Opinion
No. 2011 KJ 0400.
June 10, 2011. NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEALED FROM THE JUVENILE COURT IN AND FOR THE CITY COURT OF SLIDELL, FOR THE PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY, LOUISIANA JUVENILE COURT NUMBER 2010 JC 4355 HONORABLE JAMES "JIM" LAMZ, JUDGE.
Walter P. Reed, District Attorney, David R. English, Assistant District Attorney, Slidell, LA and Kathryn Landry, Baton Rouge, LA, Attorneys for State — Appellee.
Annette Roach, Lake Charles, LA, Attorney for Juvenile — Appellant.
BEFORE: CARTER, C.J., GAIDRY AND WELCH, JJ.
A sixteen-year-old child, identified herein as D.C., was alleged to be delinquent by a petition filed on August 20, 2010, pursuant to the Louisiana Children's Code. The petition was based upon the alleged commission of flight from an officer (count one: a violation of La.R.S. 14:108.1), aggravated criminal damage to property (counts four, five, and thirteen: violations of La.R.S. 14:55), aggravated assault (counts six and seven: violations of La.R.S. 14:37), unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (count eight: a violation of La.R.S. 14:68.4), failure to stop (count ten: a violation of La.R.S. 32:123), speeding in a posted zone (count eleven: a violation of La.R.S. 32:63), and disregarding a traffic-control signal (count twelve: a violation of La.R.S. 32:232). After an adjudication hearing, the juvenile was adjudged to be a delinquent as to counts one, four, six, seven, eight, ten, eleven, and twelve. The court found that the State failed to carry its burden as to counts five and thirteen and those counts were dismissed. At the disposition hearing, the trial judge committed the juvenile to six months imprisonment on counts one, six, and seven; five years imprisonment or up to his twenty-first birthday on counts four and eight; and thirty days imprisonment on counts ten, eleven, and twelve. The trial judge ordered that the dispositions be served concurrently.
The State dismissed two resisting an officer charges (counts two and three: violations of La.R.S. 14:108(B) and a charge of driving without a license (count nine: a violation of La.R.S. 32:52).
On appeal, the juvenile argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding of delinquency, and the dispositions imposed on counts four and eight are unconstitutionally excessive and illegally indeterminate. After a thorough review of the record and the errors assigned, we affirm the juvenile's adjudications, amend the dispositions, and affirm the dispositions as amended.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 18, 2010, at approximately 1:30 a.m., the Slidell Police Department received reports of a white Toyota Tundra travelling recklessly on or near Pine Street in Slidell. Officer Jeremy Bertucci and Officer Joe McMann responded to the area in separate units. Officer Bertucci located a vehicle matching the description travelling south on Pine Street and reported to Officer McMann, who proceeded westbound on U.S. Highway 190. Officer Bertucci followed the truck as it travelled over U.S. Highway 190 West and continued on South Pine Street, and temporarily lost sight of it as it entered the neighborhood of Hermadel Estates. As the truck exited the neighborhood, it failed to come to a stop at a stop sign and nearly collided with Officer Bertucci's unit, then drove around the unit and sped off.
Officer Bertucci activated his police lights and pursued the vehicle at a speed of 88 miles per hour as it travelled east on West Hall. The vehicle proceeded through a red traffic light and a stop sign and then turned right onto Gause Boulevard, heading east. Officer Bertucci travelled at 118 miles per hour at one point on Gause Boulevard in an effort to stop the vehicle. The vehicle travelled through a gap in the traffic of vehicles turning left onto Gause Boulevard. Several police units, communicating via unit radio, continued to pursue the truck, and spike strips were ultimately positioned in the vehicle's path of travel. The truck turned left onto Kensington Boulevard and travelled through the yard of a home on the corner. The police remained in pursuit as the truck returned to the road and travelled through the neighborhood and made a U-turn at a cul-de-sac. The truck and Officer Bertucci's unit were positioned side-by-side as the truck completed the U-turn, and Officer Bertucci made eye contact with the driver just before the truck drove past the unit. The truck travelled southbound in the northbound travel lane of Kensington Boulevard, crossed a median, and turned right to travel west on Gause Boulevard. After the truck crossed the median, Officer McMann's unit became the lead unit in pursuit. The truck continued travelling at a high rate of speed westbound on the eastbound travel lane of Gause Boulevard through midtown, ultimately veering into the correct lane.
After the truck's tires were damaged after travelling over spikes positioned by the police, it continued until it was driven into a ditch approaching the Magnolia Street and U.S. Highway 190 intersection. The occupants exited the truck and fled on foot and canine officers pursued them with dogs. Officer Kevin Ray, one of the canine handlers, located and apprehended a suspect, Jeffery Ducray, and transported him to Slidell Memorial Hospital for treatment for minor dog bites. Officer Ray returned to the scene of the crash within fifteen to twenty-five minutes to assist with the search for the second suspect. The officers searched an open field and residential area and ultimately apprehended D.C. in a woodline in the back of an apartment complex on the west side of Magnolia Street. D.C. was also transported to Slidell Memorial Hospital for treatment.
ADJUDICATIONS
In assignment of error number one, the juvenile contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was driving the truck at the time of the offenses, a necessary element for each count. The juvenile notes that there was very little testimony regarding the identification of the driver and that Officer Bertucci was the only person who identified him as the driver. The juvenile notes that the identification took place at the hearing and that there was no identification on the night of the incident or at any time prior to the hearing. The juvenile contends that the encounter between the truck and Officer Bertucci's unit was very brief and that the videotape did not support Officer Bertucci's testimony that he was at a standstill when the truck passed him. The juvenile further notes that his testimony at the hearing contradicted Officer Bertucci's testimony in arguing that Officer Bertucci's testimony was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the driver of the vehicle.
In the second assignment of error, the juvenile contends that the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing was insufficient to prove all of the elements of aggravated criminal damage to property beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the juvenile contends that there was no testimony that the truck sustained any damage due to an intentional act on the part of D.C. The juvenile further contends that the videotape does not support testimony regarding a wreck or collision at the end of the chase and neither occupant was alleged to have been injured. The juvenile contends that the only damage that the officers testified to was the damage to the tires. The juvenile notes that the judge found the evidence was insufficient to prove that other items were struck or damaged by the truck. The juvenile concludes that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the driver had the intent to damage the truck or drive over the spike strip, or that the truck incurred damage as it was abandoned at the ditch.
In the third assignment of error, the juvenile contends that the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing was insufficient to prove all of the elements of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt. The juvenile notes that while he testified that the other occupant of the vehicle told him that the truck was stolen, the judge ultimately stated that his testimony "has absolutely no weight whatsoever." The juvenile further notes that the owner of the truck did not testify, and the State did not present any documentation to show who owned the truck or that it was reported stolen, or any evidence of a forced entry or start. The juvenile cites Officer Garrett Aucoin's testimony that the truck was "eventually" reported stolen after the chase took place and notes that there was no evidence to confirm the late reporting or pinpoint when it was made. The juvenile notes that the truck owners did not testify that he or the other occupant did not have permission to use the truck. The juvenile concludes that there was insufficient evidence that the truck was stolen. Even assuming the truck was stolen, the juvenile contends that there was no evidence that it was recently stolen or that he knew it was stolen.
In the fourth assignment of error, the juvenile contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the two counts of aggravated assault. The juvenile specifically notes that Officer Aucoin testified that the truck was sliding out of control and was not asked if he feared for his safety. The juvenile further notes that there was no testimony as to how close the vehicle came to either officer. The juvenile contends that while Sergeant Simon testified that he ran because he was scared, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that this fear was because of an intentional act directed towards him.
