the [c]ourt was impressed from a viewing of the interview with the intelligence of the [d]efendant and it was clear the [d]efendant understood Miranda warnings and the consequences of waiving the rights set forth in the warnings; and, no proof was presented regarding the extent of the [d]efendant's education and there was not indication of intoxication or drug influence or retardation; and, the [d]efendant's parents were not present in the room during the interview but their absence does not render the confession involuntary; and, the interrogation was only one (1) hour in duration such that the [d]efendant did not appear to be fatigued or beaten down; and, despite the fact that the investigator informed the [d]efendant at the beginning of the interview that he could possibly be facing the death penalty based upon the totality of the circumstances present at the [d]efendant's home and at the police station that the statements of the [d]efendant made to the officer[s] of the Milan Police Department were voluntary confessions and as such are admissible upon a trial of this matter.
The defendant then proceeded to trial.
IV. Trial
After hearing the proof at trial, which was generally consistent with the testimony at the transfer hearing, the jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, and the trial court subsequently imposed an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. The defendant filed a motion for new trial which the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed.
Analysis
On appeal, the defendant contends the juvenile court erred in transferring him to circuit court. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The State contends that the juvenile court properly transferred the defendant's case to circuit court and that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress.
I. Juvenile Transfer
The defendant argues the juvenile court erred in transferring his case to circuit court. Specifically, he contends the juvenile court lacked sufficient evidence to find "probable cause to bind the case over, considering the juvenile court suppressed the [d]efendant's statement." The State submits the juvenile court properly transferred the defendant's case to circuit court.
The statute governing juvenile transfers provides that after a delinquency petition has been filed, the juvenile court "may transfer the child to the sheriff of the county to be held according to law and to be dealt with as an adult in the criminal court of competent jurisdiction." Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(a). The statute further requires that "[t]he disposition of the child shall be as if the child were an adult if:" (1) as applied to this case, the child was at least sixteen at the time of the offense, (2) a hearing was held in conformity with the statute, (3) the notice requirements were met, and (4) the court finds probable cause to believe that:
(A) The child committed the delinquent act as alleged;
(B) The child is not committable to an institution for the developmentally disabled or mentally ill; and
(C) The interests of the community require that the child be put under legal restraint or discipline.Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(a)(1)-(4). Accordingly, a transfer from juvenile court is discretionary unless the grounds in subsection (a) are established. Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 329 (Tenn. 2006). The statute also requires the juvenile court to consider certain factors in determining whether transfer is appropriate:
(b) In making the determination required by subsection (a), the court shall consider, among other matters:
(1) The extent and nature of the child's prior delinquency records; (2) The nature of past treatment efforts and the nature of the child's response thereto;
(3) Whether the offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person;
(4) Whether the offense was in an aggressive and premeditated manner; (5) The possible rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the court in this state; and
(6) Whether the child's conduct would be a criminal gang offense, as defined in § 40-35-121, if committed by an adult.Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(b).
In 2023, our legislature added an additional factor for juvenile courts to consider in determining whether transfer is appropriate: Whether the child has a history of trauma or abuse, including, but not limited to, the child's being a victim of a human trafficking offense as defined in section 39-13-314. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(b)(7).
This Court has previously stated that in reviewing a transfer decision, we do not evaluate the preponderance of the evidence but review to determine whether there are reasonable grounds or probable cause to support the decision to transfer. See State v. Strickland, 532 S.W.2d 912, 920 (Tenn. 1975); State v. Reed, No. M2009-00887-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3432663, at *6, *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2010) (noting the terms "probable cause" and "reasonable grounds" are used "interchangeably" in juvenile transfer analysis), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 13, 2011). This Court reviews a juvenile court's findings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Polochak, No. M2013-02712-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 226566, at *38 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2015) ("A juvenile court's findings in determining whether reasonable grounds exist to establish the criteria in subsection (a)(4) are reviewed for an abuse of discretion."), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2015). The juvenile court is afforded "a wide range of discretion" in determining whether to transfer a child from juvenile to criminal court. Strickland, 532 S.W.2d at 921. However, a transfer from juvenile court is mandatory once the grounds in subsection (a) are established. Howell, 185 S.W.3d at 329.
Here, the juvenile court thoroughly made the statutorily required findings. Having found that the defendant was seventeen years old and had notice of the hearing, the juvenile court found there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had committed two counts of first-degree murder and that he was not committable to an institution due to developmental disability or mental illness. In evaluating whether the interests of the community required the defendant to be put under legal restraint, the juvenile court found that the defendant had no prior criminal history or past treatment efforts. Additionally, although there was some testimony regarding gangs, the juvenile court did not find it to be enough to consider the conduct gang-related. The juvenile court noted that these were violent offenses against two victims, which the legislature prioritized over crimes against property. The juvenile court further found that the crimes were committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner, noting that "[t]he very definition of first[-]degree murder is a killing that is done in a premeditated manner. And certainly, murder is an aggressive crime." Finally, the juvenile court expressed doubt that the defendant could be successfully rehabilitated through the juvenile system "based on the nature of the charges that [the defendant was] facing and [his] age."
In his brief to this Court, the defendant acknowledges that the juvenile court "found that all three prongs of Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134(a)(4) were present." However, the defendant disagrees with the juvenile court's findings. Specifically, he contends the juvenile court's findings of fact do not indicate that the defendant was present during the shootings, that he possessed a gun, or that he threatened anyone. Therefore, he argues the juvenile court erred in finding there were reasonable grounds to believe the defendant committed the offense. We note that in a transfer hearing, "[t]he trial judge's finding of fact are given the weight of a jury verdict and are conclusive unless we find that the evidence preponderates against these findings." State v. Swatzell, No. 01-C01-9005-CC-00126, 1992 WL 25008, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 14, 1992). The juvenile court was presented with evidence that the defendant and Mr. Walton were at The Meadows apartment complex prior to the shooting where they interacted with one of the victims, and multiple witnesses testified that Mr. Walton had a gun in his waistband. Mr. Williams testified that he saw two people speed walking near his godbrother's house following the shooting. He later identified the two people as the defendant and Mr. Walton in a photo array; however, at the transfer hearing he testified that they only looked like the two people he saw that night. Investigator Williams testified that each victim suffered four gunshot wounds. However, because he only recovered three shell casings from the crime scene, he concluded that both a revolver and a 10-millimeter semiautomatic weapon were used during the shootings. Based on this testimony, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court's findings were in error. Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court considered the statutory factors and made appropriate findings, which are supported by the record, in determining whether transfer was appropriate. The defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
II. Motion to Suppress
The defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress. Specifically, the defendant contends his statement should have been suppressed because his mother was not allowed in the interrogation room and because he was subjected to psychological coercion, including threats that he faced the death penalty. The State contends the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress.
