Georgia Courts have consistently held that this type of evidence entitles the insurer to summary judgment on a cancellation defense. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 177 Ga. App. 826, 828, 341 S.E.2d 472 (1986) ("Once it was established that the [proof of mailing] list was admissible in evidence as a business record . . . and the facts show a mailing of a notice of cancellation of coverage, then summary judgment should have been granted to State Farm."); Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 151 Ga. App. 542, 260 S.E.2d 370 (1979). Metro Parts' argument that it did not receive the Notice does not create an issue of fact. "O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 provides that notice is effective upon deposit in the U.S. mails with the issuance of an appropriate receipt [showing] that the mail was in the hands of the postal authorities."

Likewise, in the absence of the insured's address, a receipt or list stamped by the Postal Service is not the statutorily mandated evidence of a mailing "to the last address of record of the insured." Compare State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 177 Ga. App. 826 ( 341 S.E.2d 472) (1986); Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 151 Ga. App. 542 ( 260 S.E.2d 370) (1979). In the instant case, it appears that appellee has proved compliance with the first requirement of OCGA § 33-22-13 (c). By the affidavits of its agents, appellee demonstrated that the notices were mailed via first class mail to appellant's last address of record.

Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 151 Ga. App. 542, 543 (2) ( 260 SE2d 370) (1979); see also Cont'l Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 212 Ga. App. 839, 843 (2) ( 443 SE2d 509) (1994) (holding that "[w]hether or not [the insured] actually received the cancellation notice is legally irrelevant" because "[t]he statute only requires proof of mailing, not receipt by the insured of the notice of cancellation." (citations and punctuation omitted)); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 177 Ga. App. 826, 828 ( 341 SE2d 472) (1986) (same). But see Bituminous Cos. Co. v. Renfroe, 130 Ga. App. 621, 624 (1) ( 204 SE2d 317) (1974) (physical precedent only) (holding that insured rebutted presumption of receipt); New Amsterdam Cos. Co. v. Russell, 102 Ga. App. 597, 600-01 (2) ( 117 SE2d 239) (1960) (holding that there was sufficient evidence of nonreceipt for jury consideration when insured's name in cancellation notice contained typographical error); Powell v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 419 F2d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1969) (construing Georgia law to hold that mailing notice is sufficient minimum requirement only when policy so provides). See generally Harris, 134 Ga. App. at 744-47 (3) (distinguishing cases that have held that an insured's claim of nonreceipt creates a jury question).

A cancellation notice, however, becomes valid only "upon deposit in the U. S. mails with the issuance of an appropriate receipt." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 177 Ga. App. 826, 828 ( 341 SE2d 472) (1986); see also OCGA § 33-24-45 (d) (2002) ("No notice of cancellation of a policy . . . shall be effective unless mailed or delivered as prescribed in Code Section 33-24-44."). Regardless of when it was generated, the cancellation notice could not take effect until the date of mailing, at which point Auto-Owners had received payment satisfying Alexander's past due balance. Under these circumstances, cancellation for nonpayment was improper.

[Cit.]" State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 177 Ga. App. 826, 828 ( 341 S.E.2d 472) (1986). State Farm's proof of mailing having been uncontroverted, its cancellation of the policy issued to Staggs was effective July 3, 1991, and no coverage existed under that policy with regard to the collision between Staggs and the Giddenses on August 23, 1991.

However, the cases upon which it relies in support of this position are inapposite: either they do not involve a premium finance agreement governed by OCGA § 33-22-13, or there was no denial that the required proof of mailing procedures was complied with, only that the insured failed to receive the notice. See, e.g., State Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 177 Ga. App. 826 ( 341 S.E.2d 472) (1986). "`[I]n construing any section of the Code, we must treat it as a single statute forming one homogeneous and consistent body of laws, and each Code section is to be considered in explaining and elucidating every other part of the common system to which it belongs.' [Cits.

She then personally delivered to the postmaster the 370 pieces of mail along with the certificate of mailing and the P. O. R. S. list, and the post office certified receipt of the 370 pieces for bulk mailing. Under these uncontroverted circumstances, the notice of cancellation provisions of OCGA § 33-24-44 were satisfied, and the trial court properly directed verdict for the insurer on the issue. See Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 151 Ga. App. 542 ( 260 S.E.2d 370) (1979); State Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 177 Ga. App. 826 ( 341 S.E.2d 472) (1986). Judgment affirmed in Case No. 76595; judgment reversed in Case No. 76596. Birdsong, C. J., Banke, P. J., Sognier, Pope, Benham, and Beasley, JJ., concur.

No evidence other than the assertion of Globe's agent exists in the record to show that notice of cancellation was sent to Motley. Compare State Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 177 Ga. App. 826 ( 341 S.E.2d 472) (1986). This situation is similar to that in Lumbermen's Invest. Corp. v. American c. Ins. Co., 158 Ga. App. 705 ( 282 S.E.2d 178) (1981).

This court has examined the potentially applicable Georgia case law and found no case that resolves the issue of whether Admiral complied with the statute when it attempted to cancel Cresent's policy. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Guess, 243 Ga. 559, 255 S.E.2d 55 (1979); Trammell Crowe Constr. Co., Inc., 198 Ga.App. 754, 403 S.E.2d 72 (1991); Favati v. National Prop. Owners Ins. Co., 153 Ga.App. 723, 266 S.E.2d 359 (1980); Moore v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 264 Ga. 808, 450 S.E.2d 198 (1994); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drury, 222 Ga.App. 196, 474 S.E.2d 64 (1996); Continental Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 212 Ga.App. 839, 443 S.E.2d 509 (1994); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 177 Ga.App. 826, 341 S.E.2d 472 (1986); Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Photographic Assistance, 732 F.Supp. 1572 (N.D.Ga. 1990); Edmondson v. Air Service Co., 123 Ga.App. 263, 180 S.E.2d 589 (1971); In re East Coast Brokers and Packers, Inc., 961 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1992); Pogue v. Oglethorpe Power Corp., 82 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 1996). Because no Georgia case law resolves the issue of whether Admiral's attempted cancellation complied with the statute, we respectfully certify the following question of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia: