1. In State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288 ( 290 S.E.2d 149) (1982), we held that to invoke the extreme sanction of acquittal, a demand for trial must be couched in language which may reasonably be construed as referencing the provisions of OCGA § 17-7-170 (former Code § 27-1901). Specifically, we held in that case that a general demand for "trial by jury" was not reasonably subject to such a construction.

A motion is sufficient to invoke the extreme sanction of OCGA § 17-7-171 so long as it constitutes a demand to be tried within the next two succeeding terms of court. See Forbus v. State, 250 Ga. 24 ( 295 S.E.2d 530) (1982) (approving Court of Appeals' construction of OCGA § 17-7-170 in State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288, 289 ( 290 S.E.2d 149) (1982)). The dissent correctly notes that a defendant who seeks a speedy trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-171 must comply strictly with the applicable statutory requirements.

We hold that it was not. In State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288 ( 290 S.E.2d 149), the document on which the defendant based his claim for discharge/acquittal was entitled "Demand for Copy of Accusation (Indictment), Etc." In Adamczyk, amidst demands for copies of the indictment, witness list, and other documents, there appeared the sentence, "Trial by jury and all other procedural rights provided by the . . . Constitution and statute provisions . . . are also especially demanded.

No particular form is required "so long as the demand can reasonably be construed as a demand for trial under the provisions of [OCGA § 17-7-170]." State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288, 290 ( 290 S.E.2d 149) (1982). Although appellants' demand for trial does not specifically reference OCGA § 17-7-170, it does "clearly indicate that it is a demand for speedy trial."

On November 29, prior to the commencement of trial, he moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Code Ann. § 27-1901 (now OCGA § 17-7-170), on the ground that the case had not been brought to trial within the next succeeding term of court after a demand for trial had been filed. The trial court, relying upon State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288 ( 290 S.E.2d 149) (1982), denied the motion. In his first enumeration Getz contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to § 27-1901.

WELTNER, Justice. We granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether a letter drafted by counsel for the appellants and delivered to the District Attorney reasonably might be construed as a demand for trial, so as to invoke the provisions of Code Ann. § 27-1901 under the standard of State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288 ( 290 S.E.2d 149) (1982). After consideration, we approve the holding in Adamczyk and find it applicable to this case.

[t]his liberality has given rise to the use of requests, demands, and motions which, though later made the basis for motions for acquittal pursuant to Code § 27-1901 [now O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170], cannot reasonably be construed as demands for speedy trial.State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288, 289 ( 290 S.E.2d 149) (1982). So, in order to discourage the drafting of demands that could potentially cause confusion, this Court held that

Green v. State, 191 Ga. App. 873, 875 ( 383 S.E.2d 359) (1989). See also State v. Allen, 192 Ga. App. 730, 732 (2) ( 386 S.E.2d 394) (1989); Verscharen v. State, 188 Ga. App. 746 ( 374 S.E.2d 349) (1988); State v. Prestia, 183 Ga. App. 24 (1) ( 357 S.E.2d 829) (1987); Edwards v. State, 177 Ga. App. 557 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 229) (1986); State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288, 289-290 ( 290 S.E.2d 149) (1982). This Court holds that the minimum acceptable standard for such demand requires that the defendant's demand for trial be coupled with some other language that places the State on reasonable notice that a speedy trial under the sanctions of OCGA § 17-7-170 are being invoked, i.e., a reference to trial at the next term, reference to a "speedy trial," use of the language of the code, or reference to the code section.

The demand for trial contained in the fifth paragraph of defendant's document entitled, "MOTIONS FILED ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT," is insufficient to invoke the speedy trial requirements of OCGA § 17-7-170 (b). See Cummins v. State, 202 Ga. App. 155 ( 413 S.E.2d 773); State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288 ( 290 S.E.2d 149). Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's demand for discharge and acquittal.

In the case sub judice, as in Ferris, the demand indicated clearly that it is a demand for a speedy trial. See State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288 ( 290 S.E.2d 149). But it failed to identify the charges upon which defendant demanded a speedy trial by "name, date, term of court, or case number." Ferris v. State, 172 Ga. App. 729, 731, supra.