Suppression issues on appeal are subject to well-established standards of review. Appellate courts are bound by a trial court's findings of facts determined after a suppression hearing unless the evidence preponderates against them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996); State v. McGee, No. E2011-01756-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4017776, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2012). "Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact." Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23.
Appellate courts should consider the entire record, affording the prevailing party "the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence." McGee, 2012 WL 4017776, at *2 (citing State v. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001)); see also State v. Sanders, 452 S.W.3d 300, 306 (Tenn. 2014). However, applying the law to the factual findings of the trial court is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).
A. Miranda
The defendant argues that he "lacked the experience and intelligence to fully understand the implications of waiving his Miranda right to make a statement." He also argues that he requested the presence of his mother during his interrogation but was denied.
Initially, we note that the defendant was not under arrest when he spoke with officers and ultimately confessed. Per the body camera footage, the defendant and his mother were told no less than three times that he was not under arrest and that the officers just wanted him to come to the station and talk to them. The defendant then agreed to go and speak with the officers. Additionally, while the defendant rode with officers to the station, he was not placed in handcuffs. The Miranda decision only applies "to the questioning of an individual who has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in a significant way." State v. Dailey, 273 S.W.3d 94, 102 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect is (1) in custody and (2) subjected to questioning or its functional equivalent. State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 83 (Tenn. 2001). In the absence of either, Miranda requirements are not necessitated. Id. Accordingly, because the defendant was not under arrest or in custody at the time he spoke with officers and ultimately confessed, officers were not required to Mirandize him. However, despite this, the defendant was advised of his rights on three occasions and waived them prior to confessing - once at home and twice at the police station.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Despite, as noted above, that a Miranda waiver is not required, we will address the defendant's claim - whether his waiver was knowing and voluntary. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, states that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. Amend. V. Similarly, the Tennessee Constitution states "that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself." Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. If a suspect is in police custody "or otherwise [has been] deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," the police must first inform him of his Fifth Amendment rights for any subsequent confession to later be admissible as substantive evidence. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has said, "[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. These rights must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived. Id.
In State v. Callahan, our supreme court held that "juvenile waivers shall be analyzed under a totality-of-the-circumstances test" and that courts should consider the following factors:
(1) . . . all circumstances surrounding the interrogation including the juvenile's age, experience, education, and intelligence; (2) the juvenile's capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and consequences of the waiver;
(3) the juvenile's familiarity with Miranda warnings or the ability to read and write in the language used to give the warnings;
(4) any intoxication; (5) any mental disease, disorder, or retardation; and (6) the presence of a parent, guardian, or interested adult.979 S.W.2d 577, 583 (Tenn. 1998). While this Court should "exercise special care" in analyzing a juvenile's waiver, "no single factor such as mental condition or education should by itself render a confession unconstitutional absent coercive police activity." Id.
Applying the Callahan factors, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding the defendant's waiver was valid. At the time of the defendant's interview, he was seventeen years old and in the twelfth grade; however, no proof was presented regarding the defendant's grades or school records. Although the defendant did not have prior experience with the criminal justice system, the trial court "was impressed from a viewing of the interview with the intelligence of the [d]efendant and it was clear the [d]efendant understood the Miranda warnings and the consequences of waiving the rights set forth in the warnings." The defendant does not contend that he was intoxicated during the interview, and the trial court found "no indication of intoxication or drug influence." The trial court likewise found that the defendant was not suffering from any mental disease or defect. While this Court is troubled by the fact that the defendant did not have the advice of a parent, guardian, or interested adult, "the admissibility of a juvenile's confession is not dependent upon the presence of his parents at the interrogation." State v. Carroll, 36 S.W.3d 854, 864 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). Accordingly, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant's waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
B. Voluntariness/Coercion
The defendant also argues that he was "subject to psychological coercion including, but not limited to, threats that he would face the death penalty if he did not cooperate and that he would be forced to take lie detector and gunshot residue tests." The State submits the defendant waived the issue of voluntariness for failing to reference it at the suppression hearing. However, the trial court thoroughly discussed Investigator Williams' statement regarding the death penalty throughout the suppression hearing and found in both its oral and written findings that the defendant's statement was voluntary. Therefore, we will review the defendant's claim on the merits.
The voluntariness of a confession "remains distinct from Miranda." State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 567 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 43233 (2000). In determining the voluntariness of a confession, the essential inquiry is whether a suspect's will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion. Id.; see State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996) ("The test of voluntariness for confessions under article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution is broader and more protective of individual rights than the test of voluntariness under the Fifth Amendment.").
In order to determine the voluntariness of the defendant's statement, we must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement, including "both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation." Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 (quoting Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434). The circumstances relevant to this determination are:
[T]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured[,] intoxicated[,] or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep[,] or medical
attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse.Id. (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Tenn. 1996)).
Our review of the record affirms the trial court's finding that the defendant's statement was voluntary and uncoerced. As discussed supra, the defendant was seventeen years old and in the twelfth grade at the time of his statement. He had no experience with law enforcement, and no evidence existed that he had a mental disability or illness. During the defendant's interview, he appeared calm, was not overly emotional, and did not appear to be under the influence of intoxicants. Moreover, the defendant was read his Miranda rights three times, once at his house with his mother present and twice at the station at the beginning of the interview, and at no time did the defendant indicate he wished to exercise his rights and terminate the interrogation or speak with a lawyer. Additionally, no proof was offered showing that the defendant's mother requested termination of the interview. The defendant was provided food and water, he was not restrained at any time, and he was not physically abused or threatened with abuse if he did not provide a statement. While the defendant was interviewed off and on for six hours, he provided a significant portion of the statement in question and implicated himself in the murder after only one hour. Within the first hour, the defendant admitted to the following: that he had a "beef" with the victim and that they had been arguing over social media; that the defendant even threatened the victim stating, "you'll see me when you see me" and "come to my back yard and we gonna squash, we gonna fight, we gonna squash it"; he also admitted that he interacted with the victim the evening prior to the shooting and that during their interaction the victim and the victim's friends were armed; and finally, while initially denying he had a gun, the defendant admitted that during a second interaction with the victim that evening, he was standing with his co-defendant when the co-defendant shot the victim.
