Opinion
Case No. 20010774-CA.
FILED November 15, 2002. (Not For Official Publication)
Seventh District Juvenile, Price Department, The Honorable Scott N. Johansen.
Attorneys: Margret Sidwell Taylor, Helper, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Jackson, Davis, and Greenwood.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress. We affirm.
Defendant argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated during the police officers' investigation and subsequent level two stop. Specifically, Defendant argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when (1) the officers proceeded without a warrant to the backyard of a house where Defendant was a guest; and (2) the officers conducted a level two stop of Defendant without reasonable articulable suspicion. "We review factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard." State v. Galvan, 2001 UT App 329, ¶ 5, 37 P.3d 1197 (quotation and citations omitted). Additionally, a determination of "`whether a set of facts supports a reasonable articulable suspicion is a question of law that we review for correctness.'" Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ¶ 8, 998 P.2d 274 (quoting State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct.App. 1998)). However, we grant "`a measure of discretion . . . to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts.'" State v. Mogen, 2002 UT App 235, ¶ 6, 52 P.3d 462 (quoting State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah Ct.App. 1997)).
Defendant first argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officers proceeded to the backyard without permission or a warrant. Defendant has the burden of showing he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in property where he claims Fourth Amendment violations. See In re A.C.C., 2002 UT 22, ¶ 14, 44 P.3d 708 ("the proponent of a motion to suppress, must prove that [Defendant] possessed a `legitimate expectation of privacy . . .'") (citation omitted)). "[O]ne who `owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy.'" State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 566 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 n. 12 (1978)). However, this court has previously determined that an occasional guest has no reasonable expectation of privacy in property owned by another. See id. at 567.
Defendant nevertheless argues that a social guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy under State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992). In Rowe, this court held that a social guest had standing to challenge the validity of a search warrant. See id. at 736. However, in Rowe the defendant was a girlfriend of the owner of the home and had stayed overnight several times. See id. at 735. Additionally, the court noted that the defendant "felt secure enough in the home" to take her shoes off, roam around the house, and leave her purse unattended. Id. at 736. In this case, Defendant was initially found outside the house with a large group of people, and Defendant was apparently one of several people attending a party. Where Defendant was merely a guest at a party with no ownership or control of the home, he has no standing to assert a legitimate privacy interest.
Defendant's argument that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered the backyard also fails because officers' use of a driveway or walkway is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. InState v. Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah 1980), the court held that an officer who walked up a driveway and could see marijuana plants growing in the backyard, "was afforded an implicit invitation to enter upon the premises." Under similar circumstances other jurisdictions have also determined no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. See United States v. French, 291 F.3d 945, 953 (7th Cir. 2002) (public drives, sidewalks, or walkways (even those which lead to a rear side door) are not within the curtilage of the home when they are not enclosed by a gate or fence."); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 288 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding "officers may enter a person's yard without probable cause if they have a `legitimate reason . . . unconnected with a search of [the] premises,' and . . . a desire to speak to the party's host is such a legitimate reason").
Defendant next argues the officers conducted a level two stop without reasonable suspicion, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The circumstances relating to the stop include the following: a complaint of a loud party, loud noises coming from the residence, a large number of cars at the residence, the officers' observation of a juvenile with alcohol, Defendant's attempt to flee, and Defendant's statement admitting his consumption of alcohol. Utah courts have upheld a finding of reasonable suspicion on similar and less compelling facts. See Utah v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183, 186 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) (smell of alcohol on driver, reasonable belief defendant was a minor, and knowledge that defendant owned vehicle, held to be reasonable suspicion of defendant's intoxication). Viewing these facts objectively, Defendant's argument fails because the facts provide reasonable suspicion that Defendant was a minor in possession of alcohol.
Defendant's arguments relating to violations of Defendant's First Amendment right to free speech, the constitutionality of anonymous tips, and whether Defendant was guilty of disturbing the peace, will not be addressed because they were inadequately briefed. "`It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed.'" Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2002 UT 98, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 1122 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998)); see also Utah R. App. 24(a)(9).
In sum, we conclude that Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated; thus the trial court did not err in rejecting Defendant's Motion to Suppress. We therefore affirm.
I CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Presiding Judge.
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: James Z. Davis, Judge.