Opinion
CR0183963
02-27-2017
State of Connecticut v. William Adamson
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE APPLICATION FOR DISCHARGE FROM THE JURISDICTION OF THE PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD
Arthur C. Hadden, Judge, Superior Court.
The factual background for the Application now before the court begins on December 5, 2001. On that date, the applicant, William Adamson, while in the throes of psychosis, came to believe that he needed to kill someone in order to obtain " magical powers." Mr. Adamson, while seated in a motor vehicle, observed a state police officer nearby and was directed by " voices" to kill the trooper. Mr. Adamson then believed that the state trooper communicated with him telepathically and directed him to kill the victim, a man with whom the applicant was acquainted. After driving to the victim's place of business, Mr. Adamson confronted the victim in a parking lot and shot him multiple times, killing him. Subsequently, Mr. Adamson engaged police in a motor vehicle pursuit; rammed a police cruiser; fled on foot; and physically struggled with police officers. As a consequence of these events, the applicant was charged with and tried before a three-judge panel for the crimes of murder, two counts of Threatening in the Second Degree and two counts of Interfering with an Officer. Following the trial, the three-judge panel found the defendant not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to Section 53a-13 of the Connecticut General Statutes. On February 7, 2003 the trial court committed William Adamson to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board for a period not to exceed sixty-four years. The commitment was imposed pursuant to the provisions of Sections 17a-580 et seq. of the Connecticut General Statutes.
In an application dated December 19, 2014, the applicant, William Adamson, requested that he be discharged from the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. On March 6, 2015 the Psychiatric Security Review Board held a hearing regarding this application. In its report to the court the Board included in its findings of fact the following:
. . . William Adamson is an individual with a psychiatric illness requiring treatment and supervision. During this reporting period, William Adamson continued to remain clinically stable and in compliance with the conditions of his conditional release . . . If discharged from the Board, there will be no monitoring of William Adamson's medication compliance and he will not have any mandates to refrain from alcohol or drug use. While William Adamson appears very committed to his recovery from alcohol and drugs, his community providers have not yet requested the elimination of random monthly drug screenings. In addition, the community providers have determined that he continues to require meetings with his conditional release supervisor, at least every other week. Given the gravity of his criminal offense and his ongoing need for monitoring, the Board finds that William Adamson continues to require supervision and treatment under the jurisdiction of the Board.
In a motion dated January 22, 2016, the applicant requested that the Board update its report to the court. On July 22, 2016 the Board held a hearing to again consider Mr. Adamson's Application for Discharge from the Jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. Following this hearing, the Board issued an updated report to the court. In its findings of facts and recommendation to the court, this report contains the following statement:
. . . At the time of the Board's last report to court, dated March 25, 2015, the Board acknowledged Mr. Adamson's progress, but also noted that community providers had yet to request the elimination of random monthly drug and alcohol screenings and a reduction in meetings with his conditional release supervisor to at least every other week. Therefore, the Board did not support the Application for Discharge. Since then, the community providers requested modifications of Mr. Adamson's conditional release and eliminated drug and alcohol screenings and reduced conditional release supervision meetings to once a month. The Board approved the modification requests on March 4, 2016. Following the decrease in Mr. Adamson's stipulations, he remained clinically stable and compliant with the condition of his release . . . He continues to demonstrate a strong engagement with his community providers and an understanding of the importance of having a support network. He also remains active in the recovery community, articulating his strong commitment to abstain from drugs and alcohol. Should William Adamson be discharged from the jurisdiction of the Board, he can continue to receive the same treatment services from his community providers.
The Board, pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Section 17a-593, respectfully recommends to the court that it grant William Adamson's Application for Discharge from the Jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board.
On November 22, 2016, the parties appeared before the court, and the court heard testimony consistent with the findings of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. The state, while it did cross examine the witnesses for the applicant, offered no evidence contradicting the facts, conclusions and opinions of those witnesses. The family of the victim, through letters to the court, did express their objection to the requested discharge. The victim's family appropriately pointed out the extreme nature of the offense and the uncertainty of recovery from psychiatric illness and substance abuse.The applicant, William Adamson, has filed an application for discharge from the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. The application has been filed pursuant to sections 17a-593(a) and 17a-580(11) of the Connecticut General Statutes. The pertinent sections of those statutes read as follows:
The acquittee may apply directly to the court for discharge from custody. The court shall send copies of the . . . application to the state's attorney and to counsel for the acquittee. An aquittee may apply for discharge not more than once every six months and no sooner than six months after the initial board hearing held pursuant to section 17a-583.
" Person who should be discharged" means an acquittee who does not have psychiatric disabilities or does not have intellectual disability to the extent that such acquittee's discharge would constitute a danger to the acquittee or others.
