Opinion
Civil No. 2:04 CV 0149TS.
March 21, 2005
PAUL M. WARNER, CARLIE CHRISTENSEN, MAGGIE H. ABUHAIDAR, Salt Lake City, Utah, Attorneys for the Federal Defendants.
Kyle W. Jones, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES' MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on the United States of America's ("Defendant" or "United States") motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("Plaintiff" or "State Farm"). For the reasons stated below, the Court hereby grants Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
I. FACTS
A. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
On or about February 22, 2000, in Salt Lake County, Utah, Plaintiff's insured, Bruce Hanson ("Hanson"), was involved in an automobile-pedestrian accident with a vehicle owned by the United States Postal Service ("USPS") and driven by USPS employee Sue Monk ("Monk"). A. Compl. at ¶¶ 2, 4, 5. Plaintiff alleges that Monk was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident, id. at ¶ 4, and that the accident resulted from Monk's negligence, id. at ¶¶ 6-7. Plaintiff further alleges that the accident caused Hanson to suffer "injuries and damages." Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff claims that it has suffered $21,900.56 in "PIP" damages as a result of the accident. Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff seeks this amount plus interest. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9 p. 3.
B. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On December 8, 2004, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). On or about December 27, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Response to Motion to Dismiss. On January 10, 2005, Defendant filed a reply memorandum. The Court heard oral argument on February 28, 2005. After oral argument, the Court ruled in favor of Defendant, and instructed defense counsel to prepare this Memorandum Order containing findings of law.
II. FINDINGS OF LAW
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The United States seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Where, as here, the jurisdictional challenge is a facial attack, the Court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, assuming all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true. See Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991);Bauchman by and through Bauchman v. West High School, 900 F. Supp. 254, 259 (D. Utah 1995) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)), aff'd, 132 F.3d 542 (10th Cir. 1997),cert. denied, 524 U.S. 953 (1998). The Court may dismiss Plaintiff's complaint if `the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim to entitle him to relief.'" Williams, 926 F.2d at 997 (quoting Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 (10th Cir. 1986)); see also Bauchman, 900 F.Supp. at 259.
B. THE UNITED STATES IS ENTITLED TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.
The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671et seq., "defines the conditions under which the United States consents to suit for the torts of its employees acting within the scope of their employment." United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1989) (Sam, J.) ("USFG"). Section 2674 of the FTCA provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Section 1346(b) further provides that the United States is liable for its employees' torts "under circumstances where the United States if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
1. Utah Law Does Not Allow An Insurance Company To Recover PIP Benefits From A Secured Owner Or Operator Of A Vehicle.
Utah law requires "every resident owner of a motor vehicle" to "maintain owner's or operator's security in effect at any time that the motor vehicle is operated on a highway or on a quasi-public road or parking area within the state." Utah Stat. Ann. § 41-12a-301(2). The phrase "owner's or operator's security" is defined in Utah Stat. Ann. § 41-12a-103(9) to include an insurance policy satisfying the requirements of Utah Ann. Stat. § 31A-22-302. Section 302, in turn, requires that any policy purchased to satisfy "the owner's or operator's security requirement" of Section 301 include personal injury protection, or PIP. Utah Stat. Ann. § 31A-22-302(2); see also Utah Stat. Ann. § 31A-22-306 (defining personal injury protection).
If a person satisfies the owner's or operator's security requirement and is thereafter involved in an automobile accident, he is entitled to recover a certain amount of PIP benefits on a no-fault basis. See Utah Stat. Ann. § 31A-22-307 (outlining the coverage and benefits of personal injury protection). He may not, however, "maintain a cause of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile accident," unless he suffers:
(i) death;
(ii) dismemberment;
(iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings;
(iv) permanent disfigurement; or
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
Utah Stat. Ann. § 31A-22-309(1)(a).
This partial tort exemption does not apply if the tortfeasor himself did not satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement at the time of the accident. See Utah Stat. Ann. § 41-12a-304. Under these circumstances, the tortfeasor is "personally liable for the payment of the benefits provided for under Section 31A-22-307 to persons entitled to receive them under Section 31A-22-306." Id.
