State Highway Dept. v. Alexander

3 Citing cases

  1. Levine v. Wyatt

    287 S.E.2d 649 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 3 times

    What we must decide is whether, in the instant case, the trial court was authorized to write-off from a general verdict an amount equal to that "available [to the plaintiff] for economic loss" under Code Ann. § 56-3403b (b). Appellant was required to present her case in accordance with the pretrial stipulation. See State Highway Dept. v. Alexander, 222 Ga. 354 ( 149 S.E.2d 788) (1966); Interstate N. Associates v. Hensley-Schmidt, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 487, 488 (1) ( 226 S.E.2d 315) (1976). Thus, having stipulated, in effect, that the case would be tried as a non-no-fault tort action, appellant was bound to present evidence of all her "recoverable" damages resulting from the collision, whether economic or non-economic. Compare King v. Parson, 149 Ga. App. 28, 29 (2) ( 253 S.E.2d 426) (1979).

  2. Swiney v. State Highway Department

    158 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 5 times
    In Swiney v. State Hwy. Dept., 116 Ga. App. 667 (2) (158 S.E.2d 321) (1967), the Court of Appeals relied on Code Ann. § 38-701 to hold that preliminary proof, to allow the admission of a plat in evidence, must show that the plat is correct and is a fair representation of what it purports to show.

    Preliminary proof, to allow admission of a plat into evidence, must show that the plat is correct and is a fair representation of what it purports to show. Code § 38-701; State Hwy. Dept. v. Alexander, 222 Ga. 354 (3) ( 149 S.E.2d 788); Hammett v. Thompson, 115 Ga. 762 (2) ( 156 S.E.2d 190). It is true that, as stated in Clarke County School District v. Madden, 99 Ga. App. 670 (2) ( 110 S.E.2d 47), plats are admissible where a witness testifies to their correctness, but this witness testified only to the source of the plat as embodied in preliminary drawings of the condemnor subsequently altered in various particulars. Whether the tract could have been divided under existing zoning restrictions into four lots facing Evans Road depended in part on whether a small segment thereof in an adjoining landlot belonged to the condemnee and whether, if so, it had been eliminated in the widening of Henderson Mill Road. There was testimony as to all these facts, and, under the circumstances of the case it was not harmful error to sustain objections to admitting the drawing in evidence on the grounds that it was not proved to be a true representation.

  3. Cheek v. Floyd County, Georgia

    308 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ga. 1970)   Cited 6 times

    See, e.g., State Highway Department v. Murray, 102 Ga. App. 210, 115 S.E.2d 711 (1960); 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.4441[9]. and [10]. Again the extent to which the change of grade affected the market value of plaintiff's property may range from none to substantial. (3) Over and above any element of loss of access or change of grade, the plaintiff here seeks to recover damages for loss of parking spaces as such. For such claim, the plaintiff relies on State Highway Dept. v. Alexander, 222 Ga. 354, 149 S.E.2d 788 (1966). However, examination of the facts there shows that the point at issue was just compensation for an area previously used for parking on the owner's property.