We are aware that several other states have allowed revocation under circumstances similar to this case. See Florida v. Accurse, 347 So.2d 828 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977); State v. Andersen, 232 Neb. 187, 440 N.W.2d 203 (1989); State v. O'Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 516 N.E.2d 218 (1987). However, in our view, this doctrine could cause more ills than it cures.

h DCA 1980) (reversing order granting motion for discharge under speedy trial rule because the motion was filed prematurely); State v. Rollins, 386 So.2d 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (applying law of the case in reversing order discharging defendant under speedy trial rule); State v. Belien, 379 So.2d 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (reversing order discharging defendant under speedy trial rule when defendant moved for and was granted a continuance, thus waiving the benefit of the rule); State v. Wright, 375 So.2d 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (reversing order discharging defendant because defendant was a prisoner within the meaning of the Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(b)(1), which was the applicable rule contrary to trial court ruling that Rule 3.191(a)(1) was applicable); State v. Humphrey, 363 So.2d 392 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (reversing discharge under speedy trial rule because defendants demand for speedy trial was filed prior to the filing of the information rendering it null and ineffective); State v. Acurse, 347 So.2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (affirming order discharging defendant under speedy trial rule when the defendant revoked a prior waiver of speedy trial rights and filed a valid and bona fide demand for speedy trial); State v. Luck, 336 So.2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (reversing discharge of defendant on speedy trial grounds and holding that the state's amendment of information did not vitiate prior waiver by defendant of speedy trial rights); State v. Sampson, 317 So.2d 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (reversing discharge of defendant pursuant to the speedy trial rule when the defendant's motion for discharge was filed prematurely); State v. Jones, 285 So.2d 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (reversing dismissal of action for violation of the speedy trial rule because the defendant was charged with a Metro traffic offense and not a crime). Nieman was arrested in May 1981 for extortion and for dealing in stolen property.

PER CURIAM. State v. Acurse, 347 So.2d 828 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). Affirmed.

Therefore, petitioner is entitled to be discharged. State v. Acurse, 347 So.2d 828 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). Accordingly, the writ of prohibition is granted and the case remanded to the trial court with orders to discharge the defendant.

It is not only appropriate, but necessary, to ascertain whether or not the accused had a `bona fide desire' to obtain the speedy trial and to determine whether or not the accused or his attorney `has diligentlyinvestigated his case, and that he is prepared' for trial. If these prerequisites to the filing of the demand were not met, the demand for speedy trial should be stricken as being null and void. [emphasis supplied] See also, Turner v. State ex rel. Pellerin, 272 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1973); State v. Acurse, 347 So.2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (dictum); compare State v. Embry, 322 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1975). Hopkins cogently argues that the application of this principle has the effect of denying the benefit of the speedy trial rule to one who may sincerely desire, for his own reasons, to go immediately to trial even without the investigation or preparation which a court might deem reasonably necessary for a proper defense.

However, a defendant's rights under the speedy trial rule may be regained by the filing of a demand for speedy trial. State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1971); State v. Acurse, 347 So.2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Reed, by filing his demand for speedy trial on January 27, was entitled to be tried within 60 days. The appeal filed by the state did not automatically operate to toll that 60 day period.