Although the defendant contends he was psychologically coerced into giving his statement with threats of polygraph and gunshot residue tests, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that either the polygraph or gunshot residue tests were a ruse to coerce the defendant into giving a statement. After the defendant denied being at the scene during the shootings, Investigator Williams asked him if he had ever taken a polygraph test before. The defendant stated that he had not but that he would be willing to take one. Investigator Williams suggested that the defendant would fail a polygraph test because police had received multiple calls from people who identified the defendant as being at the scene when the shootings occurred. Later, Investigator Williams asked the defendant if his hands would test positive for gunshot residue, and the defendant denied that they would test positive. Although the defendant's hands were not tested that night, at trial, Investigator Williams testified that clothing collected from the defendant's house tested positive for gunshot residue. Finally, although Investigator Williams incorrectly stated the law in regard to minors being eligible for the death penalty, a fact which was later corrected in front of the defendant by the chief of police, the proof, taken together, confirms that the defendant's statement was not "extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence," or law enforcement overreach. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 542, 542-43 (1987). Accordingly, while we are, as noted supra, are troubled by the fact that the defendant was not allowed to see his mother, under the totality of the circumstances, it is clear the defendant's statement to law enforcement was voluntary and was not a product of coercion. See Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568. The defendant is, therefore, not entitled to relief.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., dissenting.
Police officers in this case obtained a confession from a juvenile by threatening him with the death penalty, repeatedly denying his requests for his mother who was present at the station, and interrogating him for over six hours in the middle of the night. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, I would have concluded that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress because the Defendant's Miranda waiver was invalid and his confession was involuntary. I also would have concluded that the juvenile court erred in finding probable cause that the Defendant committed the offenses. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
I. Juvenile Transfer. The juvenile court found probable cause that the Defendant committed two counts of first degree murder based on the following facts presented at the transfer hearing: (1) the Defendant was at the Meadows with the co-defendant two hours before the shooting; (2) the co-defendant interacted with one of the victims and displayed a gun; (3) a witness saw the Defendant and the co-defendant speed walking or running through "the cut" after the shooting; and (4) the victims were shot with two different guns. These facts amount to mere suspicion rather than probable cause.
Appellate review of a lawyer juvenile judge's order transferring a child to be tried as an adult is "awkward" because it occurs only after there has been a final judgment in the case. State v. Griffin, 914 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In other words, if the juvenile court erred in transferring jurisdiction to the trial court, then appellate review of the issue is held in abeyance until the case is concluded on the merits. This is particularly problematic where, as in this case, a defendant contends that there were insufficient findings of fact in support of probable cause that he committed the offense. If the Defendant's contention is true, then the State lacked the ability to charge him as an adult, the jury lacked the authority to consider his guilt, and the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to impose a sentence.
At issue in this case is Tennessee Code Annotated Section 37-1-134(a)(4)(A), which requires that the juvenile court find probable cause to believe that the child committed the delinquent act before transferring that child to criminal court. Probable cause in the context of juvenile transfer hearings is not statutorily defined. In the context of an arrest, probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances and reliable information known to the officer at the time of arrest were "'sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [individual] had committed or was committing an offense.'" State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 75-76 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn. 1997)). "[T]he probable[-]cause standard is ... practical, nontechnical, and focuses upon the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283, 300-01 (Tenn. 2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted). "[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972) ("Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction."). Finally, probable cause must be more than a mere suspicion, but less than absolute certainty. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d at 300.
Giving deference to the factual findings of the juvenile court, I am unable to conclude that the Defendant was properly transferred to be tried as an adult. It bears mentioning that the juvenile court suppressed the Defendant's statement and did not consider it at the juvenile transfer hearing. The remaining evidence presented at the transfer hearing does not establish probable cause that the Defendant committed two counts of first-degree murder. First, the State presented no evidence tending to show that the Defendant intended to kill the victims or engaged in premeditation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (first degree murder is a "premeditated and intentional killing of another"). More importantly, the State presented no evidence from which a reasonable person could infer the Defendant's identity as the shooter, or that the Defendant was even at the scene of the shooting at the time of the offense. See State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tenn. 1975)) ("The identity of the perpetrator is an essential element of any crime."). The testimony that the Defendant was speed walking or running through "the cut" on the night of the offense established only that he was in the vicinity of the shooting after it occurred. But this activity, standing alone, amounts to mere suspicion and not probable cause.
It is significant to my conclusion that the juvenile court heard testimony regarding the co-defendant and the Defendant at the same time. When describing the testimony supporting a finding of probable cause, the juvenile court mentioned the co-defendant individually no less than five times, and only mentioned the Defendant in joint references to "the defendants." While there was testimony that earlier that night the co-defendant had a verbal exchange with a group that included one of the victims, and that the co-defendant displayed a gun, no such testimony was offered against the Defendant. This is problematic because "probable cause to arrest and/or search an individual must be particularized to that individual" and "mere proximity to criminal activity alone is insufficient[]" See, e.g., Whitehead v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 299, 313 (Va. 2009). Given the lack of proof particularized to the Defendant, the juvenile court erred in finding probable cause that the Defendant committed the offenses. This error means that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence the Defendant. Accordingly, I would have reversed the judgments of the trial court.
II. Motion to Suppress. The trial court admitted a confession obtained: (1) from a juvenile with no prior experience with the police; (2) after over six hours of interrogation in the middle of the night; and (3) after he was improperly threatened with the death penalty and repeatedly denied access to his mother. The totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the Defendant's Miranda waiver was invalid and his confession was involuntary.
Body camera footage shows officers arriving at the Defendant's home at around 2:00 a.m. the night of the shooting. One of the officers asks the Defendant where he had been that night. The Defendant looks at his mother, who says, "you don't have to explain that." The Defendant says he was at the Meadows around 7:00 p.m. Sergeant Joe Fountain tells the Defendant he is not under arrest, but provides verbal Miranda warnings. Sergeant Fountain asks if the Defendant understands. The Defendant appears to nod affirmatively, but his mother quickly interjects and asks why he is being advised of his rights and questioned if he is not under arrest. Sergeant Fountain tells the Defendant's mother that Investigator Jason Williams will explain "in just a minute." Investigator Williams arrives and asks the Defendant if he has seen the co-defendant. The Defendant says he was with him earlier. Investigator Williams says he is going to take the Defendant to the police station to talk and will bring him home when they are done. When the Defendant's mother asks if she can come, he says she is "more than welcome." She asks again what is going on, and Investigator Williams says there was a double homicide and that the Defendant "knows something." The Defendant's step-father asks Investigator Williams if the Defendant's mother can be present while they question the Defendant since he is seventeen, and Investigator Williams says she can. Officers take the Defendant to a patrol car, and the Defendant's mother tells the Defendant she is right behind him.
The recording of the interrogation begins at 2:21 a.m. The Defendant is seated in the interrogation room with the door open and two officers are standing in the doorway. Around 2:24 a.m., officers can be heard saying, "This is mother. She is welcome back." Another officer then says, "Hold off on that. Hold up." At 2:30 a.m., Officer Nick Glenn, the resource officer at the Defendant's school, enters the interrogation room. The Defendant tells Officer Glenn he was at the Meadows earlier in the day, but he did not see anyone get shot. He saw one of the victims, with whom he previously had an altercation, and the victim's friends at the Meadows. The victim and his friends lifted their shirts to show the guns in their waistbands.
At 2:39 a.m., Investigator Williams enters the room and Officer Glenn leaves. After asking some background questions, Investigator Williams asks the Defendant if he wants to go over his rights again. The Defendant shakes his head negatively. Investigator Williams reads his rights anyway, in a rapid but coherent fashion. He adds to the end of the rights that "whereas anything we discuss right now, I can talk to the [district attorney] about in the future." Investigator Williams immediately tells the Defendant, "I probably got enough to charge you with two counts of first degree murder." He then says:
But, first of all, before we get that far. I heard some of the conversation you had with [Officer Glenn].... And evidently, you've had some beef with these guys. If you're scared of them or if they, you know if you [were] in fear for your life, or if you and [the co-defendant] were in fear for your lives . . . Now, right now is the time to tell me the truth. Because if you don't . . .
I don't know if you realize how much trouble that ya'll are in. Okay? I mean, you're looking at possibly the death penalty.
He tells the Defendant if he is honest with him, he will help him as much as he can. The Defendant repeats the same things he told Officer Glenn. Investigator Williams responds, "I would believe that if I didn't see you on video. The Meadows has got video. Marshall Gardens has got video pointing towards the shooting." No such video existed. Still, the Defendant denies being there or shooting anyone.
At 2:51 a.m., Investigator Williams says he does not believe the Defendant and asks him if he has ever taken a polygraph test. The Defendant says he does not know what that is, and Investigator Williams explains it is a lie detector test. The Defendant says he has never taken one, and Investigator Williams asks if he would take it. Though the transcript indicates that the Defendant responds, "I'll take one," it sounds like the Defendant actually says, "Ask my mamma." Investigator Williams tells the Defendant that he would fail the polygraph test. Investigator Williams says numerous people told him the Defendant and the co-defendant were there at the time of the shooting. The Defendant again denies any involvement.
At 2:52 a.m., Investigator Williams asks the Defendant who shot the victims if it was not him. The Defendant replies, "I don't know who shot . . . Can you get my mamma in here?" Investigator Williams responds, "No, I'm not getting your mamma in here. I mean this is grown up shit you know what I'm saying?" The Defendant slumps his head down and pauses. Investigator Williams says, "You want me to run with this?" The Defendant responds, "You said everybody saw me?" He again denies being involved in the shooting. He says he was with his father when the shooting occurred. Investigator
Williams says he is going to get his father's phone records to determine if they would "ping" at the location where the Defendant said he was.
At 2:57 a.m., Investigator Williams tells the Defendant, "You ain't going nowhere. . . . The first lie that I prove, I'm gonna charge you with two counts of first degree murder. So if you want to start over and tell me the damn truth, we'll deal with it." At 3:00 a.m., the Defendant admits to being at the Meadows when the shooting occurred. He says he and the co-defendant heard gunshots and ran because they did not want to get shot. Investigator Williams insists that "all of that is bullshit" and either the Defendant or the codefendant pulled the trigger. The Defendant denies that they were involved in the shooting.
At 3:07 a.m., Investigator Williams says the Defendant is lying and asks whether it was him or the co-defendant that pulled the trigger. The Defendant says it was the codefendant, but he was with him. The Defendant explains that the co-defendant shot after the other group pulled out a gun, and the Defendant ran away out of fear. Investigator Williams draws a map of the Meadows, and the Defendant shows him where he and the co-defendant were standing when the shooting occurred. Investigator Williams says, "I believe everything you're telling me, but I don't believe you're putting yourself where you need to be." The Defendant asks, "Where was I at?" and Investigator Williams points to another location, presumably where the victims were found, and asks the Defendant if he was there instead. The Defendant denied being at that location, and Investigator Williams asks, "Well, if what you're telling is true . . . How is my guys right here dead?"
At 3:19 a.m., Investigator Williams asks the Defendant, "And if I test your hands right now, there won't be no gunshot residue on them?" The Defendant responds, "Right." Investigator Williams gets up to leave, and the following exchange occurs:
[Defendant:] Is my mamma here?
[Investigator Williams:] She is. I'll talk to her too. Okay?
[Defendant:] Can I talk to her?
[Investigator Williams:] Yea. We'll let you talk to her in just a second.
Investigator Williams leaves. The Defendant crosses his arms, places them on the table, and lays his head down on his arms.
At 3:23 a.m., Chief Bobby Sellers enters the room and tells the Defendant he is the police chief. The following exchange occurs:
[Chief Sellers:] . . . Do you understand how much trouble you're in?
[Defendant:] Because I was with him when it happened?
[Chief Sellers:] [nods affirmatively]
[Defendant:] [nods affirmatively]
[Chief Sellers:] You're just as guilty as he is.
[Defendant:] I didn't know he was going to do it though.
[Chief Sellers:] I understand. But do you think twelve men and women in a jury box are gonna believe that?
