He has used various procedural mechanisms including a request for reconsideration, numerous petitions for post-conviction relief, and petitions for extraordinary writs of mandamus, procedendo and habeas corpus. See State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17515, 1999 WL 173551 (Mar. 31, 1999); State ex rel. Wilson v. Sunderland, 87 Ohio St.3d 548, 2000-Ohio-479, 721 N.E.2d 1055 (2000); State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21738, 2007-Ohio-4885, appeal not accepted for review, 117 Ohio St.3d 1405, 2008-Ohio-565, 881 N.E.2d 274 (Table); State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23247, 2009-Ohio-7035; State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24352, 2011-Ohio-599. None of these actions have been successful.
The request for mandamus is moot. State ex rel. Smith v. Fuerst, 89 Ohio St.3d 456, 2000-Ohio-218, 732 N.E.2d 983; State ex rel. Wilson v. Sunderland, 87 Ohio St.3d 548, 2000-Ohio-479, 721 N.E.2d 1055. {¶ 7} Finally, Halder possesses an adequate remedy at law, which prevents this court from issuing a writ of mandamus.
In reviewing a claim for mandamus relief, we must "consider the facts and conditions at the time we determine whether to grant the writ." State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 90 Ohio St.3d 55, 64, 734 N.E.2d 811 (2000), citing State ex rel. Wilson v. Sunderland, 87 Ohio St.3d 548, 549, 721 N.E.2d 1055 (2000). We therefore deny the request for a writ of mandamus with respect to the municipal court's demand for additional funding.
Although the common pleas court's February 26, 2007 order was issued after Blandin filed this action, we properly consider it in determining hip entitlement to the requested writ. State ex rel. Wilson v. Sunderland (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 548, 549, 721 N.E.2d 1055 (in mandamus actions, courts are not limited to the facts at the time the action is commenced and should consider the pertinent facts at the time it decides the claim). {¶ 20} Based on the foregoing, Blandin has established none of the requirements for the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.
{¶ 9} Finally, in determining actions involving extraordinary writs, a court is not limited to considering the facts and circumstances at the time that the writ was requested but can consider the facts and conditions at the time that entitlement to the writ is considered. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wilson v. Sunderland (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 548, 549, 721 N.E.2d 1055. The court of appeals correctly considered Judge Skow's performance of the requested acts, which rendered Howard's procedendo claim moot.
We have held that in mandamus actions, a court is not limited to considering facts and circumstances at the time a proceeding is instituted but should consider the facts and conditions at the time it determines whether to issue a peremptory writ. State ex rel. Wilson v. Sunderland (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 548, 549, 721 N.E.2d 1055. In the mandamus cases cited by relators, however, later events either mooted the case or names were subsequently withdrawn from a petition to transfer territory.
And in mandamus actions, we are not restricted to considering facts and circumstances at the time a proceeding is instituted, but we consider the facts and conditions at the time we determine whether to grant the writ. See State ex rel. Wilson v. Sunderland (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 548, 549, 721 N.E.2d 1055, 1057. The board had sufficient time to review Judge Wilke's funding requests while this case was pending.
Therefore, Fuerst complied with his duty to serve the entry on Smith, and mandamus will not issue to compel an act that has already been performed. State ex rel. Wilson v. Sunderland (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 548, 548-549, 721 N.E.2d 1055, 1056; see, also, Atkinson v. Grumman Ohio Corp. (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 80, 523 N.E.2d 851, paragraph two of the syllabus. In addition, Smith had adequate remedies at law by a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment or appeal to raise his claim that he was entitled to additional time to perfect his appeal from the October 17, 1996 judgment.
However, in determining whether the writ should be granted we are permitted to consider the circumstances existing at the time the petition is considered. State ex rel. Howard v. Skow, 102 Ohio St.3d 423, 2004-Ohio-3652, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Wilson v. Sunderland (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 548, 549. {¶ 9} A review of the federal court docket from John Doe indicates that that case was concluded in August 2008.
In reviewing whether the writ is warranted, we are not limited to considering the circumstances at the time the petition was filed. State ex rel. Howard v. Skow, 102 Ohio St.3d 423, 2004-Ohio-3652, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Wilson v. Sunderland (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 548, 549. Rather, we can consider the circumstances existing at the time the petition is considered.