Conversely, if the tortfeasor satisfies the owner's or operator's security requirement, Utah's "no-fault insurance act confers two privileges: first, he is granted partial tort immunity; second, he is not personally liable for the [PIP] benefits provided under [Section 307]." Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 1980) (construing predecessor Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act). Because the tortfeasor who has the required security is not personally liable to the injured person for payment of Section 307 benefits, such tortfeasor also "has no personal obligation to reimburse the injured party's insurer" for such benefits. Id. at 1203; see also Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Assoc., Inc., 657 P.2d 1304, 1308-09 (Utah 1982) (same).
2. The United States Is In "Like Circumstances" To A Secured Owner Or Operator Of A Vehicle Under Utah Law And Is Therefore Immune From Suit.
In USFG, 728 F. Supp. at 653, this Court considered "whether the federal government, under the [FTCA], has waived immunity to allow an injured party's insurer to sue in Utah to recover PIP benefits." The Court rejected USFG's claim that the United States failed to satisfy the security requirement by failing to select the optional security set forth in Utah Stat. Ann. § 41-22-301(4). Id. at 654. Instead, the Court found that, because the United States provides its employees through the Federal Employees Compensation Act ("FECA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101et seq., with financial security at least equivalent to that required by Utah law, "the federal government is in similar circumstances to a `secured' owner or operator of a vehicle despite the fact the federal government did not select one of the options described in § 41-21a-103(9)." Id. at 654 n. 1. The Court also found that, under Utah law, an injured party's insurer does not have a claim for recovery of PIP benefits against a secured owner or operator of a vehicle. Id. at 654-55. Consequently, because the federal government was in like circumstances to a secured owner or operator, the Court concluded that the FTCA did not waive the United States' sovereign immunity to allow USFG's claim for recovery of PIP benefits. Id. at 655.
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States, 3 F.3d 1392, 1397 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly concluded that the United States was in "like circumstances" to a private party who had obtained no-fault insurance through a Colorado insurance company, even though the United States had not obtained such insurance. Id. at 1396-97;see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (D. Colo. 1994) ("Utah's no-fault law is similar to Colorado's."). Because a private party who had obtained no-fault insurance through a Colorado insurance company would not be "legally responsible" to reimburse the injured's insurer for PIP benefits under the Colorado no-fault law and because the United States was in like circumstances to such insured private party, the Court concluded that the United States could claim immunity if it provided insurance coverage equivalent to that required by Colorado law. Id. at 1395, 1398. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for such a determination. Id. at 1398.
In Allstate Insurance Co., 864 F.Supp. at 1018, the District of Colorado answered the question left open in Nationwide, i.e., whether the United States possesses "equivalent coverage" as that required by Colorado law. The court compared the coverage requirements of Colorado law with the coverage actually provided by the United States under FECA and the FTCA, id. at 1018-19, and concluded that "the United States, through its waiver of sovereign immunity in FTCA, and through the benefits provisions of FECA, provides `coverage equivalent to that required under [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §] 10-4-706,'" id. at 1019. Therefore, the Court determined that Allstate could not bring a subrogation claim against the United States. Id.
Every federal court which has considered this issue under similar state no-fault laws has reached the same conclusion: the United States is in like circumstances to a private party who has complied with the no-fault law's insurance requirements and, therefore, has not waived its sovereign immunity to a claim by an injured's insurer for reimbursement of paid PIP benefits. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. of N.J. v. United States, 335 F.Supp.2d 532, 538-543 (D.N.J. 2004); Witty v. United States, 947 F.Supp. 137, 141-43 (D.N.J. 1996); Lafferty v. United States, 880 F.Supp. 1121, 1134-38 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
Based on the above authority, the Court finds that, as a matter of law, the United States is in like circumstances to a "secured" owner or operator of a vehicle within the meaning of the Utah no-fault law. See USFG, 728 F.Supp. at 654; Utah Stat. Ann. §§ 41-12a-301(2), -304, -307, -309(1)(a). The United States' system of self-insurance constitutes "financial security at least equivalent" to that required by Utah law. See USFG, 728 F.Supp. at 654. Therefore, because a secured owner or operator of a vehicle would not be personally liable to reimburse the injured's insurer for PIP benefits under the Utah no-fault law, supra at 4-6, and because the United States is in like circumstances to such secured owner or operator, supra at 6-9, the United States is immune from suit and Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed.
III. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT
1. The United States' motion to dismiss is GRANTED; and
2. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).