[Defendant:] [shrugs his shoulders]
Chief Sellers tells the Defendant that he "needs to start thinking about helping himself." The Defendant says that is why he told them the truth, and he only lied initially to protect the co-defendant. Shortly after, Chief Sellers says, "You know what they do to seventeen-year-olds in the [penitentiary]?" The Defendant shakes his head no, and Chief Sellers says, "I don't think you want to know." The Defendant responds, "And [Investigator Williams] said I might get the death penalty." Chief Sellers says, "I don't know about that. We don't know about that. But you're in a lot of damn trouble. What you've got to do right now is help yourself. Where is [the co-defendant] at?" The Defendant says he does not know. Chief Sellers leaves at 3:27 a.m. The Defendant places his head in his hands, tightly grips his hair, and rocks back and forth in his chair. He then puts his head down and taps it repeatedly on the table.
Investigator Williams returns at 3:45 a.m. They go back over the shooting, and Investigator Williams says he does not believe that the Defendant "bailed on his homeboy" and stayed by the dumpsters, which were approximately forty yards away from the shooting, when the co-defendant approached the victims. At 3:54 a.m., the Defendant tells Investigator Williams that Chief Sellers told him even though he was not the shooter, he can still get in trouble for being there and the jury will probably not believe that he was not involved. At 3:57 a.m., Investigator Williams says he believes the Defendant that he was not the shooter, but the Defendant was right there with the co-defendant and he is "on the verge of proving that." The Defendant maintains he stayed by the dumpsters. Investigator Williams insists that does not make sense and that "shows how cooperative" the Defendant is being. The Defendant asks if he means he is "being bad or good cooperating" and Investigator Williams tells him he is in the middle. Investigator Williams tells the Defendant he has to be truthful if he wants his help.
At 4:01 a.m., Investigator Williams gets up to leave. The Defendant tells Investigator Williams he has a question. The recording, however, jumps forward ten seconds to the Defendant saying, "they not gonna believe that?" Investigator Williams accuses the Defendant and the co-defendant of being in a gang and says there is "no way in the world" that he stayed back while the co-defendant walked up to three rival gang members. Investigator Williams tells the Defendant that if he wants him to "whisper in [the district attorney's] ear" that the Defendant was cooperative, scared, remorseful, and just a kid, he needs to tell the truth. At 4:03 a.m., Investigator Williams begins leaving and the Defendant says, "Is my. . . You said I could talk to my mamma." Investigator Williams responds, "Yea, I think they're talking to her. But we'll get her in a minute." The Defendant slumps his head down. Investigator Williams leaves, and the Defendant lays his head in his lap. At 4:05 a.m., an officer opens the door and asks the Defendant if he wants a biscuit. The Defendant asks for water, and the officer brings him a bottle of water.
The recording repeatedly jumps forward in time throughout the interrogation, sometimes ten seconds and sometimes five minutes. This appears to be the only time where any conversation is cut. The other times, the Defendant is alone.
At 4:31 a.m., Investigator Williams and Detective Kelvin Whitney enter the room. Investigator Williams insists that the Defendant was right beside the co-defendant during the shooting, but the Defendant maintains that he stayed back. Investigator Williams tells the Defendant that they are about to pick up the co-defendant, and the co-defendant is going to "put this on [the Defendant]." At 4:35 a.m., Investigator Williams says the Defendant saw the co-defendant shoot and "was up there with him." The Defendant says he was up there when the co-defendant shot. When questioned further, he says he did not see the codefendant pull out the gun and shoot, he just heard gunshots. On the map Investigator Williams drew, he shows the Defendant where the shell casings and victims were found. He says there is no way the Defendant was that close and did not see the gunshots. He insists that the Defendant is lying and will have to "answer for it." The Defendant says, "What? Take this charge?" Investigator Williams says that is what is going to happen, and the Defendant insists he was not the shooter. Investigator Williams describes in detail what he thinks happened. When he says the Defendant saw the co-defendant pull his pistol out and start shooting, the Defendant responds, "Yes sir." Detective Whitney asks the Defendant which way he ran, and the Defendant looks at Investigator Williams and says, "Can you show him?" Investigator Williams flips in his notebook to the previously drawn map. The Defendant points to where he was, and Investigator Williams says, "no, right here" and points to a different spot. The Defendant says he was referring to where they started. When the Defendant shows the path he ran after the shooting, Investigator Williams says the Defendant is confused and tells him he ran a different way. At 4:47 a.m., Investigator Williams and Detective Whitney leave. The Defendant says under his breath that he is about to go jail. The Defendant lays his head on the table.
At 5:06 a.m., an officer comes in briefly to ask the Defendant what clothes he was wearing during the shooting. At 5:48 a.m., after sitting alone for approximately forty minutes, the Defendant knocks on the door. An officer comes a couple of minutes later. The Defendant asks to use the restroom and is permitted to do so. The Defendant quickly returns.
At 6:00 a.m., Detective Whitney returns. He asks where the Defendant's gun is, and the Defendant denies having a gun. Detective Whitney says that is "not matching up." He says there were "two different guns out there," and the Defendant responds "okay." Detective Whitney asks what he did with the other gun, and the Defendant maintains that he did not have a gun. Detective Whitney asks if the gunshot residue test is going to show that he fired a gun. The Defendant says no, and that he thought Investigator Williams went to get the test. Detective Whitney responds, "So you didn't have a revolver or nothing?" The Defendant says no, and Detective Whitney asks, "Then where's the rest of the shell casings at then?" The Defendant says he does not know. Detective Whitney again asks if the gunshot residue test will show that he shot a weapon, and the Defendant says no. At 6:02 a.m., Detective Whitney gets up to leave, and the Defendant asks if he is going to get the gunshot residue test. Detective Whitney responds, "In just a minute, yep." Detective Whitney leaves the room. The Defendant immediately gets up and knocks on the door. Detective Whitney opens the door, and the Defendant asks, "Can I talk to my mamma? Is she still here?" Detective Whitney responds, "Yea. You can talk to her in a minute." At 6:22 a.m., while alone in the room, the Defendant says under his breath, "I'm fighting for my life because of [the co-defendant]. F*** [the co-defendant]." At 6:39 a.m., the Defendant knocks on the door and asks for a blanket or towel because he is cold. An officer says they do not have any.
At 6:55 a.m., the Defendant knocks on the door. Two officers open the door, and the Defendant asks if he can talk to Detective Whitney. At 6:57 a.m., Detective Whitney returns. As soon as Detective Whitney sits down, the Defendant says, "I'm scared." Detective Whitney says he has known the Defendant for a long time and the Defendant needs to "spill the beans" and come "completely clean." The Defendant promises that he has told them everything. Detective Whitney asks what he is scared of, and the Defendant says he is scared that if the officers cannot get to [the co-defendant], they are going to "come to [him]." Detective Whitney asks the Defendant if there is anything else, and the Defendant says that the co-defendant had two guns. Detective Whitney asks if the codefendant had an automatic and a revolver, and the Defendant says yes. The Defendant denies holding either of the guns and says he is ready to take a gunshot residue test. Detective Whitney tells the Defendant to knock on the door if he thinks of anything else. As Detective Whitney is leaving, the Defendant asks if he "has to stay here still" after he takes the gunshot residue test. Detective Whitney responds, "I don't know man. We're still trying to figure everything out." The Defendant hangs his head. Detective Whitney leaves at 7:02 a.m. The Defendant puts his head down on the table. Though his face is not visible, it sounds like he is crying. He whispers, "I'm scared." He blows his nose in a napkin and wipes his eyes. At 7:07 a.m., he turns sideways in his chair, lays his head on the back of the chair, and tries to sleep. After seven minutes, he lays his head on the table for a couple minutes, then stands up.
At 7:26 a.m., the Defendant knocks on the door and no one comes. At 7:44 a.m., the Defendant knocks on the door again and an officer comes. The Defendant asks to use the restroom and is permitted to do so. The Defendant quickly returns. At 8:08 a.m., an officer brings the Defendant McDonald's, which the Defendant does not eat.
At 8:34 a.m., Detective Whitney returns. He tells the Defendant they are about to "run a search warrant" on the Defendant's home and talk to his father and "some other people." The following exchange occurs:
[Detective Whitney:] . . . [D]ude, we know you had a gun.
[Defendant:] Did you -
[Detective Whitney:] Now the question is . . . Did you shoot out of fear? Or did you shoot to kill somebody?
[Defendant:] Cause I was scared.
[Detective Whitney:] Okay.
[Defendant:] I was scared.
Detective Whitney asks whether the Defendant had the revolver or ten-millimeter. The Defendant says he had the revolver. He says the co-defendant gave him the revolver after the initial altercation to protect himself. He says someone pulled out a gun, and he shot because he "felt like it was [his] life or their life." Detective Whitney tells the Defendant, "I'm gonna come back in here again, and if I find out you lied to me this time about anything . . . it's gonna be bad dude." He leaves the room at 8:38 a.m. At 8:39 a.m., the Defendant knocks on the door and asks for Detective Whitney. He tells Detective Whitney that there were four other people with the two victims. Detective Whitney asks, "Is that it?" The Defendant says he is trying to think, and Detective Whitney tells him to knock on the door if he thinks of anything else. At 8:42 a.m., the Defendant knocks on the door again. When Detective Whitney returns, the Defendant tells him he wants to start all the way over. He explains the events prior to the shooting and repeats that the co-defendant gave him the gun and he shot after one of the men pointed a gun at him. Detective Whitney leaves the room at 8:51 a.m. At 9:31 a.m., an officer opens the door and asks the Defendant if he needs anything. The Defendant says no and asks to talk to Detective Whitney. The recording ends at 9:38 a.m., with the Defendant still alone in the room. Neither the recording nor the transcript reflect that the Defendant was ever permitted to see his mother.
The Defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession in the juvenile court and the trial court. The juvenile court suppressed the confession, but the trial court did not. Though the trial court touched upon the Callahan factors, it did not engage in a meaningful weighing analysis at the suppression hearing or in its order denying relief. See State v. Callahan, 979 S.W.2d 577, 583 (Tenn. 1998). At the suppression hearing, after wrestling with the coercive effect, if any, of the discussion about a gunshot residue and polygraph test, the threat of the death penalty, and the absence of a parent, the trial court simply stated, "based upon the totality of the circumstances" the Defendant's confession was voluntary. In its order, the court explained its reasoning for denying relief in one paragraph, quoted in the majority opinion. This analysis falls woefully short of the "special care in scrutinizing purported waivers by juvenile suspects" that our law requires. See id.
A. Miranda Waiver. In an attempt to insulate constitutional error, the majority, sua sponte, posits that Miranda warnings were not necessary in this case because "the defendant was not under arrest or in custody at the time he spoke with officers and ultimately confessed." However, neither party disputes that the Defendant was in custody at the time of his statement, and rightfully so. See, e.g., State v. Dailey, 273 S.W.3d 94, 102-04 (Tenn. 2009) (holding that a defendant who drove himself to the police station, agreed to speak with officers, and was not handcuffed was in custody because he was subject to accusatory questioning in a small interrogation room with the door closed, and an officer told him he had enough to charge him with first degree murder); State v. Payne, 149 S.W.3d 20, 33-35 (Tenn. 2004) (holding that questioning of defendant who agreed to talk to police, drove himself to the station, and was not handcuffed became custodial when the officer's tone became accusatory, the officer denied the defendant's requests to speak with his sister, and the defendant was unable to open the door). Here, the record clearly shows multiple law enforcement officers came to the Defendant's home in the middle of the night, told him they were taking him to the police station, drove him to the police station in a patrol car, and interrogated him for over six hours. Upon entering the interrogation room, Investigator Williams immediately told the Defendant, "I probably got enough to charge you with two counts of first degree murder." Investigator Williams testified at the juvenile transfer hearing that when he denied the Defendant's request to talk to his mother within the first thirty minutes of the interrogation, the Defendant was not free to go. Throughout the six-and-a-half-hour interrogation, the Defendant requested to speak with his mother four times but was not permitted to do so. Based on these facts, no credible argument can be made that the Defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes at the time of his statement. Accordingly, the relevant question, as raised by the parties, is the validity of the Defendant's Miranda waiver under the circumstances. After analyzing the totality of the circumstances using the Callahan factors, I would have concluded that the trial court erred in finding that the Defendant's waiver was valid. See 979 S.W.2d at 583.
Factor one, the circumstances surrounding the interrogation including the juvenile's age, experience, education, and intelligence, weighs against the validity of the waiver. As the majority notes, the Defendant was seventeen-years-old, in the twelfth grade, and appeared intelligent to the trial court. The majority, however, failed to consider additional relevant circumstances surrounding the waiver. See State v. McKinney, 669 S.W.3d 753, 769 (Tenn. 2023) (considering not just the juvenile's age, experience, education, and intelligence, but also the juvenile's opportunity to consult with his mother, the manner in which his rights were explained, the detective's misleading statements, and the juvenile's signing of a waiver form).
The Defendant was provided verbal Miranda warnings twice-first at his home, and then at the police station. Both times, the Defendant's waiver was implicit. Neither officer asked the Defendant whether he wished to waive his rights, nor did they present him with a rights waiver form. Neither officer provided any further explanation of any of the rights. The Defendant did not ask any questions, though the officers didnotaskif he had questions and arguably did not provide him an opportunity to ask questions because they immediately shifted to a different discussion after reading his rights.
When the first Miranda warnings were provided at his home, the Defendant's mother was present, but the Defendant was not permitted to consult with her privately. After Sergeant Fountain read the Defendant his rights, he asked if the Defendant understood. The Defendant appeared to nod affirmatively, but his mother quickly interjected and asked why he was being advised of his rights and questioned if he was not under arrest. When Investigator Williams arrived and said he was going to take the Defendant to the police station, the Defendant's mother asked if she could come. Investigator Williams twice assured her that she could be present for the interrogation. Because of these assurances, the Defendant's mother acquiesced and followed the Defendant to the police station. The Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights and participation in the interrogation, in my view, was conditioned upon his mother being present. His mother, however, cannot be held to account for not terminating the interview, as relied upon by the majority, when she was prevented from entering the interrogation room or speaking with him despite his repeated requests.
When the second Miranda warnings were provided, the Defendant was alone in the interrogation room with Investigator Williams. Investigator Williams asked the Defendant if he wanted to go over his rights again, and the Defendant shook his head negatively. Investigator Williams read his rights anyway, in a rapid but coherent fashion. Investigator Williams added to the end of the rights that "whereas anything we discuss right now, I can talk to the [district attorney] about in the future." Immediately after, he told the Defendant that he probably had enough to charge him with two counts of first degree murder and the Defendant was "looking at possibly the death penalty." He said if the Defendant was honest, he would help him as much as he could.
I disagree with the factual characterization by the majority that though "Investigator Williams incorrectly stated the law in regard to minors being eligible for the death penalty," this statement "was later corrected in front of the defendant by the chief of police[.]" The recorded interrogation, as fully detailed above, shows no such correction. Chief Sellers was in the interrogation room for a total of four minutes. In those four minutes, the Defendant told him that Investigator Williams said he might get the death penalty. Instead of correcting the misstatement, Chief Sellers said, "I don't know about that. We don't know about that. But you're in a lot of damn trouble. What you've got to do right now is help yourself. Where is [the co-defendant] at?"
Because the majority relies on this misinformation in affirming the Defendant's conviction, it bears some explanation. The incorrect idea that the misstatement was corrected originated with the following exchange at the juvenile court transfer hearing:
[State:] After watching the statement - or when you were in a closed circuit, did you see the Chief come in and explain to [the Defendant] that he couldn't get the death penalty?
[Investigator Williams:] I did see the Chief come in, but - I guess he did. Yeah.
After the Defendant was transferred to the trial court, the State said in its response to the Defendant's motion to suppress that Chief Sellers "corrected" Investigator Williams' misstatement and "made the Defendant aware that he was not facing the death penalty." At the suppression hearing, however, the trial court asked about the correction and the State clarified that "[t]he Chief came in later and told [the Defendant] that he - that this - he didn't know whether this was a death penalty case or not." On appeal, the State rightfully abandoned its argument that the threat of the death penalty was corrected. Still, the majority uses this "correction" to support its conclusion that the threat of the death penalty was not coercive.
Based on my research, the only two appellate courts to address the admissibility of a juvenile's confession made after officers incorrectly told him he might receive the death penalty found the confession inadmissible. State v. Kerby, 2d Dist. Clark No. 03-CA-55, 2007-Ohio-187, ¶ 87; People v. McClary, 571 P.2d 620, 626-27 (Cal. 1977) (denial of requests for attorney and threat of death penalty rendered sixteen-year-old's confession involuntary). In Kerby, officers told a seventeen-year-old with no prior experience with police that he was facing a capital case and implied that he needed to confess and show remorse to avoid the death penalty. 2007-Ohio-187, ¶ 87. Though the juvenile was mature and only interrogated for approximately one hour, the court found that the officers' "[attempt] to create the impression that [the juvenile] could be facing a death sentence unless he cooperated with them and confessed" deprived the juvenile of his capacity to intelligently and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Id.
Similar to Kerby, the officers in this case attempted to create the impression that the Defendant could receive a death sentence if he did not cooperate and confess. See 2007-Ohio-187, ¶ 87. As the trial court noted during the suppression hearing, "the implication [was] that '[t]his is a death penalty case unless you tell me about it, [then] maybe I can help you get out of the death penalty.'" In other words, Investigator Williams suggested to the Defendant that the consequence of exercising his right to remain silent might be death, despite the fact that juveniles are not eligible for the death penalty. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when they committed the crime). Because the Defendant's initial waiver was conditioned on his mother's presence and his second waiver was a product of improper coercion, the circumstances surrounding the Defendant's waiver weigh against its validity.
Factor two, the juvenile's capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and the consequences of the waiver, and factor three, the juvenile's familiarity with Miranda warnings or the ability to read and write in the language used to give the warnings, also weigh against the validity of the waiver. Though there has been no suggestion that the Defendant cannot read and write in English, he had no prior experience with police and therefore was likely not familiar with Miranda warnings. As a juvenile, his capacity to understand the warnings was at least somewhat diminished. This diminished capacity was exploited by the improper threat of the death penalty, which misled the Defendant into believing that the consequence of exercising his right to remain silent might be death. See Kerby, 2007-Ohio-187, ¶ 87 (threat of death penalty deprived juvenile of capacity to waive Miranda rights, regardless of his maturity or intelligence).
Factor four, any intoxication, and factor five, any mental disease, disorder, or retardation, weigh in favor of the validity of the waiver. The Defendant has not alleged that he was intoxicated during the interrogation or that he suffers from any mental disorders.
