Opinion
C.A. No. 07C-05-141-JOH.
Submitted: July 25, 2007.
Decided: August 16, 2007.
Upon Motion of Defendant for Special Appearance or in the Alternative a Motion to Dismiss — DENIED.
Amanda L.H. Brinton, Esquire, of Shields Hope, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for plaintiffs.
Ethel M. Lee, Pro Se, Huntsville, Alabama.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, suing as a subrogee of Pepe Properties, LLC, and Pepe itself, are suing Ethel Lee. Their complaint alleges she was a tenant of Pepe in an apartment in Wilmington, Delaware at 1404 Pennsylvania Avenue.
Pepe and State Farm allege that Lee negligently caused a fire in her apartment. It is claimed this caused $5,512.06 in damage which was covered by insurance. State Farm paid Pepe that sum and obtained the right of subrogation against Lee. Pepe claims to have suffered non-covered damages in the amount of $18,157.27. These damages, it is asserted, arise from Lee's alleged breach of her lease. That claim contains two subparts: (1) she failed to abide by the lease terms requiring her to maintain active batteries in the apartment's smoke detector and (2) failure to rent or pay rent for the full lease term.
Lee is now an Alabama resident. The plaintiffs were aware of that when they filed suit and served her under Delaware's Long Arm Statute. Subsequently, Lee has filed a "Special Appearance." Lee's "Special Appearance" involves primarily a challenge to this Court's in personam jurisdiction over her. In short, most of her challenge is equivalent to a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. She raises several other points, too, which the Court will address.
There is no longer such a procedure in this Court. She filed her "Special Appearance" in paper form. She is proceeding pro se. Under the Court's procedures, as an out-of-state pro se party, she is entitled to submit her pleadings on paper. The Court's staff scans them into its e-file system.
Applicable Standards
When presented with a motion to dismiss, the Court will accept all well-pled allegations as true. The Court, of course, need not blindly accept as true all of the allegations nor draw all inferences in plaintiffs' favor, unless reasonable. Further, "[W]hen in personam jurisdiction is challenged by a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has the burden to show a basis for long-arm jurisdiction. However, this burden is met by a threshold prima facie showing that jurisdiction is conferred by the statute. Furthermore, the record is construed most strongly against the moving party. (Citations omitted)." For purposes of a jurisdictional challenge, the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true.Discussion
Lee's "Special Appearance" raises these challenges (1) she is not now a Delaware resident, (2) she does not now own or has she everowned property in Delaware, (3) she did not commit any kind of tort here, (4) this lawsuit is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas, (5) since there is diversity of citizenship (State Farm is an Illinois corporation and Pepe is a Pennsylvania corporation), federal jurisdiction is implicated, and (6) she is unaware of any jurisdictional basis for this Court to act.In none of her responses does she deny being a Delaware resident when the fire occurred in August, 2005.
When they filed suit, State Farm and Pepe were aware of Lee's residence in Alabama. Their complaint and service of process invoked to Delaware's Long-Arm Statute. The plaintiffs rely specifically upon two subsections in that statute to obtain jurisdiction over her:
(c) As to a cause of action brought by any person arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident, or a personal representative, who in person or through an agent:
(3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in this State;
(5) Has an interest in, uses or possesses real property in the State.
10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(3) and (5).
The plaintiffs allege a cause of action for negligence. They assert various grounds for Lee's negligence in causing the fire in the apartment she was renting. Among those grounds are that she was inattentive while cooking, failed to properly use her stove, and failed to discover the fire by leaving the stove unattended.
The Court sees no reason at this juncture not to accept these allegations as true.
They set out a claim for a tortious act while Lee was a Delaware resident and make the requisite specific claims of negligence. Plaintiffs, therefore, have adequately pled, for jurisdictional purposes, a claim for a tortious act under 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(3). That alone is a basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over State Farm's claim.
Magid v. Marcal Paper Mills, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (D.C. Del. 1981).
But Pepe has also asserted a claim for breach of the lease. It claims that Lee breached her lease by failing to properly maintain operative batteries in the apartment smoke detector. Pepe alleges also that Lee did not pay rent for the full term of her lease.
Lee's first line of a jurisdictional defense to Pepe's cause of action is that she does not now own and has never owned property in Delaware. But the applicable jurisdictional statute does not use the word "own." It uses the words "[h]as an interest in, uses, or possesses." The complaint alleges Lee was a tenant. A copy of the lease is attached to the complaint. A lease hold is an interest in property. Again, Lee was a Delaware resident when she leased and used and had possession of the apartment at 1404 Delaware Avenue. On that basis, also, this Court has jurisdiction over Lee.
Roffman v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 179 A.2d 99, 101 (Del. 1962).
Lee offers another jurisdictional challenge: this action is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas. While inconsistent with her other jurisdictional challenges, there is no bar to raising it. It is unclear, however, what Lee means by this challenge. Is she contending the claim is such that it falls withing Common Pleas civil jurisdiction for claims up to $50,000? Insomuch as this challenge means the plaintiffs claim being under $50,000 has to go to Common Pleas, it is without merit. This Court has jurisdiction to consider the dollar claims alleged.
10 Del. C. § 1322(a),
Article IV, § 7, Delaware Constitution.
If Lee's challenge is directed at this Court's jurisdiction to entertain breach of the lease provisions, either the claim about the smoke alarm or unpaid rent, it is also without merit. She is not in possession of the rental unit. If she were, Pepe's exclusive remedy would be in Justice of the Peace Court.
25 Del. C. c. 57.
Lee poses the question, without a firm statement, whether since the parties are all non-Delaware residents, federal diversity jurisdiction is implicated. There is no diversity jurisdiction due to the amount in controversy, less than $75,000.00, because of the "residence" of the parties. And there is no cause of action here resting on a federal claim to be heard exclusively in a federal court. Under the circumstances, because of the dollar amount, this Court has jurisdiction.
Beyond her jurisdictional challenges, Lee denies committing a tortious act in this state. That denial must be rejected at this stage; State Farm and Pepe having well-pled a negligence action against her. The Court sees no reason to reject the allegations or any inferences arising from them. For purposes of her "motion to dismiss," the plaintiffs' claim more than adequately meets the applicable standards to survive a motion to dismiss. That finding does not mean, however, that she will or will not ultimately be found negligent.
Finally, Lee offers a broad, sweeping statement that she cannot find a basis for this Court's jurisdiction. That is too broad and is wrong. This opinion explains why this Court has jurisdiction.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, defendants Ethel Lee's "Special Appearance," really a motion to dismiss, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.