The Court does not perceive, and Taylor does not persuasively suggest, any real advantage to a second trial which could have motivated intentional conduct to obtain one. See State v. Morris, 2002 WL 31520508, *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2002) ("[W]hether it be to gain advantage in a second trial or merely harassment, if the Court finds the State intentionally caused the defense to seek a mistrial, then that subverting of justice requires that double jeopardy bar future prosecution."); see also, Oseni, 996 F.2d at 187-88 (citing Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676, 679) ("If after a criminal trial begins the government decides that the case is going badly for it . . . it cannot engage in trial misconduct that is intended to and docs precipitate a successful motion for mistrial by the defendant."). Motion to Dismiss Indictment, at ¶34 (Taylor suggests the State now knows his trial strategy and has "a more favorable opportunity to rebut [his] claim of self-defense").