Factor six, the presence of a parent, guardian, or interested adult, weighs heavily against the validity of the waiver. Though the majority is correct that a parent need not be present for a juvenile to validly waive his Miranda rights, this factor cannot be so easily dismissed. The absence of a parent always weighs against the validity of the juvenile's waiver. This weight, in my view, becomes greater when the juvenile is expressly denied access to his parent during his interrogation. See State In Interest of A.A., 222 A.3d 681, 692 (N.J. 2020) ("If law enforcement officers do not allow a parent and juvenile to consult in private, absent a compelling reason, that fact should weigh heavily in the totality of circumstances to determine whether the juvenile's waiver and statements were voluntary."); see also People v. Morgan, 758 N.E.2d 813, 834 (Ill. 2001) (the juvenile's opportunity to consult with his parent before or during the interrogation "is particularly relevant" when the juvenile has asked to speak with his parent or the police have prevented his parent from speaking with him). Where an adult seeking advice or seeking to end an interrogation is likely to ask for an attorney, a juvenile seeking the same is likely to instead ask for a parent. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 729-30 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (a juvenile "will likely turn to his parents, or another adult responsible for his welfare, as the only means of securing legal counsel"). Denying a juvenile's request to speak with his parent should therefore hold significant weight in the totality of the circumstances analysis. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (a juvenile's request for his parent "is surely inconsistent with a present desire to speak freely").
In this case, the Defendant was not only denied access to his mother, but was denied access to her after officers twice assured his mother that she could be present for the interrogation and after the Defendant requested to speak with her four times. At the outset of the interrogation, an officer tried to bring his mother into the room, and he was told to "hold off on that." At 2:52 a.m., thirty minutes into the interrogation and in response to being asked who shot the victims, the Defendant asked, "Can you get my mamma in here?" Investigator Williams denied his request because this was "grown up shit." Around 3:19 a.m., the Defendant asked to talk to his mother, and Investigator Williams told him he could "in just a second." At 4:03 a.m., the Defendant told Investigator Williams that he told him he could talk to his mother. Investigator Williams responded, "we'll get her in a minute." Around 6:02 a.m., the Defendant again asked to talk to his mother, and Detective Whitney said he could "in a minute." At no point during the six-and-a-half-hour interrogation, however, was the Defendant permitted to speak with his mother, or have her present during questioning. This intentional exclusion of the Defendant's mother contributed to the coercive nature of the interrogation and weighs heavily against the validity of the waiver.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid. A valid waiver must be both "'voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception'" and made "'with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequence of the decision to abandon it.'" State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 564 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). A waiver obtained from a juvenile with no prior experience with police, after denying him access to his mother who was present at the station, and threatening him with the death penalty, cannot be said to be the product of a free and deliberate choice, nor to have been made with full awareness of the nature of the right and the consequence of abandoning it. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress.
B. Voluntariness of Confession. Even if the Defendant's Miranda waiver was valid, the Defendant's confession should still have been suppressed because it was involuntary. After analyzing the totality of the circumstances under the Climer factors, I would have concluded that the trial court erred in finding that the Defendant's confession was voluntary. See 400 S.W.3d at 568.
The facts discussed in the above Miranda-waiver analysis are also relevant to the voluntariness analysis. The Defendant's perceived intelligence and lack of intoxication weigh in favor of the voluntariness of the confession. The threat of the death penalty and exclusion of the Defendant's mother from the interrogation, in addition to the Defendant's age and lack of previous experience with the police, weigh against the voluntariness of the confession. Before determining whether the confession was voluntary, however, the following post-waiver facts must also be considered.
The Defendant was interrogated for six-and-a-half-hours, from 2:21 a.m. to 8:51 a.m. The record preponderates against the trial court's finding that the interrogation was only one hour. This finding was seemingly based on the fact that the trial court was only shown the first hour of the interrogation during the suppression hearing. This also seems to be the reason the majority is focused primarily on the first hour of the interrogation. But the six-and-a-half-hour interrogation was recorded and, according to the suppression hearing transcript, provided to the trial court before the hearing. The recording from when the officers arrived at the Defendant's home as well as the full six-and-a-half-hour recording of the interrogation were also provided to this court on appeal. The length of the interrogation, and the fact that it occurred in the middle of the night, weigh against the voluntariness of the confession. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948) ("we cannot believe that [a fifteen-year-old questioned from midnight to 5:00 a.m.] is a match for the police in such a contest").
To be clear, I strenuously disagree with the cavalier characterization by the majority that "[w]hile the defendant was interviewed off and on for six hours, he provided a significant portion of the statement in question and implicated himself in the murder after only one hour." The Defendant did not confess to shooting at the victims until he was detained, threatened with the death penalty, denied access to his mother, and questioned for over six hours. Though the Defendant admitted within the first hour of the interrogation that he was with the co-defendant when the co-defendant shot at the victims, he did not admit to possessing a gun and shooting at the victims until 8:34 a.m. For the first six hours of the interrogation, he adamantly denied having shot at the victims, or knowing that the co-defendant was going to. The length of the detention before the confession therefore weighs against its voluntariness.
Several of the officers' statements made during the interrogation also weigh against the voluntariness of the confession. First, as discussed above, Investigator Williams told the Defendant at the beginning of the interrogation that he was facing the death penalty. Second, Investigator Williams said he had video of the shooting that incriminated the Defendant when no such video existed. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (an officer's misrepresentation of evidence, though it does not alone render a confession inadmissible, is relevant to the voluntariness analysis). Third, Chief Sellers implied to the Defendant that he would be abused in prison. He said, "You know what they do to seventeen-year-olds in the [penitentiary]?" When the Defendant shook his head no, Chief
Sellers said, "I don't think you want to know." Fourth, Chief Sellers insinuated that a jury would not believe the Defendant was there but did not shoot. This insinuation, in light of the threat of the death penalty, led Defendant to believe that he would be convicted no matter what and his only chance to avoid the death penalty was to confess.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Defendant's confession was involuntary. Though I agree with the majority that the discussion about a polygraph and gunshot residue test was not improperly coercive, that the Defendant was not physically abused, and that he was provided food and water, these circumstances are outweighed by the circumstances that weigh against the voluntariness of the confession. The confession was obtained from a juvenile with no prior experience with the police, after over six hours of interrogation in the middle of the night, during which he was denied access to his mother and threatened with the death penalty. The totality of the circumstances therefore demonstrates that the Defendant's "will was overborne so as to render the confession the product of coercion." Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433-35 (2000)). The record shows that the erroneous admission of the Defendant's confession was not harmless. Accordingly, if the juvenile court had properly transferred jurisdiction to the trial court, I would have reversed the judgments of the trial court and remanded for a new trial.