Declarations against interest by a person since deceased have been ruled admissible because, generally speaking, it is improbable that such declarations are false. Massee-Felton Lumber Co. v. Sirmans, 122 Ga. 297 ( 50 S.E. 92). See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Great American Ins. Co., 164 Ga. App. 457, 460 ( 297 S.E.2d 355). Thus, to be admissible, declarations against interest must also be deemed trustworthy.

The statements by Wright were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under the criteria set forth in Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, 226 Ga. 221, 224-225 (1) ( 173 S.E.2d 691) (1970), in that Wright's death created the necessity for the admission of the statements, and a circumstantial guaranty for the trustworthiness of Wright's statements was provided by the fact that the statements were against his own interest, i.e., Wright was consciously divesting himself of ownership of the certificate of deposit. OCGA § 24-3-8; see generally State Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 164 Ga. App. 457, 458-460 (1) ( 297 S.E.2d 355) (1982); compare Chrysler Motors, supra at 225-226. The fact that Wright's statements were in the best interest of the propounding witness, appellee, is not relevant to the admissibility of the declarations in question "because circumstances indicating that a witness has an interest in the case ... should merely go to the credibility of the witness, not to the admissibility of the declarant's statement.