State Farm Mut. c. Ins. Co. v. Barnard

22 Citing cases

  1. Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Jones

    286 Ala. 606 (Ala. 1970)   Cited 78 times
    In Jones, supra, the Court relied heavily upon the Florida case of Sellers v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 185 So.2d 689 (1966).

    The design and purpose of Uninsured Motorist statutes are to afford insurance protection to the same extent as would have been in effect if the tortfeasor had complied with the minimum requirements of the Financial Responsibility Act. Harris v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 448 S.W.2d 652 (Ark. 1970); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Howe, 106 N.H. 422, 213 A.2d 420 (1965); Tindall v. Farmers Auto Management Corp., 83 Ill. App.2d 165, 226 N.E.2d 397 (1967); State Farm v. Bafus, 466 P.2d 159 (Wash. 1970); M. F. A. v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W.2d 742 (1968); Varvil v. M. F. A., 243 Ark. 692, 421 S.W.2d 346 (1967); Hackman v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 261 A.2d 433 (N.H. 1970); Bryant v. State Farm, 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965); State Farm v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 156 S.E.2d 148 (1967); Title 36, Section 74(62a), Code of Ala., Recompiled 1958, Title 36, Section 74(46c), Pocket Part; New Hampshire Uninsured Motorist Statutes, RSA 268:15-a; Ill.Revised Statutes, Chapt. 73 (Sec. 755a); Ark. Statutes Annotated, Sec. 66-4003; Washington Law RCW 48.22.030; Virginia Code 1950 Sec. 38.1-381(b); Georgia Code, Sec. 56-407.1; Code of Laws of South Carolina, Sec. 46750.33. Where a bill rejected by the Legislature contains numerous provisions not contained in a second bill enacted by the Legislature and covering the same subject matter, any attempt to decipher legislative intent by comparing the enacted bill with a singled out provision of the rejected bill is purely speculative.

  2. Olukoya v. American Ass'n of Cab Companies

    414 S.E.2d 275 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 4 times
    In Olukoya v. American Assn. of Cab Companies, Inc., 202 Ga. App. 251, 253-254 (2) (414 S.E.2d 275) (1991), we held that AACCI, as a no-fault self-insurer, acted unlawfully under OCGA § 33-34-1 et seq., in restricting claims for services to certain designated providers.

    [Cits.] The [mandate of the former Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act] ([former OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (2)]) is plain and unambiguous in requiring all liability policies [and self-insurance plans] to undertake to pay the insured [`no-fault benefits without regard to fault for economic loss resulting from [an] ... [a]ccidental bodily injury' such as that which was sustained by appellant]." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 858 ( 156 S.E.2d 148) (1967). It follows that the trial court's order cannot be affirmed based upon the unauthorized limitation and exclusion contained in appellee's plan of self-insurance.

  3. General Elec. c. Corp. v. Home Indem. Co.

    168 Ga. App. 344 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 41 times
    Holding one year statute of limitations period was reasonable

    In Georgia we have often negated provisions in an insurance contract which violate or are contrary to statutory provisions. See State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857 ( 156 S.E.2d 148); State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. 710 ( 177 S.E.2d 257). As was held in Nelson v. Southern Guaranty Ins. Co., 221 Ga. 804, 807 ( 147 S.E.2d 424): "Existing and valid statutory provisions enter into and form a part of all contracts of insurance to which they are applicable, and in case of conflict between the policy and the statutory provisions, the latter control." Accord, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Landskroener, 150 Ga. App. 308, 309 ( 257 S.E.2d 376); Flewellen v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 250 Ga. 709, 713 ( 300 S.E.2d 673).

  4. American Chain c. Co. v. Brunson

    157 Ga. App. 833 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 22 times

    In Georgia, the usual circumstances under which a loan receipt is executed involve a loan to an insured by his insurer for property damages resulting from a tortious act by a third party. McCann v. Dixie Lake c. Co., 44 Ga. App. 700 ( 162 S.E. 869) (1931); Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Powell, 70 Ga. App. 213 ( 27 S.E.2d 896) (1943); Green v. Johns, 86 Ga. App. 646 ( 72 S.E.2d 78) (1952); Clark v. American Cas. Co., 96 Ga. App. 328 ( 99 S.E.2d 897) (1957); Lowance v. Dempsey, 99 Ga. App. 592 ( 109 S.E.2d 318) (1959); Coleman v. State Farm c. Inc. Co., 104 Ga. App. 328 ( 121 S.E.2d 833) (1961); Kirkendohl v. State Farm Mutual c. Co., 104 Ga. App. 834 ( 122 S.E.2d 922) (1961); State Farm Mut. c. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857 ( 156 S.E.2d 148) (1967); Pharo v. Travelers Ins. Co., 119 Ga. App. 344 ( 167 S.E.2d 226) (1969); Hall v. Helms, 150 Ga. App. 257 ( 257 S.E.2d 349) (1979). The loan receipt in such cases arises out of a policy of insurance which provides the insured with protection against damage to his property.

  5. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Renshaw

    151 Ga. App. 80 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 5 times
    In Renshaw, the state court concluded a loss resulting from the theft of plaintiff's bank card and personal identification number (PIN) constituted a "forgery" under plaintiff's homeowners insurance policy.

    Contrary to appellant's contentions, plaintiff-Renshaw's agreement with the First National Bank of Atlanta constitutes a loan-receipt agreement, not an assignment of her cause of action. See State Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 859 ( 156 S.E.2d 148); Green v. Johns, 86 Ga. App. 646 (2) ( 72 S.E.2d 78). Thus, in spite of any payment received pursuant to her loan-receipt agreement with the First National Bank of Atlanta, plaintiff-insured is the real party in interest and may sue for the losses she sustained from the misuse of her bank card.

  6. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Goza

    137 Ga. App. 581 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 15 times

    Thus, where an "other insurance" policy provision attempts to limit coverage to sums which are in excess of other uninsured motorist protection, it conflicts with the plain terms of the statute, and is of no effect. State Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, supra; Travelers Indem. Co. v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 414 ( 167 S.E.2d 174); see Woods v. State Farm c. Ins. Co., 234 Ga. 782 ( 218 S.E.2d 65); State Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857 ( 156 S.E.2d 148); State Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Harper, 125 Ga. App. 696 ( 188 S.E.2d 813). See also Anno., 28 ALR3d 551, 559.

  7. State Farm v. Carlson

    130 Ga. App. 27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 23 times
    In Carlson, supra, the requirement of physical contact was deemed satisfied by the striking of a third vehicle by the unknown vehicle, which third vehicle in turn struck the insured vehicle.

    Since the statute does not exclude government-owned vehicles, a provision of the insurance policy could not serve to "circumvent the clear mandate of the Act." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 858 ( 156 S.E.2d 148). See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 414, 417 ( 167 S.E.2d 174). Hence, the question is answered in the negative.

  8. The Mousetrap v. Blackmon

    201 S.E.2d 330 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 6 times

    While "in the interpretation of doubtful statutes, much weight will be given such administrative and legislative interpretations" ( Thompson v. Eastern Air Lines, 200 Ga. 216, 224 ( 39 S.E.2d 225); Undercofler v. Eastern Air Lines, 221 Ga. 824, 832, supra), administrative construction should be restricted to cases in which the meaning of the statute is really doubtful and must be disregarded where its invalidity is apparent. Standard Oil Co. v. State Revenue Commission, 179 Ga. 371, 376 ( 176 S.E. 1); Elder v. Home Bldg. Loan Assn., 188 Ga. 113 (2) ( 3 S.E.2d 75, 122 ALR 738); Suttles v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 495, 515 ( 21 S.E.2d 695, 143 ALR 343); Hawes v. Nashville c. R. Co., 223 Ga. 527, 529 ( 156 S.E.2d 455); Fulton County v. Holland, 71 Ga. App. 455, 461 ( 31 S.E.2d 202); Brown v. Quality Finance Co., 112 Ga. App. 369 (3) ( 145 S.E.2d 99); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 858 ( 156 S.E.2d 148); Warestores, Inc. v. Nash, 125 Ga. App. 210, 212 ( 186 S.E.2d 806). In the instant case the authority of the Commissioner to issue licenses is specifically limited under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act which were not amended by the 1964 amendment, and we must conclude that the Commissioner's contrary construction can not alter these clear and explicit provisions.

  9. Bass v. State Farm c. Ins. Co.

    128 Ga. App. 285 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 18 times
    Stating that in UM coverage, "the named insured is covered wherever he is, whether in that car, another car, or no car"

    Both the Supreme Court and this Court have held that conditions contrary to the statute are void. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. 710, supra, and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857 ( 156 S.E.2d 148), cases both involving this defendant. In particular, however, State Farm was the defendant in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harper, 125 Ga. App. 696 ( 188 S.E.2d 813), where examination of the record reveals that the exact exclusion here relied upon has been held void because contrary to the provisions of the statute.

  10. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Williams

    167 S.E.2d 174 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 41 times
    In Travelers Indem. Co. v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 414, 416 (167 S.E.2d 174), we pointed out that any policy provision which attempts to contravene the clear intent of the Uninsured Motorists' Act is void and not enforceable.

    1 (a)). As was stated in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 858 ( 156 S.E.2d 148), exclusions in uninsured motorist endorsements cannot "circumvent the clear mandate of the Act by withholding the protection required." In Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897 ( 140 S.E.2d 817), the plaintiff was attempting to recover under the terms of two separate uninsured motorists policies.