Opinion
Case No. 990648-CA.
Filed November 16, 2000. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Kimberly K. Hornak.
Gary L. Bell, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Jan Graham and John Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian Ad Litem.
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
The juvenile court terminated Appellant's parental rights on clear and convincing evidence of abandonment and unfitness. Appellant has not directly challenged the juvenile court's rulings on these issues. Rather, he contests the termination of parental rights on the ground that his paternity was not satisfactorily established and that he was not provided with "reasonable services."
Regarding Appellant's status as father, only two possibilities exist: either he is the father or he is not. If he is not the biological father, "terminating" his nonexistent parental rights does not prejudice him. Assuming Appellant is the biological father, the juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Appellant had failed to meet minimum standards of care for his child, based on his abandonment and unfitness. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-407, -408 (1998 Supp. 2000). Because the juvenile court terminated Appellant's parental rights on these grounds, and he does not challenge them, we affirm the trial court's conclusion. See In re M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 960 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) (affirming court order to terminate parental rights because father did not challenge findings of neglect and unfitness as clearly erroneous).
Appellant next argues that the juvenile court should have ordered "reasonable services" to him, including visitation services and arrangement of contact rights under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-311(6) (Supp. 2000) ("If a parent is incarcerated or institutionalized, the court shall order reasonable services unless it determines that those services would be detrimental to the minor."). These services, he argues, should have been ordered regardless of whether, at the time, family reunification was being considered. At the very least, he claims, the court should have established that such services would be detrimental to the minor. We disagree.
The "reasonable services" Appellant refers to are "family reunification services" (reunification services). See id. § 78-3a-311(6). Appellant cites no legal authority defining the phrase "reasonable services" as anything other than its plain meaning in the context of section 78-3a-311: reunification services. Because of Appellant's abandonment, the court had no "duty to make `reasonable efforts' or to, in any other way, attempt to provide reunification services." See id. § 78-3a-311(2)(a) (1998); cf.M.E.C., 942 P.2d at 959-60 (stating "there is `no duty to offer rehabilitative services to parents in cases of obvious physical abuse, neglect, or abandonment'" (quoting In re J.L.W., 900 P.2d 543, 546 (Utah Ct.App. 1995))). Thus, we conclude that the juvenile court correctly interpreted the statute at issue as not requiring the court to order reunification services, nor to establish detriment to the minor.
Regarding abandonment, the juvenile court found that Appellant "admitted in his testimony that he has not communicated with [D.B.] for several years. He has not sent [D.B] any presents, cards, or letters. The evidence is clear that he has failed to show the normal interest of a natural parent."
We have considered Appellant's remaining argument, that the juvenile court should not have granted the motion to take judicial notice of the default order ruling he was the father when the State had not yet complied with a prior order, and find it without merit. Accordingly, we affirm.
While it is true that the State failed to comply with the order, we decline to address this argument because it contained no citation to legal authority. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 870, ¶ 8, 995 P.2d 14 ("Briefs that are not in compliance with rule 24 may be disregarded or stricken sua sponte by the court."); cf. Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, ¶ 8, 984 P.2d 987 (holding, to allow supreme court certiorari review, this court must "at the very least identify the basis for refusing to treat an issue").
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge
WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge.