State ex Rel. v. Randolph

4 Citing cases

  1. State v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City

    99 P.2d 876 (Okla. 1940)   Cited 11 times

    Many such decisions expressly hold or definitely imply to the contrary. See Moreland v. State, 175 Okla. 38, 51 P.2d 945; State ex rel. Morrison v. City of Muskogee, 70 Okla. 19, 172 P. 796; State ex rel. Wood v. Kimbrell, 152 Okla. 239, 5 P.2d 366; State ex rel. Awtrey v. Randolph, 139 Okla. 254, 281 P. 956; State v. Cole, 178 Okla. 567, 63 P.2d 730; Dorsett v. State, 144 Okla. 33, 289 P. 298; McGuire v. Skelton, 36 Okla. 500, 129 P. 739; State ex rel. Shillings v. Oklahoma City, 67 Okla. 18, 168 P. 227, and Dowler v. State, 179 Okla. 532, 66 P.2d 1081. If good faith is to be so controlling as a defense, it seems at least that a defendant relying thereon should be required to submit his good faith to test, by answer pleading it, so that it might be controverted. It is generally so in cases where good faith relieves from liability.

  2. Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Cloudman

    185 Okla. 400 (Okla. 1939)   Cited 34 times
    Concerning a board of education of an independent school district: "The school board has and can exercise those powers that are granted in express words; those fairly implied in or necessarily incidental to the powers expressly granted, and those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation."

    This case is not otherwise in point exactly, as it involves a fraudulent contract, but it does announce the statutory duty of the officers to protect taxpayers from obligations not authorized by law. In State ex rel. Awtrey v. Randolph, 139 Okla. 254, 281 P. 956, it was definitely held that the school board was liable for double the amount paid out on illegal claim's with nothing whatever said about knowledge of illegality on the part of the board. In the first paragraph of the syllabus it is held:

  3. Dowler v. State ex Rel. Prunty

    66 P.2d 1081 (Okla. 1937)   Cited 20 times
    In Dowler v. State, 179 Okla. 532, 66 P.2d 1081, we sustained a judgment against city commissioners for unauthorized and illegal expenditures and without any showing of bad faith.

    This decision is clear and concise in its language and specifically points out that the statute means what it says, to wit: "That a warrant cannot be drawn against a fund in excess of the appropriation." Other cases to the same effect are noted as follows: State ex rel. Decker v. Standfield, 34 Okla. 524, 126 P. 239; Haskins Sells v. Oklahoma City, 36 Okla. 57, 126 P. 204; Carey, Lombard, Young Co. v. Hamm, 61 Okla. 174, 160 P. 878; Comstock v. City of Commerce, 100 Okla. 302, 229 P. 167; Wilson v. Oklahoma City, 120 Okla. 266, 251 P. 484; Boardman Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Ellis County, 136 Okla. 85, 276 P. 474; Blake, County Treas., v. Abraham, 149 Okla. 112, 299 P. 488; Myers v. Independent School District, Consol. No. 1, Comanche County, 104 Okla. 51, 230 P. 498; State ex rel. Awtrey v. Randolph, 139 Okla. 254, 281 P. 956. There are many other decisions of this court dealing with this question, all of which support the rule that a municipal general fund warrant may not be issued or paid except by authority of an appropriation by the excise board and within the limits thereof.

  4. Opinion No. 91-03

    Opinion No. 91-03 (1991) (Ops.Okla.Atty.Gen. May. 1, 1991)

    Rather, to the extent that any such obligation exceeds the district's appropriation, the obligation is avoid." State ex rel. Awtrey v. Randolph, 281 P. 956 (Okla. 1929). See also Board of Commissioners of LeFlore County v. Central Nat. Bank of Poteau, 41 P.2d 853 (Okla. 1935).