Opinion
C.A. No. 02C-08-019-FSS.
Submitted: September 12, 2003.
Decided: December 2, 2003.
Upon Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment — GRANTED
Colin M. Shalk, Esquire, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Jeffrey S. Friedman, Esquire, Silverman McDonald, Attorney for Defendants.
Gordon L. McLaughlin, Esquire, Attorney for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an insurance coverage case. Under Delaware law, a minor driver's negligence is imputed to the adult who signed the minor's license application. The law indirectly encourages parents to obtain automobile insurance to protect the public and avoid personal responsibility for their children's torts. The question here is whether an insurance company must cover a mother who signed her son's license, even though the son was neither living with her when he allegedly caused a serious accident, nor was he named in her insurance policy. For its answer, the court will consider the insurance policy and Delaware's insurance code.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 Del. C. § 6105(a) (1974).
I.
Procedurally, on September 27, 2001, Fred Quercetti, Jr. filed a complaint for injuries arising from a June 30, 2001 automobile accident that Clint Eastburn allegedly caused. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company filed a complaint on August 2, 2002, against Clint Eastburn, Christie Eastburn, Robin Haldeman, and Quercetti requesting a declaration that it need not provide coverage here. State Farm amended its complaint on October 21, 2002.
On May 9, 2003, State Farm moved for summary judgment against Defendants Clint and Christie Eastburn, and Haldeman. Defendants responded to State Farm's motion on June 13, 2003, and Haldeman filed a supplemental response on July 31, 2003. State Farm responded by letter to Haldeman's supplemental filing on August 7, 2003. It filed its own supplemental response in a letter on August 8, 2003, and sent a third letter to the court on September 2, 2003. As a courtesy, the court announced its decision during a status conference on November 24, 2003. This is the formal decision on State Farm's summary judgment motion.
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. A court deciding a summary judgment motion must identify disputed factual issues whose resolution is necessary to decide the case, but the court must not decide those issues. On summary judgment in an insurance coverage case where material facts are disputed, the court must view all the facts, disputed and undisputed, in the light must favorable to the non-moving party, consider the policy, apply the law as the court determines it to be, and in that way decide the motion.
Johnson v. Bowman, 1997 WL 719354, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct.) (citing Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99-100 (Del. 1992).
Merrill, 606 A.2d at 99.
III.
On June 30, 2001, Clint Eastburn, a minor with a learner's permit, severely injured Fred Quercetti, Jr. in a collision. Eastburn was driving his sister, Christie Eastburn's, car. Christie purchased the car with her own money, titled it solely in her name, and insured it through Progressive Insurance Company. Christie was living with Robin Haldeman, who is Christie's and Clint's mother.
Five or six months before the accident, Clint had moved out of Haldeman's home to live with his father, Gary Eastburn. Gary was not responsible for child support. Instead, he and Haldeman merely had a "liberal" arrangement regarding Clint. Haldeman did not claim Clint as a dependent on her 2001 tax return, although she had done that the year before.
Haldeman was insured by State Farm. She never added Clint's name to the policy, but she signed Clint's driver license application. State Farm never asked Haldeman if she had minor children, or if she had signed a minor's license application. Among other things, Haldeman's policy provides that State Farm:
. . . will pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay because of: bodily injury to others and damage to or destruction of property . . . caused by accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of [the insured's] car. . . .
State Farm Insurance Policy at pg. 7.
An insured is defined as ". . . the first person named in the declarations . . . their relatives. . . ." The policy, however, defines "relative" as:
Id.
. . . a person related to [the insured] . . . who lives primarily with [the insured].
Id. at pg. 4.
As mentioned, although Clint is related to Haldeman, he was living primarily with his father.
IV.
Haldeman's position is that her State Farmpolicy must respond because, as a "covered insured," she is entitled to coverage for all her legal liability arising from auto accidents, including the liability imposed on her by law for damage caused by her son to Quercetti. She focuses on her personal liability, regardless of whether it falls on her because of her or her son's driving. Put another way, Haldeman contends that when State Farm issued her automobile insurance, in effect, it agreed to cover not only her, but also her teenage son, even if he lived away from her and when he was driving someone else's car.
By its plain language, however, State Farm's policy does not cover every instance where Haldeman, as the named insured, has liability thrust upon her. To the contrary, the policy pinpoints when she is covered. The policy will respond, but only for liability resulting from Haldeman's car ownership. Haldeman's liability here results from her having signed Clint's license, not from her car ownership.
See O'Brien v. Progressive Northern Insurance Company, 785 A.2d 281, 288 (Del. 2001) (court will not torture policy terms to create ambiguity where none exists).
The policy also extends coverage to the use of a "non-owned car" by an insured. "Non-owned car" is defined as:
. . . a car not owned, registered or leased by: 1. [insured], [insured's spouse]; 2. any relative unless at the time of the accident or loss — (a) the car currently is or has within the last 30 days been insured for liability coverage; and (b) the driver is an insured who does not own or lease the car. . . .
State Farm Insurance Policy at pg. 3.
The car Clint was driving, however, did not qualify as a non-owned car. It was owned by Haldeman's daughter, a relative living with Haldeman. Moreover, "insured" is defined by the policy both generally and in the "non-owned car" context. Generally, it means the person named in the policy. As to a "non-owned car," insured means the named insured as well as her relatives. But, "relative" is defined as someone not only related to the named insured, but also as someone who lives primarily with the named insured. For the policy's purposes, therefore, Clint did not qualify as a covered relative because he was not living with Haldeman. Under the policy alone and the undisputed facts, Haldeman is not entitled to coverage. That leaves open the possibility that State Farm must respond by operation of law.
See Engerbretsen v. Engerbretsen, 675 A.2d 13, 18 (Del.Super.Ct. 1995) (relevant factors include abandonment of prior residence with no intent to return, dwelling of family under one roof, and support of occupier by policyholder).
As mentioned at the outset, a minor driver's negligence is imputed to the adult who signed the minor's license application. The adult is jointly and severally liable for the child's negligence. Thus, as a matter of law, Haldeman will be liable if Quercetti proves that her son's negligence caused damages. Even so, Haldeman presents no authority for requiring Haldeman's automobile insurance carrier to respond here. The court appreciates that unless Haldeman is covered, she and Quercetti will be let to their resources, Quercetti's underinsured motorist coverage and Haldeman's personal assets. Nevertheless, assuming liability for a teenage driver is a major undertaking. There is no evidence that State Farm agreed to protect Haldeman from liability she assumed, by law, when she signed her teenage son's license. And no statute imposes a duty on State Farm to provide coverage for the risk Haldeman voluntarily assumed.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, as a matter of law and without fact-finding, State Farm's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.