Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. No. CIVRS706701, Martin A. Hildreth, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Mun. Ct., West Valley Div., assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed.
Yocis & Cox, Stephen M. Smith; Gilsleier & Enerle and Douglas S. Yee for Defendant and Appellant.
Pillemer & Pillemer, David B. Pillemer; Law Offices of Scott R. Kamrath and Scott R. Kamrath for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MILLER J.
Respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) sued appellant Joseph Halstead (Halstead) alleging general negligence, motor vehicle negligence, and subrogation. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of State Farm. The trial court awarded State Farm $29,327.20 plus interest. Halstead raises two issues. First, Halstead contends the trial court erred by violating his constitutional right to a jury trial. Second, Halstead asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court (a) awarded excessive damages, and (b) should have excluded evidence related to the actual cash value of the damaged vehicle, as well as the vehicle’s salvage value. We reverse the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We present the facts of the car accident, followed by the procedural history of the case.
A. CAR ACCIDENT
On April 27, 2006, Halstead was driving west on Baseline towards Day Creek Boulevard, in Rancho Cucamonga. When Halstead was less than 200 feet from the intersection, he saw that the traffic signal light was yellow. Halstead saw that a car was “coming up behind” him, so rather than stop, Halstead proceeded to enter the intersection. Halstead’s vehicle was struck by a Corvette in the intersection. The Corvette was driven by Richard Kaatz, who was travelling north on Day Creek. When Kaatz entered the intersection, the traffic signal for northbound traffic was green. An independent witness, who was traveling south on Day Creek, confirmed that the traffic signal was green for the northbound and southbound traffic on Day Creek at the time of the collision.
Kaatz’s Corvette was insured by State Farm at the time of the accident. State Farm compensated Kaatz for the total loss of the Corvette, which amounted to $31,241.20.
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 14, 2007, State Farm filed a complaint against Halstead alleging general negligence, motor vehicle negligence, and subrogation as the causes of action. In regard to the general negligence cause of action, State Farm alleged that Halstead negligently operated his vehicle, which caused damage to Kaatz’s Corvette. State Farm asserted that it paid for the damage to Kaatz’s Corvette, and therefore was subrogated to Kaatz’s right to sue Halstead. The motor vehicle cause of action again alleged that Halstead was negligent.
The third cause of action-subrogation-alleged that Kaatz was insured by State Farm. State Farm asserted that it paid Kaatz for the property damage sustained during the collision. State Farm alleged that it became subrogated to the rights of Kaatz for all payments made for the repair of the damaged vehicle. State Farm requested damages in the amount of $29,627.20, prejudgment interest, and compensatory damages.
The complaint reflects that Halstead was insured by State Farm, and that Halstead was compensated for his property damage. We infer that the complaint is in error, given the facts of the case, and that State Farm intended to allege that Kaatz was insured by State Farm and that Kaatz was compensated for his property damage.
On May 15, 2008, Halstead filed a demand for a jury trial and an answer to State Farm’s complaint. State Farm objected to the demand for a jury trial. State Farm argued that an insurance subrogation action is an equitable proceeding, which does not invoke a defendant’s right to a jury trial. Halstead asserted that the case involved disputed liability and disputed damages; therefore, he was entitled to a jury.
The trial court concluded that Halstead was not entitled to a jury on the subrogation cause of action, but that he was entitled a jury for the general negligence and motor vehicle negligence causes of action. State Farm requested that the trial court dismiss the two negligence causes of action. The trial court ordered that the two negligence causes of action be dismissed without prejudice. The case proceeded as a bench trial. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of State Farm, and awarded State Farm $29,327.20, plus interest.
DISCUSSION
A. JURY TRIAL
Halstead contends the trial court erred by violating his constitutional right to a jury trial. Specifically, Halstead asserts that a jury should have decided the issues related to liability and damages. We agree.
The right to a jury trial is guaranteed by our Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) However, “[a]s a general proposition, ‘[t]he jury trial is a matter of right in a civil action at law, but not in equity.’ [Citations.]” (C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 8 (C & K).) If a case includes both legal and equitable issues, then either litigant is entitled to have the legal issues tried by a jury. (Veale v. Piercy (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 557, 562.)
“‘In the case of insurance, subrogation takes the form of an insurer’s right to be put in the position of the insured in order to pursue recovery from third parties legally responsible to the insured for a loss which the insurer has both insured and paid. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Low v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1361.) Typically, the issue of whether an insurer is entitled to subrogation is an equitable matter, which is tried separately from the legal negligence issues. (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Cooperative of American Physicians, Inc. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 199, 206 (State Farm); see also Veale v. Piercy, supra, 206 Cal.App.2d at pp. 562-563.)
