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reaffirming that Texas law "does not require a trial court to evaluate the merits of the plaintiffs' claims."
Summary of this case from Snyder Comm. v. MaganaOpinion
No. 01-0540
Opinion Delivered: October 31, 2002
On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas
This is an interlocutory appeal of a trial court order certifying a class. Because there is no dissent from the court of appeals' opinion, and because the court of appeals' opinion does not conflict with the decisions of this Court or other courts of appeal, we must dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction.
Generally, a court of appeals' decision is conclusive for interlocutory appeals. Tex. Gov't Code § 22.225(b)(3). However, when the court of appeals' decision conflicts with a decision of this Court or of another court of appeals, we may exercise jurisdiction to resolve the conflict. Tex. Gov't Code § 22.225(c).
State Farm argues that the court of appeals' decision conflicts in two ways with our decision in Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000). State Farm first asserts that Bernal required rigorous analysis of all the prerequisites to class certification, while the court of appeals held that rigorous analysis was limited to commonality and predominance. We do not so read the court of appeals' opinion. State Farm's argument to the court of appeals was that Bernal's rigorous analysis requirement required the trial court to examine the merits of the plaintiff's claims before certifying a class. The court of appeals disagreed, stating that "[t]o interpret the `rigorous analysis' requirement of Bernal as mandating an evaluation of the ultimate merit of appellees' claims at the class certification hearing would be stretching the holding of Bernal far beyond what we believe the supreme court intended." 45 S.W.3d 182, 192. The court of appeals merely noted that the "rigorous analysis" language from Bernal came in the context of a predominance discussion. Id. at 191-92 ("The `rigorous analysis' required by Bernal is set in the context of analyzing whether the predominance requirement of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b)(4) was met for a class of plaintiffs alleging they received personal injuries from an explosion of a refinery tank. . . . In this case, appellants have not challenged the class certification on commonality or predominance of common issues grounds and, in fact, could not reasonably do so. . . ." (citation omitted)). Bernal does not require a trial court to evaluate the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. Therefore, there is no conflict.
Second, State Farm argues that the court of appeals' statement that a "trial plan" is not required in all class certification orders conflicts with Bernal. In Bernal, we stated that "[a] trial court's certification order must indicate how the claims will likely be tried so that conformance with Rule 42 may be meaningfully evaluated." Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435. On rehearing, the court of appeals stated that "we do not read . . . Bernal . . . to require a trial plan in every class certification order." 68 S.W.3d 701, 702 (op. on rehearing). State Farm asserts this language creates a sufficient conflict. However, the court of appeals' statements about the trial plan requirement are dicta. The court of appeals first held that State Farm had waived this issue by not bringing it to the court's attention until its motion for rehearing. Id. Then it stated that "[e]ven if this issue was not waived," a trial plan is not required. Id. As we noted in Bernal, conflicts jurisdiction requires that "`[t]he conflict must be on the very question of law actually involved and determined.'" Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 430 (quoting Coastal Corp. v. Garza, 979 S.W.2d 318, 319-20 (Tex. 1998)). Dicta cannot be the basis of conflicts jurisdiction. Tex. Gov't. Code Ann. § 22.001(a)(2); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 2000).
Therefore, State Farm's petition is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.