Summary
In State ex rel. Williams v. Court of Common Pleas (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 433, 329 N.E.2d 680, the Ohio court held that the language of its speedy trial limitations did not apply to a minor and held that the juvenile comes within the scope of the speedy trial requirements only if and when the juvenile court relinquishes jurisdiction and transfers the case to the appropriate court.
Summary of this case from People v. WoodruffOpinion
No. 74-953
Decided June 11, 1975.
Criminal law — Juvenile Court — Minor charged with "adult" offenses — Time for trial — R.C. 2945.71 — Runs from transfer to Court of Common Pleas for trial as adult.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County.
On February 4, 1974, appellant, then age 16, was taken into custody and confined in the Toledo Child Study Institute. Between that date and February 7, 1974, three affidavits were filed against appellant, each alleging that he was a delinquent in that he committed specified acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a felony.
The felonies allegedly committed by appellant were carrying a concealed weapon, theft and unarmed robbery.
On February 14, 1974, the state filed a motion requesting the Juvenile Court to relinquish jurisdiction over appellant and to transfer him to the General Division of the Court of Common Pleas for trial as an adult. The motion was granted by a judgment entry filed March 26, 1974. The entry also set bond for appellant at $50,000.
The Lucas County Grand Jury returned a two-count indictment against appellant on May 24, 1974. On June 14, 1974, appellant, who had been continually confined from February 4, 1974, filed a motion for discharge, alleging that he had not been tried within the time limits specified by R.C. 2945.71. The motion was overruled by the Court of Common Pleas, and a trial scheduled for June 20, 1974.
The first count accused appellant of theft of a credit card; the second count accused appellant of unarmed robbery.
Appellant's prohibition complaint alleged that "he had not been tried in accordance with the provisions of Section 2945.71 (C) (1) and (D) of the Ohio Revised Code." R.C. 2945.71 (C) provides:
"A person against whom a charge of felony is pending:
"(1) Shall be accorded a preliminary hearing within fifteen days after his arrest;
"(2) Shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after his arrest."
The record discloses that appellant's sole argument before both the Court of Appeals and this court was that he had not been brought to trial within the period set forth in R.C. 2945.71. Therefore, despite the language of appellant's complaint, R.C. 2945.71 (C) (1) is not relevant to this appeal, but R.C. 2945.71 (C) (2) is. See Civ. R. 15 (B).
R.C. 2945.71 (D) states:
"For purposes of computing time under divisions (A), (B), and (C) of this section, each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted as three days."
The prohibition action presently before this court was commenced on June 19, 1974. Appellant alleged in his complaint that he had not been brought to trial within the time provisions of R.C. 2945.71 and that, therefore, the Court of Common Pleas was without jurisdiction to try him. The Court of Appeals eventually dismissed the complaint, and the cause is now before this court as a matter of right.
Mr. Jas. Slater Gibson, for appellant.
Mr. Harry Friberg, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. James D. Bates, for appellees.
Even assuming, without deciding, that prohibition is a proper remedy in this case, appellant cannot prevail; this court agrees with the Court of Appeals that if a juvenile is accused of committing a felony, the 90-day period established by R.C. 2945.71 (C) (2) and (D) for commencing trial does not begin to run until the Juvenile Court relinquishes jurisdiction and transfers the accused to the "adult" court.
The time limits set forth in R.C. 2945.71 (C) apply only to "[a] person against whom a charge of felony is pending * * *." A juvenile who has lodged against him an affidavit alleging that he is delinquent because he committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a felony is not a person against whom a charge of felony is pending. See In re Agler (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808; Cope v. Campbell (1964), 175 Ohio St. 475, 196 N.E.2d 457 (paragraph one of the syllabus); In re Darnell (1962), 173 Ohio St. 335, 182 N.E.2d 321; Prescott v. State (1869), 19 Ohio St. 184. The juvenile becomes such a person and is, therefore, included within the scope of R.C. 2945.71 (C) only if and when the Juvenile Court relinquishes jurisdiction over the case and transfers it to the appropriate "adult" court.
This holding is based solely on the language of R.C. 2945.71 (C) and the nonfelonious nature of a delinquency allegation made against a juvenile. We find it unnecessary to decide whether a minor has a constitutional right to a speedy disposition of juvenile charges pending against him. In passing, however, it should be noted that this court has taken action to assure the prompt convening of juvenile adjudicatory hearings. Juv. R. 29 (A) provides:
"The date for the adjudicatory hearing shall be set when the complaint is filed, or as soon thereafter as is practicable. If the child who is the subject of the complaint is in detention or shelter care, the hearing shall be held not later than ten days after the filing of the complaint; upon a showing of good cause the adjudicatory hearing may be contained and detention or shelter care extended."
In the present case, the Juvenile Court relinquished jurisdiction over appellant and transferred him to the General Division of the Court of Common Pleas on March 26, 1974. Trial was subsequently scheduled for June 20, 1974, which was less than 90 days from March 26th. Therefore, R.C. 2945.71 (C)(2) and (D) were not violated in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, CORRIGAN, STERN, CELEBREZZE, W. BROWN and P. BROWN, JJ., concur.