Opinion
No. CV03-0180959S
July 16, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This action comes before this court on an application to vacate an arbitration award dated September 5, 2003 in favor of the defendants filed by the plaintiff. The defendants subsequently filed an application to confirm the arbitration award. The court heard argument on both applications, as well as having received briefs, transcripts and supporting evidence regarding the arbitration award.
The facts are that on March 24, 1999, the defendants, Gina Piombo and Kacey Jarjura, (with a third friend, Stacey Therrien), were traveling in a westerly direction on Pine Street in Waterbury, Connecticut in a vehicle driven by Piombo (the Piombo vehicle) when they were struck from behind by another vehicle. The vehicle that struck the Piombo vehicle stopped momentarily and then after individuals in that vehicle switched seats so that another individual was driving, the vehicle that struck the Piombo vehicle fled the scene. The occupants of the Piombo vehicle were able to take down the marker plate number of the vehicle as it left the scene.
The resulting investigation by the police found that the vehicle had been leased by Virginia Ecklin from Camrac, Inc. Ms. Ecklin provided an affidavit and a deposition which indicated that she was not the operator of the motor vehicle when it struck the Piombo vehicle. She also provided testimony that her niece, Kwana Ecklin, was living with her at the time. She testified that Kwana denied to her that she was the unidentified hit and run operator of her vehicle (the Camrac vehicle).
In view of the fact that the identity of the operator of the Camrac vehicle was not ascertained, the defendants brought a claim for uninsured motorist coverage on the Piombo vehicle against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) which insured the Piombo vehicle. The defendants based their claim under the State Farm policy on the unidentified driver provision under the uninsured motorist coverage of the policy, also known as the hit-and-run driver provision.
The defendants' claim was heard by a three-arbitrator panel as required under the State Farm policy. The arbitrators were John J. Kennedy, Jr. (for Piombo and Jarjura); Kevin Murphy (for State Farm) and James Geanuracos (the neutral arbitrator). The hearing was held on May 5, 2003. The arbitrators by a 2-1 decision held in favor of Piombo and Jarjura. The majority (Geanuracos and Kennedy), specifically found that the tortfeasor vehicle (Camrac vehicle) left the scene and the operator was not identified. The majority also found that sufficient facts were not present for them to make a finding that Kwana Ecklin, Virginia Ecklin's niece, was operating the Camrac vehicle at the time of the accident. The dissent (by Murphy) did not rule in favor of the claimants because he felt that the claimants had the burden of proving that Kwana Ecklin was not the driver and if she was the driver that she was uninsured. The resulting decision by the arbitrators has led to the applications to vacate the arbitration award by State Farm. Piombo and Jarjura in response move to confirm the award.
The basis for vacating an arbitration award is established in General Statutes § 52-418(a), which states the following:
Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Since the parties were subject to binding arbitration pursuant to General Statutes § 38-336, this court must apply the substantial evidence test in reviewing the panel's factual findings.
Because the issue in this case is one of coverage and coverage issues are subject to compulsory arbitration under § 38-175c [now § 38a-336], we review the arbitrators' resolution of the issue de novo. When an arbitration panel's interpretation and application of the law is at issue, an appellate court must conduct a de novo review . . . Conversely, the appropriate standard of review of the factual findings of an arbitration panel is the substantial evidence test . . . Pursuant to this test, the reviewing court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the arbitrators' findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable . . . [R]eview of questions of law includes . . . inquiry into whether the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or imperfectly executed them.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Allstate Ins. Co. v. Caltabiano, 74 Conn. App. 49, 54-55, 809 A.2d 1153 (2002).
In Almeida v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 234 Conn. 817, 663 A.2d 382 (1995), the Supreme Court further expounded on the substantial evidence test:
It is the established policy of the courts to regard awards with liberality . . . Every reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor of an award of arbitrators and of their acts and proceedings . . . Hence, the burden rests on the party attacking the award to produce evidence sufficient to invalidate or avoid it . . . Thus, a reviewing court must uphold an arbitration award unless it determines that the factual findings of the arbitrators are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 824-25.
The court in D'Addio v. Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn., 30 Conn. App. 729, 622 A.2d 609 (1993) gives further guidance on the scope of review to be made by this court:
The test in this context requires that a court determine whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the [arbitration panel's] findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable . . . Substantial evidence will be found to exist if the . . . record supplies a substantial basis of fact from which the court reasonably can infer the fact in issue . . . A reviewing court must defer to the arbitrators' right to credit testimony in whole, in part, or not at all . . . The fact that a possibility exists that two inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence does not prevent the arbitrators' finding from being supported by substantial evidence.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 773-74.
Upon the direction given by the appellate court precedent, this court reviewed the transcript of the testimony given at the arbitration hearing, as well as the depositions and affidavits provided to the arbitrators. The court cannot conclude that the arbitrators violated § 52-418(a)(4) by either exceeding their authority or imperfectly executing their authority. Applying the substantial evidence test, the decision reached by the majority of the arbitrators based on the record is reasonable.
As the D'Addio court concluded, the fact that two inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence does not prevent the arbitrators' finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Id. The majority of the arbitrators found that the tortfeasor was unidentified and therefore there was uninsured motorist coverage for this accident. The substantial evidence supports that conclusion.
Therefore, the court denies the plaintiff's Application to Vacate Arbitration Award and grants the defendants' Application to Confirm Arbitration Award dated September 5, 2003.
AGATI, J.