Opinion
No. 137698.
April 7, 2010.
Court of Appeals No. 277300.
Summary Disposition.
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the Court of Appeals and we remand this case to the 36th District Court with directions to grant the defendant's motion to set aside the default and the default judgment. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in allowing substituted service because the plaintiff did not demonstrate a "diligent inquiry" to ascertain the defendant's present address, as required by MCR 2.105(I)(2). Therefore, the plaintiff failed to show that service of process could not reasonably be made and that substituted service should be permitted.
Because the defendant was not properly served and did not appear in court, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant. See Turrill v. Walker, 4 Mich 177, 184 (1856); Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 US 84, 91; 98 S Ct 1690; 56 L Ed 2d 132 (1978). Accordingly, the grounds in MCR 2.603(D)(1) for setting aside a default have been met.