Opinion
NO. 03-14-00012-CV
02-19-2016
State Office of Risk Management, Appellant v. Katina A. Edwards, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 353rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-GN-09-003089, HONORABLE TIM SULAK, JUDGE PRESIDINGMEMORANDUM OPINION
The State Office of Risk Management (SORM) appeals from the district court's judgment affirming the final decision of the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation (the Division) on claims asserted by Katina Edwards. For the following reasons, we will vacate the district court's judgment and dismiss this cause for want of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
On June 17, 2008, Edwards visited a home in the course of her employment with the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. The home was allegedly ridden with black, odorous mold. Edwards felt ill after the visit, sought medical treatment, and was diagnosed with an allergic reaction to mold. In August 2008, she was hospitalized and diagnosed with hypersensitivity pneumonitis. Edwards asserted that, as a result of her condition, she could not return to her job with the Department of Family and Protective Services.
Edwards filed a claim for workers' compensation with SORM, the workers' compensation insurance carrier for the State of Texas and its employees. SORM contested Edwards's claim in a benefits-review conference and again in a contested-case hearing held by the Division, contending that Edwards did not sustain a compensable injury resulting in her disability. The administrative hearing officer concluded that Edwards "did sustain a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease, hypersensitivity pneumonitis, on June 17, 2008," and "has had a disability resulting from the compensable injury sustained on June 17, 2008 from August 22, 2008 and continuing through the date of this hearing." The hearing officer ordered SORM to pay benefits in accordance with her decision. SORM appealed to the Division's Appeals Panel, which issued a letter opinion indicating that the hearing officer's decision was final.
SORM filed a suit for judicial review in district court in Travis County. In its original petition, consistent with the focus of the proceedings below, SORM sought review of the Appeals Panel's final decision—and the hearing officer's underlying findings of fact, conclusions of law, and ruling—regarding compensability under Chapter 410, Subchapter G, of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, which governs "[j]udicial review of a final decision of the appeals panel regarding compensability or eligibility for or the amount of income or death benefits." See Tex. Lab. Code § 410.301(a). SORM requested a judgment that:
1) [Edwards] did not sustain a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease, hypersensitivity pnuemonitis, on June 17, 2008; andIncident to these claims, SORM also sought "review of the improper application of the burden of proof . . . at the administrative level."
2) [Edwards] does not have disability resulting from the compensable injury sustained on June 17, 2008 from August 22, 2008 and continuing through May 12, 2009.
Edwards filed a motion to transfer venue, arguing that mandatory venue lay in her home county of Fort Bend pursuant to the venue provision that governs appeals under Subchapter G, Section 410.252(b) of the Texas Labor Code. See Tex. Lab. Code § 410.252(b)(2) (party bringing appeal must file in county where employee resided when disability began). In response, SORM amended its petition, abandoning its request for judicial review of the compensability of Edwards's injury. However, SORM recast its complaint regarding "the application of the burden of proof" in the underlying compensability dispute as a stand-alone "due process" complaint. This change, according to SORM, enabled it to proceed under the alternative judicial-review mechanism that the Legislature has provided "[f]or all issues other than those covered under Section 410.301(a)." See id. § 410.255. Besides fixing its potential venue problem, this pleading amendment, SORM reasoned, enabled it to avoid the modified-de-novo review standard and jury-trial right that the Legislature has provided claimants in cases governed by Subchapter G and instead proceed under the substantial-evidence form of review that applies under Section 410.255. See id. § 410.255 ("[J]udicial review shall be conducted in the manner provided for judicial review of a contested case under Subchapter G, Chapter 2001, Government Code," and "is governed by the substantial evidence rule"); see also Tex. Gov't Code § 2001.176(b)(1) (mandatory Travis County venue).
Tex. Lab. Code §§ 410.301-.308; see also Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 511-515 (Tex. 1995) (1989 Texas Workers' Compensation Act, including Subchapter G's provision for modified-de-novo review of Appeals Panel's decisions regarding compensability, is product of intensive study and debate and careful balancing of interests, including interests of injured workers.).
The district court denied Edwards's motion to transfer venue. Subsequently, the district court proceeded to hold a hearing on the merits and affirmed the Division's final decision. SORM then perfected this appeal, insisting that the district court erred.
Judge Gisela D. Triana ruled on Edwards's motion to transfer venue while Judge Tim Sulak made the final judgment denying SORM's request for reversal of the Division's final decision. --------
DISCUSSION
By dropping its claim seeking review on the ultimate issue of whether Edwards's injury was compensable, SORM effectively mooted the subsidiary question of whether the hearing officer had misapplied the burden of proof when deciding the underlying compensability dispute. Given the posture of the underlying dispute, even if SORM were correct that the hearing officer had misapplied the burden of proof, such error could cause harm—and the parties would have a justiciable interest in the resolution of the question—only in the context of a live dispute regarding the ultimate issue of compensability. In short, SORM essentially seeks an advisory opinion, which the separation-of-powers doctrine prohibits courts from rendering. See Tex. Const., art. II, § 1; see also Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d, 440, 444 (Tex. 1993) (explaining constitutional prohibition against advisory opinions).
Consequently, this is a "theoretical dispute," a dispute that does not involve "a real and substantial controversy involving a genuine conflict of tangible interests"—not a justiciable controversy. See Texas Health Care Info. Council v. Seton Health Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) ("The mootness doctrine dictates that courts avoid rendering advisory opinions by only deciding cases that present a 'live' controversy at the time of the decision."). If we issued an opinion determining that the Division's method was wrong without changing the compensability decision that neither party challenges, then our opinion would be impermissibly deciding an abstract question of law without binding the parties. See Texas Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 ("The distinctive feature of an advisory opinion is that it decides an abstract question of law without binding the parties."); Brinkley v. Texas Lottery Comm'n, 986 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) ("An opinion is advisory when the judgment sought would not constitute specific relief to a litigant or affect legal relations.").
We conclude that this case became moot when SORM dropped its request in district court for a review of the Division's compensability decision. See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012) (case becomes moot when court's action on merits cannot affect parties' rights or interests). Accordingly, we vacate the district court's judgment and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction, leaving the Division's final decision intact. See id.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court's judgment and dismiss this case.
/s/_________
Cindy Olson Bourland, Justice Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Bourland Vacated and Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction Filed: February 19, 2016