use it violates the provisions of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Sections 4, 15 and 30 of Article II of the Constitution of Missouri. 16 C.J.S. 505; 12 Am. Jur. 129; Independent Gasoline Co. v. Bureau, 190 Ga. 613, 10 S.E.2d 58; certiorari refused, 311 U.S. 701, 85 L.Ed. 459, 61 S.Ct. 175; Royster Guano Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 64 L.Ed. 989, 40 S.Ct. 560; Hartford Steam Boiler, etc. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 81 L.Ed. 1273, 57 S.Ct. 838; Southern Ry. v. Green, 216 U.S. 400, 54 L.Ed. 536, 30 S.Ct. 287; Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 513, 73 L.Ed. 483, 49 S.Ct. 235; Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 402, 72 L.Ed. 927, 48 S.Ct. 553; Louisville Gas Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 72 L.Ed. 770, 48 S.Ct. 423; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 56 S.Ct. 252; Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 499, 71 L.Ed. 1165, 45 S.Ct. 676; Benner-Coryell Lbr. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bureau, 218 Ind. 20, 29 N.E.2d 776; State v. Tulsa Flour Exchange, 135 P.2d 46. (3) The Missouri Unemployment Compensation Act, approved June 13, 1937, as amended, is unconstitutional, because it provides for the members of the Commission to act in a judicial and quasi-judicial capacity, thus denying to this appellant due process of law as guaranteed to it by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Section 30 of Article II of the Constitution of Missouri. College of Physicians Case, 133 Eng. Rep. 928; Tumey v. State of Ohio, 47 S.Ct. 437.
Strelecki v. Oklahoma Tax Commission , 1993 OK 122, n. 71, 872 P.2d 910, 920, citing Neumann v. Tax Com'n , 1979 OK 64, 596 P.2d 530, 532 ; Wilson v. State ex rel. Okl. Tax Com'n, Okl., 1979 OK 62, 594 P.2d 1210, 1212.Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission , 1946 OK 113, 196 Okla. 633, 167 P.2d 884, 887, citing State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission v. Tulsa Flower Exchange , 1943 OK 109, 192 Okla. 293, 135 P.2d 46, Sutherland, Statutory Construction , 3d Ed., § 6701, and Gould v. Gould , 245 U.S. 151, 38 S.Ct. 53, 62 L.Ed. 211 (1917). An analogous situation occurs with judicial construction of a penal statute when applied to a party aggrieved by the statute.
Fanning v. Brown, 2004 OK 7, ¶ 16, 85 P.3d 841 Sautbine v. Keller, 1966 OK 209, ¶ 0, 423 P.2d 447 [Even a family corporation is separate and distinct from its shareholders.]; State ex rel. Okla. Employment Sec. Com'n v. Tulsa Flower Exchange, 1943 OK 109, ¶ 13, 192 Okla. 293, 135 P.2d 46. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 474–75, 123 S.Ct. 1655, 1660, 155 L.Ed.2d 643 (2003) [A basic tenet of American corporate law is that the corporation and its shareholders are distinct entities.] First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 625, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983) [Separate legal personality has been described as ‘an almost indispensable aspect of the public corporation.’]; Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415, 53 S.Ct. 207, 77 L.Ed. 397 (1932) [A corporation and its stockholders are generally to be treated as separate entities.]. An individual shareholder, by virtue of his ownership of shares, does not own the corporation's assets and, as a result, does not own subsidiary corporations in which the corporation holds an interest.
Shareholders' direct authority is limited. State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n v. First Nat'l Bank of Texoma, 197 Okla. 652, 174 P.2d 259 (1946); State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Tulsa Flower Exch., 192 Okla. 293, 135 P.2d 46 (1943); Sumner Coal-Mining Co. v. Pleasant, 127 Okla. 174, 259 P. 1055 (1927); Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 458 (Del. 1991). This is true for obvious reasons.
Wilson, supra note 23 at 1212; Affiliated Management Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, Okla., 570 P.2d 335, 336 (1977).Wilson, supra note 23 at 1212; Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 196 Okla. 633, 167 P.2d 884, 887 (1946); State v. Tulsa Flower Exchange, 192 Okla. 293, 135 P.2d 46, 49 (1943). See also in this connection Willmus v. Commissioner of Revenue, 371 N.W.2d 210, 213 (Minn.
See, Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 87 L.Ed. 1407. See, also, Higgins, Inc. v. Walker, La.App., 129 So.2d 840, where certiorari was denied by this court. See, Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. Balderston, 58 Idaho 692, 72 P.2d 105; In re Potlatch Forests, Inc., 72 Idaho 291, 240 P.2d 242; Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Iowa Unemployment Compensation Com., 230 Iowa 123, 296 N.W. 791; Barnes v. Indian Refining Co., 280 Ky. 811, 134 S.W.2d 620; Louisville Title Mortgage Co. v. Com. ex rel. Unemployment Compensation Com., 299 Ky. 224, 184 S.W.2d 963; A. J. Meyer Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Com., 348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W.2d 184; Nat. School of Aero v. Div. of Employment Security, Mo. App., 226 S.W.2d 93; State v. Earl G. Smith, Inc., 79 Ohio App. 469, 72 N.E.2d 397; State v. Praetorians, 143 Tex. 565, 186 S.W.2d 973, 158 A.L.R. 596; Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board v. Albrecht, 183 Md. 87, 36 A.2d 666; State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Security Com. v. Tulsa Flower Exchange, 192 Okla. 293, 135 P.2d 46; and Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Iowa Unemployment Compensation Com., 230 Iowa 123, 296 N.W. 791. See, also, Higgins, Inc. v. Walker, La.App., 129 So.2d 840, certiorari denied; and 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 96, p. 140, under the heading of "Taxes". The legislature has not defined what it means by the word "establishment," or the phrase "two or more separate establishments" as set out in the isolated sentence from R.S. 23:1472(10) relied on by the lower courts and above quoted.
"If the individuals involved in the Application were employees the Applicant is not entitled to any refund. If the individuals involved in the Application were not employees the Applicant is entitled to a refund for the amount claimed." In construing another part of the Employment Security Act, it was pointed out, in the case of State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission v. Tulsa Flower Exchange, 192 Okla. 293, 135 P.2d 46, 48, that, "The statute here under consideration authorizes the collection of a tax from employers of a certain class.
The word as there used should be held to connote the management and direction of every act, and the formulation of every business policy, of the employment unit, without right of legal interference from anyone with respect to all lawful pursuits. ( State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Secur. Com. v. Tulsa Flower Exch. 192 Okla. 293, 135 P.2d 46.) The fact one of Todd's partners was his wife in one partnership and his mother a partner in another partnership and the further fact the theatres were operated as "related businessses" are not sufficient to justify the conclusion that they were owned and controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests. It was so held in Huiet v. Dayan, 69 Ga. App. 81, 24 S.E.2d 728, where there were three businesses, each conducting a store handling almost identical goods and together employing more than the statutory number necessary to bring an employing unit within the Unemployment Compensation Act, and wherein one person was the sole owner of one business, he and a brother were equal partners in another and he and another brother were equal partners in a third business, although the owner of the one, who was also the half owner of the other two, did the buying for all the stores and had all deliveries made to his store, from which the merchandise was apportioned to all three. To the same
A corporation has a real individuality, In re Clarke's Will, [5] supra, and is in law an entity entirely separate and distinct from its stockholders. McCarroll v. Ozarks Rural Electric Co-op. Corp., 201 Ark. 329, 146 S.W.2d 693, 695; Matthews v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 215 Minn. 369, 10 N.W.2d 230, 232, 147 A.L.R. 147, 150; State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission v. Tulsa Flower Exchange, 192 Okla. 293, 135 P.2d 46, 48; Department of Treasury of Indiana v. Crowder, 214 Ind. 252, 15 N.E.2d 89, 91; Rapides Dairy Dealers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Mathews, La. App., 158 So. 247, 249; Wild v. Standard General Realty Co., La. App., 145 So. 58, 59; Levert v. Shirley Planting Co. 135 La. 929, 66 So. 301; Commonwealth v. Muir, 170 Ky. 435; 186 S.W. 194, 196; Ulmer v. Lime Rock R. Co., 98 Me. 579, 57 A. 1001, 1006, 1007, 66 L.R.A. 387; Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 593, 75 A. 568, 571, 27 L.R.A., N.S., 658; Ex parte Rickey, 31 Nev. 82, 100 P. 134, 140, 135 Am. St. Rep. 651; People's Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 109 Va. 439, 61 S.E. 794, 796, 63 S.E. 981; State ex rel. City of Tacoma v. Tacoma Ry. Power Co., 61 Wn. 507, 112 P. 506, 508, 32 L.R.A., N.S., 720; Aiello v. Crampton, 8 Cir., 201 F. 891, 893. R.C.M. 1947, Title 14, Chapter 2, sections 14-201 to 14-222 set forth the special statutes of this state governing the incorporation and management of cooperative associations for the purpose of trade or pros
In order for plaintiff to have a sufficient number of employees to come within the purview of the act, it was necessary for the Corner Drug Store to be under his "control". In State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission v. Tulsa Flower Exchange et al., 192 Okla. 293, 135 P.2d 46, we said: "The word 'control' should be accorded its full and complete meaning with due regard to the general purpose for which it was used in the statute.