Opinion
20001.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 10, 1958.
DECIDED MARCH 7, 1958.
Equitable petition. Tift Superior Court. Before Judge Gray. December 5, 1957.
Eugene Cook, Attorney-General, Paul Miller, E. J. Summerour, Lamar L. Murdaugh, Assistant Attorneys-General, Ariel V. Conlin, for plaintiff in error.
John T. Ferguson, A. L. Kelley, Jr., Robert R. Forrester, contra.
The judgment of the trial court denying an injunction, and denying the title to the property in question to be in the Highway Department, and decreeing the title to be in the defendant in error was not erroneous for any reason assigned.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 10, 1958 — DECIDED MARCH 7, 1958.
The State Highway Department of Georgia brought an equitable petition against Willard Blalock, alleging that the Highway Department was the owner of a triangular-shaped parcel of land located in Tift County, Georgia; that the defendant had begun the erection of a filling station upon said tract of land. The plaintiff prayed that title to the land be decreed to be in the Highway Department, and that the defendant be enjoined from erecting the filling station thereon. W. L. Walker was vouched into court by the defendant Blalock. Both defendants filed answers, denying that the Highway Department owned the land, and contended that the land was the property of the defendant Blalock. The issue, by agreement, was submitted to the judge to decide all questions of law and fact without a jury upon a stipulation of facts. The trial judge decided against the Highway Department, denied the prayers of the petition, and decreed title to the property in question to be in the defendant Blalock. The exception here is to that judgment.
The Highway Department claimed title to the property in question under a deed from Mrs. Lillian Sineath Fournier, dated November 15, 1940. The defendant claimed title under a deed to W. L. Walker, dated January 21, 1952, and a deed from Walker to Willard Blalock dated July 15, 1953. The question presented, therefore, is whether or not the deed to the Highway Department covered the property in question or was sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the claim of title by the Highway Department. The description of the property as contained in the deed to the Highway Department reads as follows: "I do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to said Highway Board of Georgia, and their successor in office so much land as to make a right of way for said road, as surveyed and as shown on said map 100 feet wide or as shown by description below, hereby selling and conveying enough of my land to make said right of way said width through my land; said land being known as the . . . . . . place in the . . . . . District of said County, and on the said Highway known as the Tifton-Ocilla Public Road. The land herein conveyed is further described as follows:
"All that portion of land belonging to the undersigned, which lies within the right of way lines as shown on the plan for Federal Aid Project No. 2703-B(1), which plans are on file in the office of the State Highway Board of Georgia, Atlanta, Ga. Said right of way beginning at Station 3-30 which is the boundary line between the land of R/W State Route 50 and the undersigned party, and continuing to Station 4-90 which is the boundary lines between the lands of the undersigned and further land of Mrs. Fournier. The right of way covered by this deed is best shown by attached sketch. The right of way begins and ends where said Highway location enters and leaves my property and is bounded by my property lines as already established as above indicated and total approximately 160 lineal feet or 0.213 acres."
The sketch attached to the deed showed the intersection of State Route 37 and State Route 50, showing each of said roads to be 100 feet in width. In the triangular tract at the intersection of the two highways, there are straight lines or marks with the figures 160, 115, and 175 appearing on the three sides of the triangles. We discover nothing in the deed or sketch that would put an innocent purchaser upon notice that the Highway Department claimed any land located in this triangle, and we are here dealing with an innocent purchaser for value. The description in the deed expressly describes the land conveyed as a right of way 100 feet wide. The sketch attached shows a right of way 100 feet wide as to both highways, and no reason appears, in so far as the description in the deed or the sketch attached is concerned, why the lines and figures were placed in the triangle at the intersection of the two highways. Clearly the description in the deed purports to convey a right of way 100 feet in width. This could not possibly include the triangular tract in question.
It follows the judgment of the court below was not error for any reason assigned.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.