Opinion
No. CV 10 6013991
July 11, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #123
FACTS
On August 25, 2010, the plaintiff, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, filed a one-count complaint against the defendant, Claire Esposito. The plaintiff brings its action against the defendant as a subrogee of Emilie Ngom and alleges the following facts. On or about March 23, 2009, the plaintiff insured a car owned by Ngom when her vehicle collided with a vehicle owned and operated by the defendant. The defendant's carelessness and negligence caused the accident from which Ngom sustained personal injuries. The plaintiff specifically alleges that the defendant (1) failed to keep a reasonable lookout for vehicles in her vicinity; (2) failed to grant the right of way to Ngom, in violation of General Statutes § 14-245; (3) failed to stop for a red traffic light in violation of General Statutes § 14-299; (4) operated her vehicle at a unreasonable rate of speed given the traffic, weather and width and use of the highway and intersection of the streets; and (5) failed to apply her brakes to avoid a collision, although she could have done so with the exercise of proper and reasonable faculties. As a result of these allegations, the plaintiff seeks $7,500 in uninsured motorist benefits from the defendant.
The defendant, who is pro se, filed an answer, special defenses and a counterclaim on February 3, 2011. In her answer, the defendant admits that her vehicle collided with Ngom's vehicle on March 23, 2009, but she disagrees with the plaintiff's allegations regarding her negligence. In her counterclaim, the defendant asserts, inter alia, that she strained her hip as a result of the March 23, 2009 collision with Ngom and that she has suffered various monetary damages from the loss of her car and her injury. Additionally, the defendant asserts that the collision was caused by Ngom's carelessness and negligence in that Ngom (1) failed to exercise great care in approaching the intersection; (2) exercised reckless disregard of the rights of others, including failure to stop at a red traffic light in violation of General Statutes § 14-299; (3) abandoned care and was careless, inattentive and indifferent to consequences; and (4) acted wilfully by placing the blame for the accident on the defendant and making fraudulent statements.
She addresses the plaintiff's allegations in her special defenses, and asserts: "According to the police report, `both operators did not claim any injuries as a result of the accident.'" The defendant also asserts: "As I approached the intersection, I had a solid green light. I saw Emily Ngom's car approaching the intersection, but she did not attempt to slow down or brake at the last minute . . . [The solid green light] granted me the right of way . . . I also did not receive an infraction for failure to stop at a red traffic control signal. I was operating my vehicle at 25 mph, there were no other cars in front of me, or behind me, the weather was clear and crisp. Up ahead, Emily Ngom's vehicle was the only car approaching the intersection. I also did not receive an infraction for driving at an unreasonable rate of speed. I did not apply the brakes, as I was approaching a green traffic control signal and heeding the right of way."
The defendant filed a second counterclaim on March 28, 2011. The defendant asserts the same allegations as those in her first counterclaim, but she adds two additional claims. The defendant alleges that Ngom failed to stop at a red traffic light in violation of General Statutes § 14-299 and that Ngom operated her motor vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed by proceeding through the intersection in a careless and reckless manner and placing the defendant "at great harm."
On April 21, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendant's counterclaim on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiff also filed a supporting memorandum. The defendant filed an objection and a memorandum in opposition on May 9, 2011. This matter was heard at the May 9, 2011 short calendar.
DISCUSSION
"[A] counterclaim is a cause of action existing in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff and on which the defendant might have secured affirmative relief had he sued the plaintiff in a separate action . . . A motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of a cause of action and may properly be used to challenge the sufficiency of a counterclaim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) JP Morgan Chase Bank, Trustee v. Rodrigues, 109 Conn.App. 125, 131, 952 A.2d 56 (2008). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded, it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings" (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).
In its motion to strike, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant's counterclaim seeks personal injury damages from it, an insurance company, based on allegations that Ngom was negligent. The plaintiff reiterates that it is merely a subrogee for Ngom. Thus, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant has no cause of action or legal basis for recovery because it was not negligent and the allegedly negligent owner and operator is not a party to the present matter. In her objection to the plaintiff's motion to strike, the defendant contends that "the substitution of one person in place of another with reference to a lawful claim" is available in the present matter with regard to the plaintiff. Based on this foundation, the defendant states that she is "simply requesting that [she] be given a fair hearing in the matter of [the] motor vehicle accident."
"`[W]hile a subrogee succeeds to the rights of the insured and is subject to all defenses which would have been available against the insured, a counterclaim is not one of these rights or defenses and, therefore, cannot be asserted against a nonparty to the action.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Royal Ins. Co. v. Prudential Residential Services, L.P., [Superior Court, judicial district of Stanford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 01 0185458 (February, 13, 2003, Adams, J.)] ( 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 59, 60). This is because `[t]he jurisdiction of the trial court is muted to those parties expressly named in the action coming before it.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Exley v. Connecticut Yankee Greyhound Racing, Inc., 59 Conn.App 224, 234, 755 A.2d 990, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 939, 761 A.2d 760 (2000). A defendant may, however, assert a counterclaim against a subrogee plaintiff when the claim `is based upon the plaintiff's alleged conduct, and not upon that of its insured.' Royal Ins. Co. v. Prudential Services, L.P., supra, 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 61." Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Drummey, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 5002071 (January 25, 2007, Hale, J.T.R.) ( 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 717, 720).
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Flores, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 09 5013453 (October 1, 2009, Swienton, J.) ( 48 Conn. L. Rptr. 581), the court ruled on a motion to strike a counterclaim in an identical situation: an insurance company brought a lawsuit as a subrogee after a motor vehicle accident and the defendant filed a counterclaim "alleging that the accident was caused by the plaintiff's insured, and that the plaintiff [was] therefore responsible for compensating the defendant for personal injury damages." In granting the plaintiff insurance company's motion to strike the counterclaim, the court stated "There is no question that State Farm as subrogee of its insured . . . stands in the shoes and is subject to any and all defenses which would have been available against [the insured] had he brought the suit in his own name . . . A counterclaim is [however] not a defense . . . but is an independent cause of action and must be complete by itself . . . Thus, while a subrogee may stand in the place of the insured and is subject to any and all defenses which would have been available against the insured had the insured brought suit in its own name, a counterclaim is not one of these rights or defenses, and therefore, cannot be asserted against a nonparty to the action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 582. As in State Farm, the defendant in the present matter cannot assert a counterclaim against the insurance company when the alleged conduct is against its insured.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the court grants the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's counterclaim.