Opinion
No. 25227-2-III.
February 5, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Douglas County, No. 05-1-00067-1, John Hotchkiss, J., entered May 8, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Kulik, J., concurred in by Sweeney, C.J., and Brown, J.
Kellie Adcock agreed to serve as a confidential informant after police found drugs in her home. As part of the agreement, she waived her right to a jury trial. Ms. Adcock was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Ms. Adcock appeals, claiming her waiver was not valid. Concluding that the waiver of her constitutional rights to a jury trial was knowing and voluntary, we affirm her conviction.
FACTS
On December 10, 2004, Kellie Adcock was arrested after police searched her home and found drugs. The police and Ms. Adcock discussed the possibility of Ms. Adcock serving as a confidential informant (CI) in exchange for a reduction of a felony drug charge. Ms. Adcock was offered the chance to speak to an attorney, but she did not do so. As part of the agreement, Ms. Adcock was asked to waive her right to a jury trial and to agree to a trial on stipulated facts. Ms. Adcock signed the CI contract, as well as the stipulated facts agreement, which included the waiver of a jury trial.
The original CI contract was revoked when the State claimed Ms. Adcock did not comply. However, the court found that the contract had not been violated and Ms. Adcock was given another opportunity to perform the contract. The parties indicated that the second contract would contain the same terms as the first contract. The second contract was ultimately signed by the parties, but the contract was not filed with the court. Ms. Adcock violated the terms of the second contract.
Prior to the bench trial, the court briefly discussed waiver of a jury trial with the parties. The record reflects that the waiver had been signed as part of the stipulation and that someone had discussed the waiver of a jury trial with Ms. Adcock. At the time of the bench trial, the court had Ms. Adcock's statement on submittal of stipulated facts and the stipulated facts on file.
Ms. Adcock was found guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and a standard range sentence was imposed. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
The right to a jury trial is a constitutional right and, thus, the standard of review for the waiver of this right is de novo. State v. Vasquez, 109 Wn. App. 310, 319, 34 P.3d 1255 (2001), aff'd, 148 Wn.2d 303, 59 P.3d 648 (2002).
"Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant files a written waiver of a jury trial, and has consent of the court." CrR 6.1(a). Waiver of jury trial must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. City of Bellevue v. Acrey, 103 Wn.2d 203, 207, 691 P.2d 957 (1984). The reason a waiver must be in writing is to ensure that the right was waived knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. Lund, 63 Wn. App. 553, 558-59, 821 P.2d 508 (1991) (quoting State v. Downs, 36 Wn. App. 143, 145, 672 P.2d 416 (1983)). Waiver is also valid if it is done orally on the record. State v. Wicke, 91 Wn.2d 638, 645-46, 591 P.2d 452 (1979). The burden of establishing a valid waiver is on the prosecution. Id. at 645.
Here, Ms. Adcock signed a statement on submittal of stipulated facts. The court asked whether the stipulation had been "gone over with Ms. Adcock" and the prosecutor replied that he had done so when Ms. Adcock entered into the CI contract. Report of Proceedings at 208. During a pretrial hearing, Deputy Brian Bolz testified that he discussed the stipulated facts agreement with Ms. Adcock and that she did not request an attorney. Deputy Bolz stated that Ms. Adcock signed the document in his presence.
Ms. Adcock argues that she did not make a waiver on the record and, therefore, the waiver is not valid. CrR 6.1(a) states that a written waiver is required. Wicke held that an oral waiver on the record is acceptable as an alternative to a written waiver. Wicke, 91 Wn.2d at 646. Therefore, when there is a written waiver filed on the record, an oral waiver on the record is unnecessary.
Deputy Bolz was present when Ms. Adcock signed the stipulated facts agreement and he was available to answer any of her questions. Ms. Adcock was not under any pressure or undue influence to sign the agreement. Furthermore, the court inquired as to whether Ms. Adcock waived her right to a jury in writing and whether that waiver had been explained to her. The court received affirmative responses to both questions. These facts establish that Ms. Adcock's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
We affirm.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Brown, J., Sweeney, C.J., concur: