Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5404-11T4
06-03-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ALAN S. ADAMEZ, a/k/a ALLAN S. ADAMEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Alicia J. Hubbard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Hubbard, of counsel and on the brief). Sara B. Liebman, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Liebman, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fuentes, Fasciale and Haas.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 10-05-545.
Alicia J. Hubbard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Hubbard, of counsel and on the brief).
Sara B. Liebman, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Liebman, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Alan S. Adamez appeals from his convictions for third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1); third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and -5b(3); and third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. We affirm.
In March 2010, Officers Carmine Giannetta and Jorge Joaquim stopped a vehicle in which defendant and two other men (the "co-defendants") were riding. Defendant had entered the vehicle just before the stop and was sitting in the backseat. The police officers found a brown paper bag containing drug paraphernalia on the front passenger seat of the car and a clear zip-lock bag containing cocaine on the floor in the back of the car. The three men were charged jointly with possession and possession with intent to distribute the cocaine.
Defendant and the co-defendants moved to suppress the cocaine and the drug paraphernalia as the fruit of a warrantless search. The judge granted the motion as to the evidence found in the front seat, but denied the motion as to the evidence found on the floor in the back of the car because it was in plain view. Over three days in October 2011, a judge and jury tried defendant with the co-defendants. Defendant did not move to sever his trial from that of the co-defendants.
The jury found defendant guilty of the charges, but found the co-defendants not guilty. The judge sentenced defendant to a six-year extended term of imprisonment with a three-year period of parole ineligibility.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SEVER ADAMEZ' TRIAL FROM THOSE OF HIS CO-DEFENDANTS RESULTED IN A DENIAL OF THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE AND PREVENTED HIM FROM RECEIVING A FAIR TRIAL. U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, VI AND XIV; N.J. CONST., ART. I, § 1, 9 AND 10. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT II
THE TESTIMONY OF TWO STATE'S WITNESSES THAT THE NEIGHBORHOOD WAS A "HIGH CRIME" AND "HIGH NARCOTIC" AREA, AN ASSESSMENT CHALLENGED BY THE COURT AND THE DEFENDANT, WAS IRRELEVANT AND UNDULY PREJUDICIAL, IMPLYING "GUILT BY ASSOCIATION," AND REQUIRING REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS AND A NEW TRIAL. U.S. CONST., AMENDS. V, XIV; N.J. CONST. ART. I, §1 (PARTIALLY RAISED BELOW).
After carefully considering the record and the briefs, we conclude that defendant's arguments are "without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion." R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add the following brief comments.
Because defendant did not raise these issues at trial, the plain error standard applies. R. 2:10-2. "Under that standard, '[a] reviewing court may reverse on the basis of unchallenged error only if it finds plain error clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'" State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 541 (2004) (quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997)). Applying this standard, we conclude that neither of the issues raised by defendant constituted plain error.
We disagree with defendant's contention that the judge erred by failing to sever the trials sua sponte. Rule 3:15-2(b) permits a judge, upon a defendant's motion, to grant a severance of defendants' trials if "it appears that a defendant . . . is prejudiced by a permissible or mandatory joinder." Defendant does not cite any authority indicating that the judge had an affirmative obligation to sever the trials sua sponte.
We also reject defendant's argument that allowing testimony referring to the neighborhood as "high crime" and "high narcotics" constituted plain error. Officer Giannetta testified that the area was "high crime," but that reference was fleeting and used only to create context about his familiarity with the area. Detective Fay's reference, as an expert, to the area as "high crime" and "high narcotics" was relevant to the charge of possession with intent to distribute. See State v. Summers, 176 N.J. 306, 315-16 (2003) (holding that admitting similar expert testimony was not plain error). The assistant prosecutor did not focus on either witness's description of the neighborhood during the summation.
Therefore, we conclude that these references were not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION