The law that enacted subsection (a) (3) also enacted this language and therefore, the legislature could not have intended to prohibit a superior court judge from leaving office and at a later time, seeking appointment as a senior judge. This court declared unconstitutional a portion of former O.C.G.A. ยง 47-9-60 (b) in State v. McMillan, 253 Ga. 154 ( 319 S.E.2d 1) (1984). McMillan, however, invalidated only the restrictions on the practice of law by senior judges found in subsection b, and not the portion quoted above.
Again, we agree. The appellants draw attention to a 1984 decision of this court, State of Ga. v. McMillan, 253 Ga. 152 ( 319 S.E.2d 1) (1984). They argue that McMillan, and cases cited in that opinion, establish conclusively that "voluntary participation in a retirement plan does not constitute a waiver of a participant's right to challenge the constitutionality of the plan.
Life Care did not file a motion to disqualify Mabrey in this case, but instead filed a motion to compel arbitration to enforce a prior settlement agreement in another case by removing Mabrey as plaintiffs counsel in this action. The trial court denied the motion, citing State of Ga. v. McMillan, 253 Ga. 154, 164 ( 319 SE2d 1) (1984), and the rule that "matters relating to the practice of law . . . are within the inherent and exclusive power of the Supreme Court of Georgia." Life Care argued below and on appeal that under the settlement agreement at issue, plaintiff's counsel was required to maintain the confidentiality of all the information produced during discovery for a period of three years.
The employees argue that the county's failure to give them the promised annual four percent salary increases violates their due process rights under the Georgia Constitution. In support of their argument, they cite State of Ga. v. McMillan, 253 Ga. 154, 160 (1) ( 319 S.E.2d 1) (1984), which held that a prohibition on the ability of retired superior court judges to practice law violated their due process rights to work. Unlike the appellants in McMillan, the employees in this case have not had their right to work limited.
An individual's right to work is a liberty or property interest protected by the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution.See State v. McMillan, 253 Ga. 154, 159-60, 319 S.E.2d 1, 7 (1984). Review of economic legislation under the Georgia Constitution is similar to federal substantive due process analysis; the regulation must be "reasonably related" to a legitimate state interest.