When the State charges a child with a delinquent act, it has the burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. La.Ch.C. art. 883. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the identity of the perpetrator of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 821; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Johnson, 461 So.2d 673, 674 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984). The same standard of review applies to a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence adduced to support an adjudication in a juvenile proceeding. La.Ch.C. art. 883; State in the Interest of D.M., 97-0628, p. 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/7/97), 704 So.2d 786, 789. Further, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, an appellate court is constitutionally mandated to review the law and facts. See In the Interest of L.C., 96-2511, p. 3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/20/97), 696 So.2d 668, 670. In a juvenile case, when there is evidence before the trier of fact that, upon its reasonable evaluation of credibility, furnished a factual basis for its finding, on review the appellate court should not disturb this factual finding in the absence of manifest error. Reasonable evaluation of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review. State in Interest of Wilkerson, 542 So.2d 577, 581 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
The Louisiana Children's Code defines "child" as "any person under the age of twenty-one, including an emancipated minor, who commits a delinquent act before attaining seventeen years of age." La.Ch.C. art. 804(1). A "delinquent act" is defined as "an act committed by a child of ten years of age or older which if committed by an adult is designated an offense under the statutes or ordinances of this state, or of another state if the offense occurred there, or under federal law, except traffic violations." La.Ch.C. art. 804(3).
The Jackson standard is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La.R.S. 15:438 provides that, assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State in Interest of D.F., 2008-0182, p. 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/6/08), 991 So.2d 1082, 1085, writ denied, 2008-1540 (La. 3/27/09), 5 So.3d 138. When the key issue is the identity of the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. In the Interest of L.C., 96-2511 at p. 3, 696 So.2d at 670.
Pursuant to La.Ch.C. art. 104(1), "[w]here procedures are not provided in this Code, or otherwise by law, the court shall proceed in accordance with . . . [t]he Code of Criminal Procedure in a delinquency proceeding."
Aggravated criminal damage to property is defined as the intentional damaging of any structure, watercraft, or movable, wherein it is foreseeable that human life might be endangered, by any means other than fire or explosion. La.R.S. 14:55. This offense requires only a general criminal intent. See La.R.S. 14:11; State v. Brumfield, 329 So.2d 181, 189-90 (La. 1976); State v. Davenport, 33,961, p. 3 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 11/1/00), 771 So.2d 837, 842, writ denied, 2000-3294 (La. 10/26/01), 799 So.2d 1150. "General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act." La.R.S. 14:10(2). The trier of fact is to determine the requisite intent in a criminal case. State v. Crawford, 619 So.2d 828, 831 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 625 So.2d 1032 (La. 1993).
Aggravated assault is the attempt to commit a battery or the intentional placing of another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery with a dangerous weapon. La.R.S. 14:36; La.R.S. 14:37(A). Battery is defined, in pertinent part, as the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another. La.R.S. 14:33. A dangerous weapon includes "any . . . instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm." La.R.S. 14:2(A)(3). An automobile used in a manner calculated to produce or likely to produce death or great bodily harm has been found to be a dangerous weapon. State v. Trahan, 416 So.2d 65, 68 (La. 1982).
Finally, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is the intentional taking or use of a motor vehicle that belongs to another either without the other's consent, or by means of fraudulent conduct. La.R.S. 14:68.4(A). The statute does not specifically require the titled owner of the vehicle to testify and identify the vehicle. Additionally, the State can meet its burden of proof by proving that the perpetrator was aware that he was driving a stolen vehicle, as there is a presumption that there can be no legitimate permission given to drive a stolen vehicle. State v. Macon, 2006-481, p. 8 (La. 6/1/07), 957 So.2d 1280, 1286.
In this case, Officer Bertucci identified D.C. as the driver. Officer Bertucci testified that he made eye contact with the juvenile right after the truck made the U-turn at the cul-de-sac. According to Officer Bertucci's testimony, as he positioned his unit and opened his driver's door to exit (assuming that the occupants of the truck would exit at the dead end and flee on foot), he had to close the door to prevent the truck from hitting it as it passed at approximately five miles per hour, as Officer Bertucci's unit remained stationary. Officer Bertucci also testified that the driver was wearing dark clothing.
