The design and purpose of Uninsured Motorist statutes are to afford insurance protection to the same extent as would have been in effect if the tortfeasor had complied with the minimum requirements of the Financial Responsibility Act. Harris v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 448 S.W.2d 652 (Ark. 1970); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Howe, 106 N.H. 422, 213 A.2d 420 (1965); Tindall v. Farmers Auto Management Corp., 83 Ill. App.2d 165, 226 N.E.2d 397 (1967); State Farm v. Bafus, 466 P.2d 159 (Wash. 1970); M. F. A. v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W.2d 742 (1968); Varvil v. M. F. A., 243 Ark. 692, 421 S.W.2d 346 (1967); Hackman v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 261 A.2d 433 (N.H. 1970); Bryant v. State Farm, 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965); State Farm v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 156 S.E.2d 148 (1967); Title 36, Section 74(62a), Code of Ala., Recompiled 1958, Title 36, Section 74(46c), Pocket Part; New Hampshire Uninsured Motorist Statutes, RSA 268:15-a; Ill.Revised Statutes, Chapt. 73 (Sec. 755a); Ark. Statutes Annotated, Sec. 66-4003; Washington Law RCW 48.22.030; Virginia Code 1950 Sec. 38.1-381(b); Georgia Code, Sec. 56-407.1; Code of Laws of South Carolina, Sec. 46750.33. Where a bill rejected by the Legislature contains numerous provisions not contained in a second bill enacted by the Legislature and covering the same subject matter, any attempt to decipher legislative intent by comparing the enacted bill with a singled out provision of the rejected bill is purely speculative.
[Cits.] The [mandate of the former Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act] ([former OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (2)]) is plain and unambiguous in requiring all liability policies [and self-insurance plans] to undertake to pay the insured [`no-fault benefits without regard to fault for economic loss resulting from [an] ... [a]ccidental bodily injury' such as that which was sustained by appellant]." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 858 ( 156 S.E.2d 148) (1967). It follows that the trial court's order cannot be affirmed based upon the unauthorized limitation and exclusion contained in appellee's plan of self-insurance.
In Georgia we have often negated provisions in an insurance contract which violate or are contrary to statutory provisions. See State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857 ( 156 S.E.2d 148); State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. 710 ( 177 S.E.2d 257). As was held in Nelson v. Southern Guaranty Ins. Co., 221 Ga. 804, 807 ( 147 S.E.2d 424): "Existing and valid statutory provisions enter into and form a part of all contracts of insurance to which they are applicable, and in case of conflict between the policy and the statutory provisions, the latter control." Accord, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Landskroener, 150 Ga. App. 308, 309 ( 257 S.E.2d 376); Flewellen v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 250 Ga. 709, 713 ( 300 S.E.2d 673).
In Georgia, the usual circumstances under which a loan receipt is executed involve a loan to an insured by his insurer for property damages resulting from a tortious act by a third party. McCann v. Dixie Lake c. Co., 44 Ga. App. 700 ( 162 S.E. 869) (1931); Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Powell, 70 Ga. App. 213 ( 27 S.E.2d 896) (1943); Green v. Johns, 86 Ga. App. 646 ( 72 S.E.2d 78) (1952); Clark v. American Cas. Co., 96 Ga. App. 328 ( 99 S.E.2d 897) (1957); Lowance v. Dempsey, 99 Ga. App. 592 ( 109 S.E.2d 318) (1959); Coleman v. State Farm c. Inc. Co., 104 Ga. App. 328 ( 121 S.E.2d 833) (1961); Kirkendohl v. State Farm Mutual c. Co., 104 Ga. App. 834 ( 122 S.E.2d 922) (1961); State Farm Mut. c. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857 ( 156 S.E.2d 148) (1967); Pharo v. Travelers Ins. Co., 119 Ga. App. 344 ( 167 S.E.2d 226) (1969); Hall v. Helms, 150 Ga. App. 257 ( 257 S.E.2d 349) (1979). The loan receipt in such cases arises out of a policy of insurance which provides the insured with protection against damage to his property.
Contrary to appellant's contentions, plaintiff-Renshaw's agreement with the First National Bank of Atlanta constitutes a loan-receipt agreement, not an assignment of her cause of action. See State Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 859 ( 156 S.E.2d 148); Green v. Johns, 86 Ga. App. 646 (2) ( 72 S.E.2d 78). Thus, in spite of any payment received pursuant to her loan-receipt agreement with the First National Bank of Atlanta, plaintiff-insured is the real party in interest and may sue for the losses she sustained from the misuse of her bank card.
Thus, where an "other insurance" policy provision attempts to limit coverage to sums which are in excess of other uninsured motorist protection, it conflicts with the plain terms of the statute, and is of no effect. State Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, supra; Travelers Indem. Co. v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 414 ( 167 S.E.2d 174); see Woods v. State Farm c. Ins. Co., 234 Ga. 782 ( 218 S.E.2d 65); State Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857 ( 156 S.E.2d 148); State Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Harper, 125 Ga. App. 696 ( 188 S.E.2d 813). See also Anno., 28 ALR3d 551, 559.
Since the statute does not exclude government-owned vehicles, a provision of the insurance policy could not serve to "circumvent the clear mandate of the Act." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 858 ( 156 S.E.2d 148). See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 414, 417 ( 167 S.E.2d 174). Hence, the question is answered in the negative.
While "in the interpretation of doubtful statutes, much weight will be given such administrative and legislative interpretations" ( Thompson v. Eastern Air Lines, 200 Ga. 216, 224 ( 39 S.E.2d 225); Undercofler v. Eastern Air Lines, 221 Ga. 824, 832, supra), administrative construction should be restricted to cases in which the meaning of the statute is really doubtful and must be disregarded where its invalidity is apparent. Standard Oil Co. v. State Revenue Commission, 179 Ga. 371, 376 ( 176 S.E. 1); Elder v. Home Bldg. Loan Assn., 188 Ga. 113 (2) ( 3 S.E.2d 75, 122 ALR 738); Suttles v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 495, 515 ( 21 S.E.2d 695, 143 ALR 343); Hawes v. Nashville c. R. Co., 223 Ga. 527, 529 ( 156 S.E.2d 455); Fulton County v. Holland, 71 Ga. App. 455, 461 ( 31 S.E.2d 202); Brown v. Quality Finance Co., 112 Ga. App. 369 (3) ( 145 S.E.2d 99); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 858 ( 156 S.E.2d 148); Warestores, Inc. v. Nash, 125 Ga. App. 210, 212 ( 186 S.E.2d 806). In the instant case the authority of the Commissioner to issue licenses is specifically limited under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act which were not amended by the 1964 amendment, and we must conclude that the Commissioner's contrary construction can not alter these clear and explicit provisions.
Both the Supreme Court and this Court have held that conditions contrary to the statute are void. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. 710, supra, and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857 ( 156 S.E.2d 148), cases both involving this defendant. In particular, however, State Farm was the defendant in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harper, 125 Ga. App. 696 ( 188 S.E.2d 813), where examination of the record reveals that the exact exclusion here relied upon has been held void because contrary to the provisions of the statute.
1 (a)). As was stated in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857, 858 ( 156 S.E.2d 148), exclusions in uninsured motorist endorsements cannot "circumvent the clear mandate of the Act by withholding the protection required." In Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897 ( 140 S.E.2d 817), the plaintiff was attempting to recover under the terms of two separate uninsured motorists policies.