Hillman filed a motion in limine for a ruling on whether he would be allowed to introduce evidence at trial that the value of the remaining land not taken was diminished by the taking of the easements and the effect of using the temporary easement for its intended use, i.e., road construction. The trial court ruled any evidence of damage to the remaining inadmissible based on holdings of Fountain v. DeKalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302 ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980) and other cases which rely on the language from State Hwy. Dept. v. Hollywood c. Church, 112 Ga. App. 857 ( 146 S.E.2d 570) (1965) that in showing consequential damages from construction "it must be shown, among other things, that such factors are a continuous and permanent incident of the improvement," Hollywood c. Church, supra at 860. This has evolved into what the parties in this case refer to as the "temporary inconvenience rule" which the appellee contends prevents recovering consequential damages in cases of temporary partial takings.

In general, damages caused by mere temporary inconvenience due to the construction of a public project is not a proper element for consideration in determining just and adequate compensation in a condemnation proceeding. See MARTA v. Datry, 235 Ga. 568, 580 ( 220 S.E.2d 905); State Hwy. Dept. v. Hollywood Baptist Church, 112 Ga. App. 857 (2) ( 146 S.E.2d 570); Dept. of Transp. v. Dent, 142 Ga. App. 94 (1) ( 235 S.E.2d 610). Indeed it has been held that a temporary obstruction is not a taking or damaging of property under the Constitution by eminent domain, and the temporary obstruction of right of ingress and egress does not deprive one of his private property. Brown v. City of Atlanta, 167 Ga. 416 ( 145 S.E. 855).

ARGUED JULY 6, 1966 — DECIDED JULY 13, 1966. A full statement of the facts involved appears in State Hwy. Dept. v. Hollywood Baptist Church, 112 Ga. App. 857 ( 146 S.E.2d 570), when the case was here before. A second trial at which substantially the same evidence was introduced resulted in a verdict and judgment from which the condemnee appeals.

Therefore, it must be shown among other things that such factors are a continuous and permanent incident of the improvements on the damaged property. See State Highway Dept. v. Hollywood Baptist Church of Rome, 112 Ga. App. 857 at 860, 146 S.E.2d 570 (1965). And not only must plaintiff show that the condition was permanent but also that the new condition was the necessary concomitant of the road design.

See Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481 ( 195 S.E. 568) (1938) (noise); Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345 (5 a) ( 100 S.E. 207) (1919) (smoke: "There is in principle no distinction between ... smoke, smell, noise or gas."); Kea v. City of Dublin, 145 Ga. 511 ( 89 S.E. 484) (1916) (odors from garbage dump); Ingram v. City of Acworth, 90 Ga. App. 719 ( 84 S.E.2d 99) (1954) (odors from sewage plant). Others, such as State Hwy. Dept. v. Hollywood Baptist Church of Rome, 112 Ga. App. 857 ( 146 S.E.2d 570) (1965), are distinguishable. There the temporary inconvenience from the noise and dust of highway construction was held not compensable as consequential damages in a partial condemnation of property.

See Central Ga. Power Co. v. Mays, 137 Ga. 120, 124 ( 72 S.E. 900) (1911). Furthermore, defendants' contention, that such inconveniences would not be proper for consideration in a condemnation proceeding, is supported by State Hwy. Dept. v. Hollywood Baptist Church, 112 Ga. App. 857 ( 146 S.E.2d 570) (1965). "The evidence with respect to noise, smoke and dust being created as a result of the improvement to be placed on the property adjacent to the condemnee's remaining property related merely to the creation of such noise, smoke and dust during the period of the construction of the improvement, and there was no evidence whatsoever introduced which in any way tended to show that noise, smoke and dust would be a permanent or continuous incident of the improvement after the construction of it was completed.

"`In order for [such] factors [as noise, smoke, dust, and water] to be considered as adversely affecting the market value of the remaining property, it must be shown, among other things, that such factors are a continuous and permanent incident of the improvement . . ." [ State Hwy. Dept. v. Hollywood Baptist Church c., 112 Ga. App. 857 860 (2) ( 146 S.E.2d 570),] Accord, State Hwy. Dept. v. Davis, 129 Ga. App. 142, 144 ( 199 S.E.2d 275) (1973)." MARTA v. Datry, 235 Ga. 568, 579 (III), 580 ( 220 S.E.2d 905).

In the case before us, however, it is clear that the case was tried solely on the theory that market value was the yardstick by which the jury was to award damages. See State Hwy. Dept v. Hollywood Baptist Church c. Inc., 112 Ga. App. 857 (1) ( 146 S.E.2d 570) (1965). 4. The appellant's other enumerations of error have been considered and are deemed to be without merit.

Damages caused by mere temporary inconvenience due to the construction of the project for which the property was taken is not a proper element for consideration in determining just and adequate compensation for condemned realty. MARTA v. Datry, 235 Ga. 568, 580 ( 220 S.E.2d 905) (1975); State Hwy. Dept. v. Hollywood Baptist Church, 112 Ga. App. 857 (2) ( 146 S.E.2d 570) (1965). 2.

Our review of the charge as a whole shows there was no indication of a preference for either side and there was no inference that this was a proven fact. The entire charge on this subject was approved in State Hwy. Dept. v. Hollywood Baptist Church, 112 Ga. App. 857, 860 ( 146 S.E.2d 570) where our court said: "[T]he court charged the jury that `mere inconvenience is not, in and of itself, an element of damages to be considered in condemnation cases, but inconveniences such as noise, smoke, dust and the like may be considered if shown by the evidence to adversely affect the value of the condemnee's remaining property.' The charge was abstractly correct. Austin v. Augusta Terminal R. Co., 108 Ga. 671 ( 34 S.E. 852, 47 LRA 755)... In order for these factors to be considered as adversely affecting the market value of the remaining property, it must be shown, among other things, that such factors are a continuous and permanent incident of the improvement, and in the absence of such a showing this charge to the jury was error.