Opinion
No. 86-1502
Decided January 13, 1988.
Workers' compensation — Denial of claim for permanent total disability benefits.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
On or about July 25, 1968, appellant, Mona Manering Vernon, was injured during the course of her employment with appellee, the Goodyear Aerospace Corporation. Appellant timely filed for workers' compensation benefits and the claim was originally recognized for injuries to her low back.
On November 26, 1976, appellant filed a motion requesting that her claim be amended so as to allow an additional condition described as "psychoneurosis depressive reaction, with conversion features." On September 22, 1977, the Industrial Commission issued an order recognizing appellant's psychiatric condition.
On March 1, 1980, appellant filed an application with the commission for permanent total disability benefits based on the combined effect of her recognized conditions.
On August 21, 1980, appellant was examined by Dr. D.D. Kackley, a commission specialist. Dr. Kackley examined appellant in regard to her orthopedic condition and concluded that the degree of impairment attributable to this condition would be of a low-moderate degree not exceeding twenty percent.
On August 21, 1980, appellant was examined by Dr. Donald L. Brown, another commission specialist. Dr. Brown considered appellant's psychiatric condition and concluded the degree of impairment was thirty percent.
On August 18, 1981, appellant's claim for permanent total disability compensation came on for hearing before the commission. The commission referred the file to Dr. Dwight H. Davies for further review. Pursuant to this order, on September 25, 1981, Dr. Davies performed a file review of appellant's claim and concluded that most of the medical evidence in the claim file did not indicate permanent total impairment.
On April 13, 1983, appellant's treating physician, Dr. Allan R. Korb, submitted a report wherein he concluded that appellant was permanently and totally disabled as a consequence of the combined effect of her psychiatric and orthopedic conditions.
On May 6, 1983, the commission ordered that appellant's file be referred back to Dr. Davies for a supplemental combined-effect review which was to specifically include the report of Dr. Korb. On July 5, 1983, Dr. Davies re-examined appellant's claim file. Dr. Davies noted that Dr. Korb's report did not present a breakdown of how much of the permanent total disability was due to the psychiatric condition and how much was attributable to her physical condition. Dr. Davies compared the breakdowns presented in the other medical reports in the file and found that the estimates relating to the psychiatric impairment ranged from a low of between ten and fifteen percent to a high of fifty-five percent, while the estimates relating to the orthopedic impairment ranged from twenty percent to sixty percent. Dr. Davies then combined the values of the highest estimates and the lowest estimates and found that the combined values ranged from a high of eighty-two percent to a low of twenty-eight percent.
On March 20, 1985, the commission denied appellant's request for permanent and total disability compensation. The commission based this finding on the medical reports of Drs. Leist, Brown, Kackley, and "particularly on the reports of Drs. Davies, Korb and the deposition dated 12-19-83 of Dr. Davies * * *."
Appellant instituted a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying her request for permanent and total disability compensation, and seeking to direct the commission to find her permanently and totally disabled. On July 17, 1986, the appellate court denied the requested writ.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Michael J. Muldoon, for appellant.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour Pease and Robert E. Tait, for appellee Goodyear Aerospace Corp.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, Janet E. Jackson and Donald Ford, for appellee Industrial Commission.
Appellant proposes that the medical reports on which the commission bases its conclusion were deficient in that (1) they did not address the pivotal issue of whether the claimant is permanently and totally disabled, as allegedly required in State, ex rel. Paragon, v. Indus. Comm. (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 72, 5 OBR 127, 448 N.E.2d 1372, and (2) these medical reports did not consider the combined effect of the recognized disabilities, as mandated in State, ex rel. Anderson, v. Indus. Comm. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 166, 16 O.O. 3d 199, 404 N.E.2d 153.
In regard to the claim that the evidence did not address the extent of the claimant's disability, this court has noted on a number of occasions that the medical evidence before the commission need only address the claimant's degree of impairment. It is the commission that must determine claimant's disability. Meeks v. Ohio Brass Co. (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 147, 10 OBR 482, 462 N.E.2d 389; State, ex rel. Elliott, v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 76, 26 OBR 66, 497 N.E.2d 70. Hence, the fact that the medical evidence relied upon by the commission does not take into account claimant's disability in no way affects the validity of such evidence.
Similarly, appellant's reliance on State, ex rel. Anderson, supra, is also misplaced. In Anderson, this court established an evidentiary rule which prevented the commission from relying on any medical report which did not consider the combined effect of all the claimant's recognized conditions in a case involving multiple injuries. However, the Anderson decision and its accompanying evidentiary doctrine were recently overruled in State, ex rel. Burley, v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936. A writ of mandamus may only issue where the relator demonstrates, inter alia, a clear legal right to the relief requested. State, ex rel. Harris, v. Rhodes (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 41, 8 O.O. 3d 36, 374 N.E.2d 641. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we find that appellant has failed to meet this burden and hereby affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Judgment affirmed.
SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.
LOCHER, J., concurs in judgment only.
MOYER, C.J., and H. BROWN, J., not participating.