R. 4:40-1. Compare Handleman v. Cox, 39 N.J. 95 (1963) (no sign on rear door prohibiting admittance; implied invitation could be found) with State in the Interest of L.R., 112 N.J. Super. 464, 466-67 (App.Div. 1970) (high, locked, barbed-wire fence around lot indicated, even without express statement, that one who entered lot was unwanted and would be treated as trespasser). The permitted area includes those parts of the premises that, depending on all the circumstances, it would reasonably be believed that the authorized individual would enter.
No reported decision in New Jersey has ever supported a trespass conviction involving tenants with claims to possession although the occurrence of convictions may exist. See State v. Burroughs, 7 N.J.L. 426 (Sup.Ct. 1802); Bregguglia v. Vineland, 53 N.J.L. 168 (Sup.Ct. 1890); Burns v. Jagmetty, 86 N.J.L. 23 (Sup.Ct. 1914); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Fucello, 91 N.J.L. 476 (Sup.Ct. 1918); Hopewell Tp. v. Gruchowski, 29 N.J. Super. 605 (Cty.Ct. 1954); State v. Terwilliger, 49 N.J. Super. 149 (App.Div. 1958); State v. Wouters, 71 N.J. Super. 479 (App.Div. 1962); State v. Kirk, 84 N.J. Super. 151, aff'd 88 N.J. Super. 130 (App.Div. 1965); In re State in Interest of L.R., 112 N.J. Super. 464 (App.Div. 1970); State v. Besson, 110 N.J. Super. 528 (Cty.Ct. 1970); State v. Kolcz, 114 N.J. Super. 408 (Cty.Ct. 1971); State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297 (1971); State v. Karr, 119 N.J. Super. 385 (App.Div. 1972); State v. Dragon, 165 N.J. Super. 500 (App.Div. 1978). The recent case law has largely involved claims of First Amendment protection as justifications for unlawful presence.