Opinion
No. 84-1003.
February 5, 1986. On Rehearing March 11, 1986. Writ Denied May 1, 1986.
APPEAL FROM 13TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EVANGELINE, STATE OF LOUISIANA, HONORABLE JOSEPH E. COREIL, J.
Raymond Simmons, Baton Rouge, and Alex D. Chapman, Ville Platte, defendants-appellants-appellees.
Peter F. Caviness, Opelousas, Onebane, Donohoe, Bernard, Torian, Diaz, McNamara Abell, Chris Robbins, Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before DOMENGEAUX, LABORDE and KING, JJ.
This appeal involves a concursus proceeding which was filed by State Mutual Life Assurance Company of America (State Mutual) to determine the person to whom $25,000.00 in life insurance proceeds is due. The district court rendered judgment in favor of Wordna Guillory Castille and against State Mutual, Fonda Hackett Castille, and Wanda Nesom. Wanda Nesom appeals. We affirm.
The above numbered and entitled matter was consolidated at the trial level and on appeal with the case of Castille v. State Mutual Life Assurance Company of America, 487 So.2d 459 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1986). We will dispose of all issues presented in both cases in this opinion. but will render a separate decision in Castille, supra.
In August of 1981, Ray Allen Castille, Jr. joined a group insurance plan on a policy issued by State Mutual. Fonda Hackett Castille, Ray's wife, was designated as beneficiary.
Sometime in 1982, Ray and Fonda physically separated. Ray then became romantically involved and cohabited with the appellant, Wanda Nesom. During this interlude, Ray designated Wanda as the new beneficiary under the policy. After a few months, Ray and Wanda separated; Wanda returned to her husband, and Ray returned to his mother, appellee Wordna Guillory Castille. On November 22, 1982, Ray was killed in an offshore accident. Before the body was flown in from offshore and consigned to the grave, Fonda (Ray's wife) and Wanda (Ray's ex-paramour) executed an authentic "Act of Donation, Assignment and Transfer," conveying all of their "rights, title and interest" in the insurance policy to Wordna (Ray's mother). In the same act, Fonda and Wanda further authorized and directed State Mutual to pay all sums due under the policy to Wordna. The record reveals that State Mutual deposited $25,000.00 (the amount payable under the policy) into the registry of the District Court before trial began. The insurer was then excused from the proceedings. Resolution of this case turns on the force and effect to be accorded the authentic "Act of Donation, Assignment and Transfer."
The same authentic act conveys Fonda's and Wanda's interest in a second policy insuring Ray's life, issued by the Prudential Life Insurance Company of America. This second policy is not involved on this appeal.
A copy of the authentic act is attached as Appendix "A."
Appellant alleges that the district court's failure to set aside the donation on the grounds of fraud, unconscionability, and violation of public policy constitutes reversible error. Specifically, she urges that appellee fraudulently induced her to sign away her rights to the insurance proceeds under the pretext that the Castille family needed the money to give the departed a decent burial. Beside herself with grief, she explains, appellant succumbed to the ploy, and unwittingly divested herself of her rights. Appellee lodged a timely objection to appellant's offer of testimony supporting the assertion. The objection was improperly overruled, for La.Civ. Code art. 1492 provides: "Proof is not admitted of the dispositions having been made through hatred, anger, suggestion or captation." The cited article appears in the chapter of our Civil Code entitled: "Of The Capacity Necessary For Disposing And Receiving By Donation Inter Vivos Or Mortis Causa." As such, its injunction applies equally to donations inter vivos and donations mortis causa.
Admission of testimony on this point did not adversely affect Wordna's claim to the proceeds, for she prevailed in the district court. Still, it should have been excluded. Consideration of appellant's testimony or any other evidence of captation would be no less improper on appeal.
To further support our conviction that the authentic act was in all respects valid and binding, we reproduce the district court judge's reasons for judgment on this issue:
"The second question is more involved and addresses itself to the question of whether or not the act executed by Wanda Nesom is valid because of the circumstances surrounding the execution thereof.
