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stating that "Delaware recognizes the admissibility of evidence found pursuant to lawful searches incident to arrest"
Summary of this case from Jackson v. StateOpinion
I.D. No. 050917496.
Submitted: March 26, 2007.
Decided: June 15, 2007.
UPON CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT'S PRO SE MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF.
DENIED in part and SUMMARILY DISMISSED in part.This 15th day of June, 2007, it appears to the Court that:
1. James J. Addison ("Addison") was originally charged with more than ten offenses related to burglaries which took place in August 2005 and December 2005. He accepted an offer to plead guilty to two counts of Burglary Second Degree. On October 20, 2006, Addison was sentenced to thirteen years at Level V, followed by varying levels of probation. Addison filed no appeal.
See Docket 32; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 825.
See Docket 35.
2. On January 5, 2007, Addison filed this, his first pro se motion for postconviction relief. He asserts two grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) infringements of his Sixth Amendment and due process rights. Specifically, he contends that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by refusing to file any motions to suppress and by telling him there was no such thing as an "evidentiary hearing." He also maintains that he did not have a preliminary hearing and that there is no waiver of the hearing in the record.
See Docket 37.
3. Before addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must determine whether the defendant has satisfied the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). In order to protect the procedural integrity of Delaware's rules, the Court will not consider the merits of a postconviction claim that fails any of Rule 61's procedural requirements.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). See also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991); State v. Mayfield, 2003 WL 21267422, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. June 2, 2003).
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790951, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 28, 1995) (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 554).
4. Rule 61(i) establishes four procedural bars to motions for postconviction relief: (1) the motion must be filed within one year of a final judgment of conviction; (2) any grounds for relief which were not asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceeding are barred; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding. However, a defect under (1), (2), or (3) will not bar a movant's "claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or . . . a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity, or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction."
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
5. The procedural imperatives of Rule 61(i) do not bar Addison's claims. His motion was filed within one year of his conviction, and he has not made prior postconviction motions. There was no trial, direct appeal, or any other proceeding where his claims could have been formerly adjudicated. Therefore, the Court will address the substantive merits of Addison's motion.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
6. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both: (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that the errors by counsel amounted to prejudice. The defendant faces a "strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable" in attempting to meet the first prong. Under the second prong, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice by showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceeding would have had a different result. If either prong is not met, the defendant's claim fails.
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).
Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996) (citation omitted).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. See also Fletcher v. State, 2006 WL 1237088, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. May 9, 2006).
7. Addison's first ground for ineffective assistance of counsel is unavailing. In his motion and reply to the affidavit filed by his attorney at the Court's request, Addison contends that his attorney acted unreasonably by failing to file motions to suppress. In particular, Addison seems to argue that his attorney should have moved to suppress affidavits of probable cause filed with the arrest warrant applications in his case, as well as six DVDs and $ 31.00 in currency found on Addison during his December 2005 arrest. However, Addison's claim regarding his attorney's failure to file any motions to suppress does not satisfy either prong of the ineffective assistance test.
See Docket 37.
See Docket 43. Under Rule 61(g), the Court may order expansion of the record during consideration of the merits of a Rule 61 motion, as it has in this case by directing Addison's attorney to file an affidavit responding to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. When the record is expanded at the Court's direction, the opposing party must receive copies of the submissions proposed for inclusion in the record and be afforded "an opportunity to admit or deny their correctness." Therefore, for the purposes of this motion, the Court will consider Addison's reply to the affidavit filed by his attorney.
See Docket 41.
See Docket 37, 41, 43.
8. Addison was identified in connection with the August 2005 burglary through a fingerprint at the scene. The items Addison apparently sought to have suppressed were found on his person as part of a lawful search incident to arrest or Terry search as he was arrested for trespassing on the fire escape of a home he was allegedly attempting to burglarize. Delaware recognizes the admissibility of evidence found pursuant to lawful searches incident to arrest and Terry searches. Therefore, Addison's attorney acted in a reasonable and professional manner in declining to file unsupportable motions.
See Docket 41, exhibit A.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
See Docket 41.
See, e.g., Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170, 1173-74 (Del. 1983) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). See also State v. Garvey, 2006 WL 1495786, at *4 (Del.Super.Ct. May 26, 2006) (denying defendant's Rule 61 motion for relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel where attorney did not challenge the fruits of a lawful search incident to arrest).
See, e.g., Aaron v. State, 275 A.2d 791, 793 (Del. 1971) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967)).
9. Moreover, Addison has not shown that his attorney's actions prejudiced his case. He seems to indicate that there was "deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth" in the warrant affidavits that merited filing a motion to suppress and alleges that his attorney's refusal left him "no choice but to plea." The record does not support that the affidavits of probable cause were tainted by falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, and Addison offers no substantiation for his contentions. The Court will not grant relief under Rule 61 where the movant offers only conclusory or unsubstantiated allegations. Given the lack of grounds for suppression, Addison has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that his attorney's actions affected the outcome of the proceeding in any way. Addison fails to show that his attorney's refusal to file frivolous motions was objectively unreasonable or that there is a reasonable probability that his attorney's refusal prejudiced his case. Therefore, he cannot prevail on his first ground for ineffective assistance of counsel.
See Docket 37.
E.g., Zimmerman v. State, 1991 WL 190298, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Sept. 17, 1991) (citations omitted) ("This Court will not address Rule 61 claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated."). See also State v. Brown, 1998 WL 735880, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. Aug. 20, 1998) ("Conclusory claims raised in a defendant's motion for postconviction relief are insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel and will not be addressed.").
10. Addison's second ground for ineffective assistance of counsel also fails. Addison states that his attorney told him there is "no such thing as a[n] [e]videntiary hearing." Although his attorney denies recalling such a statement, Addison does provide a letter from his attorney in which the attorney makes this statement to Addison. However, the rest of the letter provides context. Addison's attorney, writing in response to a telephone message, began by advising Addison that no motions to suppress would be filed because they were inapplicable in his case. The attorney then explained that "there is no such thing as an evidentiary hearing." Addison had apparently asked about evidentiary hearings as a means to suppress evidence, and his attorney was clarifying that what Addison was calling an "evidentiary hearing" was, in fact, referred to as a motion to suppress. While the attorney's attempt to clear up Addison's understanding of motions to suppress was apparently unsuccessful, it was not objectively unreasonable. The attorney's affidavit also indicates that the statement in the letter was part of an ongoing effort to clear up legal terminology for Addison. Despite denying in his affidavit that he told Addison "there is no such thing as an evidentiary hearing," the attorney recounts that he had detailed discussions with Addison about his case and "why a Motion to Suppress, or, in his [Addison's] words, an Evidentiary Hearing, would not be filed."
See Docket 37.
See Docket 41.
See Docket 37. Delaware Court of Common Pleas Rule 12(b) and Superior Court Criminal Rule 12(b) provide for motions to suppress evidence, which may be made in writing or orally (i.e., at suppression hearings) at the discretion of the court, but not for "evidentiary hearings." However, the legislature does specifically use the term "evidentiary hearings" in other contexts, including in postconviction remedies. See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(h).
Under Delaware Lawyers' Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4(b), an attorney must explain matters to his client "to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." Similar language is used in the ABA Criminal Justice Standards. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-3.8 (3d ed. 1993). The Supreme Court in Strickland noted that ABA standards and similar expressions of the norms of practice are one possible source of guidance for evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney's conduct. 466 U.S. at 688-89.
See Docket 41.
11. Addison does not explain how his attorney's attempt to reduce his confusion over the term "evidentiary hearing" was objectively unreasonable or prejudicial to his case. Although the attorney could have elaborated that evidentiary hearings do exist, nothing in the record suggests that the statement was intended to be dishonest. What Addison thought of as an evidentiary hearing was not actually available to him, since there was no legal or factual basis for counsel to have filed a motion to suppress and to have filed one would have been frivolous. Therefore, Addison does not have grounds for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his attorney telling him that evidentiary hearings do not exist.
See supra A.9.
12. Furthermore, a review of the record does not support Addison's claim that he was forced to enter a plea of guilty as a result of his attorney's actions. The plea colloquy transcript reflects that the Court thoroughly discussed with Addison the nature and consequences of his decision to plead guilty. Addison stated before the Court, as well as in his signed Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation, was fully advised of his rights by his attorney, had carefully reviewed the plea agreement, was voluntarily pleading guilty, and was not forced to take a plea by his attorney. There being an absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Addison is bound by these representations. Therefore, the Court finds that Addison's plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
See Docket 44, p. 7-8.
Felix v. State, 2006 WL 1971786, at *2 (Del. July 14, 2006).
B. Preliminary Hearing
13. Addison's argument that he was denied his Sixth Amendment and due process rights because he was not provided a preliminary hearing also fails. The record does not support Addison's claim that he did not receive a preliminary hearing or enter a waiver. The Court of Common Pleas docket shows that Addison waived his preliminary hearing for the first three charges against him on November 7, 2005. On December 19, 2005, Addison had a preliminary hearing before a Court of Common Pleas Commissioner on the other charges in his case, which arose from the December 2005 incidents. Accordingly, Addison has not made out a claim for relief based upon the lack of a preliminary hearing.
Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 5(d), a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing unless the right is waived.
See Docket 1; Court of Common Pleas Docket.
See Docket 22, 23.
14. Based on the foregoing, Addison's Motion for Postconviction
Relief is DENIED in part and SUMMARILY DISMISSED in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.