Officer McMann's unit was leading the chase when the truck veered into the ditch. Officer McMann observed two individuals exit the vehicle from the passenger side. The first occupant to exit the passenger door was wearing a white T-shirt while the second occupant to exit the passenger door was wearing dark clothing. The one wearing a white T-shirt went northbound on Magnolia Street, while the one wearing dark clothing went northwest through an open lot towards a woodline near an apartment complex on Pine Street.
Sergeant Simon deployed spikes in an attempt to stop the truck and Officer Aucoin observed. Sergeant Simon testified in pertinent part as follows:
As I deployed the spikes, I hear the engine rev real high and start heading my way. I can see the headlights coming directly towards me. I just threw the spikes down and ran up towards the house and as [sic] when I got to the house, I turned around and looked and I saw the white truck go over the spike strip.
According to Sergeant Simon, the truck was headed toward him at a high rate of speed. When asked if he was in fear that the vehicle was going to run over him, Sergeant Simon stated, "Yes, that's why I dropped it and ran." Officer Aucoin similarly testified that after Sergeant Simon deployed the spike strip, the following occurred.
The vehicle came towards us, cut its wheel to the left and the vehicle started to roll a little bit as I assumed to avoid the spike strips. Once the vehicle began to roll, the driver cut the wheel the other way. The vehicle pointed towards me and started to slide.
At that point, Sergeant Simon ran east, I ran west because the vehicle [sic] sliding towards him and facing me. At what point the vehicle catches traction, I don't know, and I don't want to be in that area to find out.
Sergeant Simon stated that the area was lit by streetlights and he was in uniform at the time. Based on the lighting in the area, Sergeant Simon believed he was visible to the occupants of the truck. Sergeant Simon observed the truck's front tires cross over the spikes, causing the strip to roll up and land upside down before the two back tires rolled over it. The truck then jumped over a curb and travelled though a grassy area before returning to Kensington Boulevard. When Sergeant Simon made it to the site where the chase ended, all four tires of the truck were blown out and the vehicle was in the ditch, and the occupants had already exited the truck.
Officer Ray, the canine handler who apprehended Jeffrey Ducray and D.C., testified that D.C. was wearing a dark colored T-shirt when apprehended. Officer Aucoin investigated the ownership of the vehicle. He determined that the vehicle was registered to Mitchell Smith and Dale Smith. He spoke to Dale Smith and determined that the vehicle had been stolen.
D.C. testified that he was not the driver on the night in question, that he did not know how to drive, and that Ducray was the driver. The juvenile further stated that he was initially unaware that the vehicle was stolen. According to the juvenile, when the police began chasing them, Ducray informed him that the truck was stolen. D.C. stated that he told Ducray to stop the vehicle to no avail. D.C. was familiar with Ducray as he would see him around his neighborhood and during basketball games. He never saw Ducray drive the truck before the incident in question. D.C. explained that he ran from the police after the truck came to a stop because he did not want to be blamed for the incident. D.C. further explained that Ducray exited the passenger door first because he jumped over D.C., as D.C. sat in the passenger seat scared to move initially.
In the absence of internal contradictions and irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence, the testimony of one witness, if believed by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction. State In Interest D.J., 2000-1592, p. 5 (La. App. 5th Cir. 3/28/01), 783 So.2d 558, 562. Accordingly, positive identification by only one witness may be sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. In the Interest of L.C., 96-2511 at p. 3, 696 So.2d at 670.