In considering the acquittee's application for discharge, the court must be cognizant of the statutory requirement that the applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged. Connecticut General Statutes section 17a-593(f). In addition the court must comply with the statutory provisions directing the court to make a finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee and to have as its primary concern, the protection of society. Connecticut General Statutes section 17a-593(g).
" . . . [T]he ultimate determination of mental illness and dangerousness is a legal decision . . . As a result, the determination of dangerousness in the context of a mental status hearing reflects a societal rather than a medical judgment, in which the rights and needs of the [acquittee] must be balanced against the security interests of society . . . [T]he court is to look at the entire record before it, not simply the testimony of the medical personnel or the board's recommendation. In reaching its difficult decision [as to whether an individual is dangerous], the court may and should consider the entire record available to it, including the [acquittee's] history of mental illness, his present and past diagnoses, his past violent behavior, the nature of the offense for which he was prosecuted, the need for continued medication and therapy, and the prospects for supervision if released. State v. Putnoki, 200 Conn. 208, 221, 510 A.2d 1329 (1986); State v. Corr, 87 Conn.App. 717, 724-26, 867 A.2d 124 (2005).
" As a general matter, the confinement of insanity acquittees, although resulting initially from an adjudication in the criminal justice system, is not 'punishment' for a crime. 'The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous . . . As he was not convicted, he may not be punished. His confinement rests on his continuing illness and dangerousness.' Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983)." Payne v. Fairfield Hills Hospital, 215 Conn. 675, 683-4, 578 A.2d 1025 (1990). The question of the dangerousness of the acquittee is one for the court to determine. State v. Putnoki, supra, at page 219. Under section 17a-581-2(6) of the regulations of the Psychiatric Security Review Board the term " danger to self or others" is defined as the " risk of imminent physical injury to others or self . . . includ[ing] the risk of loss or destruction of the property of others." In civil commitment proceedings pursuant to section 17a-495(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes " danger to himself or herself or others means there is a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon his or her own person or upon another person." In State v Harris, 277 Conn. 378, 890 A.2d 559 (2006), the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that " in fact, it is difficult to perceive any meaningful difference between the [two] standards." Id. at page 389.
The legal meaning of " dangerousness" in the context of a commitment following a criminal finding of not guilty by reason of insanity was given extended consideration by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the case of State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (N.J. 1975). In that case the court wrote:
The standard is " dangerous to self or society." Dangerous conduct is not identical with criminal conduct. Dangerous conduct involves not merely violation of social norms enforced by criminal sanctions, but significant physical or psychological injury to persons or substantial destruction of property. Persons are not to be indefinitely incarcerated because they present a risk of future conduct which is merely socially undesirable. Personal liberty and autonomy are of too great value to be sacrificed to protect society against the possibility of future behavior which some may find odd, disagreeable, or offensive, or even against the possibility of future non-dangerous acts which would be grounds for criminal prosecution if actually committed. Unlike inanimate objects, people cannot be suppressed simply because they may be nuisances. (citations omitted)
Commitment requires that there be a substantial risk of dangerous conduct within the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at page 301-2.
At the hearing before this court, the uncontested testimony was that the applicant has a current diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and substance abuse, but suffers from no current psychiatric symptoms and that he has shown no evidence of substance abuse. In the Updated Report to the Court, dated September 14, 2016, which was entered as a full exhibit at the hearing, Mr. Adamson is described as organized, goal directed, having normal thought content, with no thoughts of suicide or homicide and no thoughts of a delusional nature. The report continues by reporting that Mr. Adamson is strongly committed to maintaining abstinence from alcohol and drugs and that he has maintained appropriate support with community groups, friends, neighbors and family members. Dr. Fred Story, the Supervising Forensic Psychologist in the Office of Forensic Evaluations opined that the acquittee did not present a significant risk of violence to himself or others under his current treatment plan. Dr. Peter Zeman, M.D. further opined that it was highly improbable that Mr. Adamson would stop taking his medication and stated that Mr. Adamson would not present a danger to himself or others if he were no longer under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. Given the fact that the applicant: has not exhibited any violent behavior since the time of his arrest; has successfully engaged in appropriate treatment programs; has committed himself to abstinence from drugs and alcohol; has further committed himself to maintaining contact with treatment professionals and has established and maintained a support system; the court agrees with these conclusions. The courtfinds that the applicant does suffer from an active psychiatric disability, paranoid schizophrenia and substance abuse in remission, but that psychiatric disability does not render the applicant a danger to himself or others upon his discharge from the supervision of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. In light of the above finding, the acquittee's Application for Discharge from the Jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board is granted.