“An insurer bringing an action based upon a claim of equitable subrogation must establish the following elements: ‘(1) The insured has suffered a loss for which the party to be charged is liable, either because the latter is a wrongdoer whose act or omission caused the loss or because he is legally responsible to the insured for the loss caused by the wrongdoer; (2) the insurer, in whole or in part, has compensated the insured for the same loss for which the party to be charged is liable; (3) the insured has an existing, assignable cause of action against the party to be charged, which action the insured could have asserted for his own benefit had he not been compensated for his loss by the insurer; (4) the insurer has suffered damages caused by the act or omission upon which the liability of the party to be charged depends; (5) justice requires that the loss should be entirely shifted from the insurer to the party to be charged, whose equitable position is inferior to that of the insurer; and (6) the insurer’s damages are in a stated sum, usually the amount it has paid to its insured, assuming the payment was not voluntary and was reasonable.’ [Citation.]” (Dobbas v. Vitas (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 809, 817.)
In the instant case, State Farm presented the following witnesses: Halstead, who testified about how the accident occurred; a law enforcement officer, who testified about the accident scene and reports of how the accident occurred; Kaatz, who testified about how the accident occurred; an independent witness, who testified about how the accident occurred; and a State Farm claims representative, who testified about the damages suffered as a result of the accident.
When the trial court made its findings, it stated, “[T]he Court finds that Mr. Halstead was, in fact, negligent in the operation of his vehicle. It appears he was inattentive. And when he saw the developing situation, it was too late when he tried to gun his vehicle and he was the prime mover and cause of the accident and the ultimate destruction of Mr. Kaatz’s Corvette. [¶] The Court finds that the vehicle struck was a total loss except for a small amount of salvage value. Court finds further that the ADP valuation of $28,090 appears to be appropriate.”
In reviewing the record, it appears that the primary issues decided at trial were related to negligence, specifically, the issues of causation and damages. Whether causation has been proven is a question of fact for a jury. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.) The questions of whether to award damages and how much damages to award are also triable issues of fact for the jury. (R.J. Land & Associates Construction Co. v. Kiewit-Shea (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 416, 429; StreetScenes v. ITC Entertainment Group, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 233, 245.) Accordingly, it appears that most of the trial was focused on questions that are typically reserved for a jury. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying Halstead a jury on those issues. (See State Farm, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 206 [similar conclusion].)
State Farm contends that a jury trial was not required in the instant case because the cause of action was equitable. As set forth ante, we agree that subrogation is an equitable cause of action; however, the preliminary issue of whether Halstead’s negligence caused the car accident was a finding that required a jury. (State Farm, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 206.) Accordingly, we are not persuaded that a jury was not required.
State Farm analogizes the instant case to C & K, supra, 23 Cal.3d 1. In C & K, a general contractor accepted a bid from a subcontractor. (Id. at p. 5.) The subcontractor refused to perform in accordance with its bid. The general contractor sued the subcontractor seeking $102,660 in damages for the breach of contract. The subcontractor asserted that its bid was the result of a mistaken calculation; that the general contractor knew about the mistake, but failed to notify the subcontractor or permit it to revise its bid; therefore, the subcontractor asserted that the general contractor should be barred from recovering damages. (Ibid.)
The subcontractor demanded a jury trial. (C & K, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 6.) The trial court found the case to be primarily equitable, i.e., promissory estoppel, but empanelled an advisory jury to consider the sole issue of the general contractor’s reasonable reliance on the subcontractor’s promise. The jury found that the general contractor reasonably relied, to its detriment, on the subcontractor’s bid. The trial court adopted the jury’s finding and entered a $102,620 judgment in favor of the general contractor. (Ibid.)
On appeal, the subcontractor contended that it was denied its right to a jury trial, because the general contractor’s action primarily involved a request for damages. (C & K, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 6.) The appellate court concluded that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is essentially equitable in nature. (Id. at p. 8.) The appellate court reasoned that a prayer for damages does not convert an essentially equitable action into a legal one for which a jury is required. (Id. at p. 11.) The appellate court concluded “that the trial court properly treated the action as equitable in nature, to be tried by the court with or without an advisory jury as the court elected.” (Ibid.)
We do not find State Farm’s reliance on C & K to be persuasive because C & K is not a subrogation case. The law has provided that in subrogation cases, the preliminary negligence issues should be decided by a jury. (State Farm, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 206.) The equitable issue of State Farm’s subrogation rights does not arise until the legal negligence issues have been settled. (Ibid.) Due to the lack of jury findings on the negligence issues, the judgment must be reversed. (Selby Constructors v. McCarthy (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 517, 527 [denial of right to a jury is reversible error per se].)
B. REMAINING CONTENTIONS
Halstead contends the trial court (1) awarded excessive damages, and (2) erroneously overruled his objections to certain evidence. Since the matter must be reversed, these remaining issues are moot; therefore, we do not address them. (See Norman v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1253 [reversal renders remaining contentions moot].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Appellant is to recover his costs on appeal.
We concur: HOLLENHORST Acting P. J., CODRINGTON J.