Officer Bertucci testified that he had an opportunity to view the driver with eye contact and positively identified D.C. as the driver. We note that the camera in Officer Bertucci's unit used to create the videotape evidence was positioned to only record a frontal view of the chase. Nonetheless, the recording is consistent with Officer Bertucci's testimony insofar as it shows the truck approach the cul-de-sac and makes a U-turn. At that point, just before Officer Bertucci made the U turn, it is conceivable that Officer Bertucci's unit would have been positioned side-by-side with the truck. Officer Bertucci stated that the driver was wearing dark clothing, which is consistent with Officer McMann's testimony that the second person to exit the vehicle from the passenger door was wearing dark clothing. Furthermore, the juvenile was wearing a dark shirt when apprehended from the area in which the second occupant to exit the truck was observed fleeing. The trial judge, who had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt. The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Johnson, 99-0385, p. 9 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/5/99), 745 So.2d 217, 223,writ denied, 2000-0829 (La. 11/13/00), 774 So.2d 971; State in Interest of R.L.K., 95-1277, p. 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/19/95), 666 So.2d 427, 430,writ denied, 95-3120 (La. 1/26/96), 666 So.2d 1084. We find that the State sufficiently negated any reasonable probability of misidentification. As the juvenile challenges identity only (and not whether the offenses were committed) as to the flight from an officer, failure to stop, speeding, and running a red light offenses, we are convinced that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed those offenses. We now turn to the remaining issues of the other challenged adjudications.
In State v. Bourg, 615 So.2d 957 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), this court found sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction of aggravated criminal damage to property where a ball bearing approximately one and one-half inches in diameter was used in a manner wherein it was foreseeable that the victim's life was endangered. In that case, the ball was thrown through the rear window of a vehicle and struck the back of the driver's seat headrest with sufficient impact to throw the driver forward against the steering wheel. Herein, Officer Bertucci testified that he had to dodge rubber from the truck's tires at one point during the pursuit. Further, Sergeant Simon testified that all four tires of the vehicle were blown by the time it crashed into the ditch. According to the evidence, D.C. continued at a high rate of speed over deployed spikes, damaging the truck tires. The endangerment of the lives of the officers and anyone else in the area was foreseeable. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:55 does not require the State to allege or prove the amount of damage to the property. See State v. Bates, 37,282, p. 12 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 10/16/03), 859 So.2d 841, 849, writ denied, 2004-0141 (La. 5/21/04), 874 So.2d 173. Thus, we find that the evidence submitted, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to show that the juvenile committed all essential elements of the crime of aggravated criminal damage to property.
Further, based on the testimony of Sergeant Simon and Officer Aucoin, it is clear that the juvenile attempted to commit a battery or intentionally placed the officers in the reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery when he drove the vehicle toward them, causing them to run to avoid death or injury. Thus, we are convinced that the evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, and with the credibility determinations made by the lower court, proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of aggravated assault.
Although claiming he was not the driver, D.C. testified that he became aware of the stolen nature of the vehicle after the chase commenced, specifically after the first officer began to pursue them. Thus, his own testimony established that during the chase he was aware of the fact that the vehicle had been stolen. The judge reasonably accepted this admission. Based on the presumption that there can be no legitimate permission given to drive a stolen vehicle, it is clear that the juvenile intentionally used a motor vehicle without the owner's consent. Thus, we find that the evidence submitted, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to show that the juvenile committed all essential elements of the crime of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
After undertaking our State's constitutionally mandated review of the law and the facts in a juvenile proceeding, we find no manifest error by the juvenile court in its adjudications of delinquency based on D.C.'s commission of flight from an officer, aggravated criminal damage to property, two counts of aggravated assault, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, failure to stop, speeding in a posted zone, and disregarding a traffic-control signal. Thus, assignments of error numbers one, two, three, and four are without merit.
DISPOSITIONS
Regarding the dispositions, the juvenile first argues, in a sentencing error section of his appeal brief, that he should have received a single disposition for the petition, noting that all of the charged offenses arose out of a single episode. The juvenile further notes that the judge did not order that he should receive credit for time served before the dispositions. Finally, in the fifth assignment of error, the juvenile argues that confinement for five years or until his twenty-first birthday for a five and one-half minute car chase is unconstitutionally excessive. The juvenile also argues that a lesser disposition would satisfy the needs of all concerned in light of his potential for rehabilitation. The juvenile notes that the judge did not order a pre-disposition report as provided in La.Ch.C. art. 890. The juvenile contends that while the judge listed two prior dispositions and commented that rehabilitative services were previously ineffective, the judge did not specifically articulate what resources had been offered. The juvenile further contends that the judge's rendition of the facts was inconsistent with testimony presented at the adjudication hearing and that his mistaken belief may have resulted in harsher punishment than necessary.
Louisiana Children's Code article 901(B) provides that the court shall impose on the child the least restrictive disposition authorized by Articles 897 through 900, which the court finds consistent with the circumstances of the case, the needs of the child, and the best interest of society. Commitment of the child to the custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections may be appropriate under any of the following circumstances: (1) there is an undue risk that during a period of a suspended commitment or probation the child will commit another crime; (2) the child is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment; (3) a lesser disposition will deprecate the seriousness of the child's delinquent act; and (4) the delinquent act involved the illegal carrying, use, or possession of a firearm. La.Ch.C. art. 901(C). In imposing a disposition, the trial court is required to indicate in the record consideration of the statutory disposition guidelines. La.Ch.C. art. 903(A); see State in Interest of R.L.K., 95-1277 at p. 9, 666 So.2d at 432.
At the outset, we note that La.Ch.C. arts. 888, et seq., do not mandate a pre-disposition report order. Herein, at the disposition hearing, the judge noted that he had given a lot of thought to this matter, and that D.C. is a "troubled young man . . . in need of help." The judge noted the facts of the instant offenses, including the fact that the juvenile was engaged in a high-speed chase through residential neighborhoods and major thoroughfares and at times, travelling in the wrong direction, and nearly hit two police officers before crashing into a ditch. The judge noted that the juvenile endangered his own life, the passenger's life, and the lives of innocent citizens and police officers. The judge also noted that the juvenile had been in the court a number of times prior to this case and took notice of the juvenile's record, including suspended dispositions and a probation period of eighteen months for a 2009 simple burglary and a probation period of one year for a 2010 resisting an officer adjudication. The judge noted that the instant offenses were committed during D.C.'s probation. The judge further noted his review of the dispositional guidelines and noted that under La.Ch.C. art. 901(C)(1), there is an undue risk that during a period of suspended commitment or probation the child would commit another crime. The judge further found that under La.Ch.C. art. 901(C)(2) and (3), D.C. is in need of correctional treatment that can be most effectively provided in a custodial environment, and that lesser dispositions would deprecate the seriousness of the delinquent acts. Finally, the judge noted that a recent progress report from the detention center stated that the juvenile continued to be placed in "administrative subrogation" because of his behavior.
We reiterate that the imposed dispositions are to be served concurrently. The juvenile cites no authority for, and nor do we find merit in, the argument that the judge was required to impose one disposition for all of the adjudications. Considering the reasons cited at the disposition hearing, we find that the judge's dispositions on the adjudications were appropriate. However, we agree and the State concedes that the judge failed to credit D.C. with time spent in secure detention prior to the imposition of disposition, as required by La.Ch.C. art. 898(A). Therefore, we amend the dispositions to reflect that D.C. is to be given credit for any time served prior to imposition of the dispositions. See State v. Greer, 572 So.2d 1166, 1172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990). We remand the case and order the trial court to amend each judgment of disposition and the appropriate minute entry to reflect that D.C. is to be given credit for time served. The fifth assignment of error and disposition error section of the juvenile's appeal brief have
no further merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the juvenile's adjudications are affirmed, the dispositions are amended and affirmed as amended.
ADJUDICATIONS AFFIRMED, DISPOSITIONS AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.