While it is true that Wanda Nesom is not overly intelligent, and has had certain mental problems in the past, the evidence clearly shows that she understood the act she executed. Mr. William Brinkhaus, a highly respected member of the Bar who prepared and executed the act, testified that not only did he read the act but explained it to the parties. The court believes Mr. Brinkhaus did so.
The court holds as a fact proven that the act was knowingly and voluntarily executed by Wanda Nesom and Fonda Hackett Castille.
While it is true that Wordna Guillory Castille showed no gratitude whatsoever with the exception of giving Wanda Nesom the sum of $300.00 at one time, and unfeelingly and selfishly refusing [sic] to give her $70.00 at another time, when Wordna Guillory Castille had at least $10,000.00 on deposit in the bank, still the court must hold in conformity with the law and the jurisprudence that the act is legal and valid.
Wanda Nesom acted foolishly, but nontheless [sic] her act is legal and binding, and therefore the court must hold that Wordna Guillory Castille is entitled to the money on deposit in the Registry of the Court."
We agree with the decision reached by the learned trial judge. For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellant Wanda Nesom's costs.
AFFIRMED.
ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING
In our recently rendered opinion affirming the district court's judgment in this matter, we omitted discussion of appellant's second assignment of error. In her application for rehearing, she again urges that her donation of rights, title, and interest in the proceeds of two life insurance policies "was, at most, an offer which was withdrawn before acceptance."
La.Civ. Code art. 1540 provides in pertinent part: "A donation inter vivos shall be binding on the donor, and shall produce effect only from the day of its being accepted in precise terms." Appellant argues that the express, formal, and unconditional language of acceptance, required by the jurisprudence, is lacking. See Rutherford v. Rutherford, 346 So.2d 669 (La. 1977).
Unlike Rutherford and other cases interpreting article 1540, this case involves one authentic act by which property was gratuitously transferred. The one act contains unequivocal language evidencing both donative and acceptive intent. The terms are precise. The donors and the donee all signed. The act is clearly not a mere offer, but rather a complete contract. That appellee has already taken possession of most of the described proceeds furthers our conviction that the authentic act qualifies as both a donation and as a valid acceptance.
For the above and foregoing reasons, we reaffirm our original opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court at defendant-appellant's cost.
AFFIRMED.
KING, J., dissents and concurs.
I dissent from the per curiam of the majority finding that the notarial act of donation, transfer, and assignment of life insurance policies was an act of donation accepted in accordance with law. I do not believe the act of donation was accepted as required by law, see LSA-C.C. Art. 1540 and Rutherford v. Rutherford, 346 So.2d 669 (La. 1977), as there was no acceptance in precise terms by the donee, Wordner Guillory Castille.
However, I do not find that it is necessary for us to reach the question of whether or not the authentic act of donation, transfer, and assignment was accepted, as the law requires, before such donation was revoked.
Under Louisiana law, a life insurance policy is a contract sui generis governed by rules peculiar to itself. Catalano v. United States, 429 F.2d 1058 (U.S.Ct. of App. 5th Cir. 1969). Louisiana Civil Code articles relating to donations, inter vivos and mortis causa, have no application to life insurance policies and no particular form is required to evidence a donation of a life insurance policy. LSA-R.S. 22:1527; Kelly v. Nat. Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 393 So.2d 130 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1980); Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930); Catalano v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1300 (U.S.Dist.Ct.E.D.La. 1968).
I believe that the notarial act, signed at the same time by the donors and donee, was a valid donation, transfer, and assignment, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 22:1527, by which Fonda Hackett Castille and Wanda Nesom transferred to Wordna Guillory Castille all of the right, title, and interest that they had or might have in the State Mutual Life Assurance insurance policy on the life of Ray Allen Castille, Jr. I further believe that the donation of the life insurance policies was effective at the time the notarial act was executed since no particular form is required to donate, transfer, or assign a life insurance policy as it is sui generis under Louisiana law.
For this reason I concur in the result reached by the per curiam of the majority, that is, that the notarial act was sufficient to donate the insurance policy in question.