* * * * * * "Is the regulation in question reasonable and does it bear correct relation to the health, safety and general welfare of the citizens of Pompano Beach? This Court finds it to be proper using the mentioned criteria and under the authority of the case of State [ex rel. Dallas Inv. Co.] v. Peace, Fla. [ 139 Fla. 394], 190 So. 607. See also, 35 Fla.Jur., Zoning Laws, § 15.

State ex rel. Taylor v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114; State ex rel. Skillman v. City of Miami, 101 Fla. 585, 134 So. 541; Miami Shores Village v. William N. Brockway Post, No. 124, 156 Fla. 673, 24 So.2d 33. And in such cases, we are not permitted to substitute our judgment for that of the city council, or to question the wisdom or policy of that body in adopting the ordinance under attack, so long as it does not infringe constitutional guaranties. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364; Godson v. Town of Surfside, 150 Fla. 614, 8 So.2d 497; State ex rel. Dallas Inv. Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607. The power of a municipality to require by ordinance the discontinuance of an existing property use also appears to be well established law in Florida.

In State ex rel. Skillman v. City of Miami, 101 Fla. 585, 134 So. 541, the Supreme Court of Florida sustained an ordinance zoning a limited area on Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida against the maintenance and operation of funeral homes. In State ex rel. Dallas Inv. Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607 the Supreme Court of Florida held valid an ordinance in the City of Miami prohibiting the erection of a gasoline filling station within 350 yards of any church, hospital, school or other public institution or within 750 feet of another filling station. Plaintiff's service station is within close proximity to the State Capitol, several State office buildings and a public school, which constitutes sufficient ground for the City to require the discontinuance of plaintiff's service station.

However, so long as the city does not act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or in bad faith, its decision to acquire or dispose of real property or interest therein, by way of an exchange of property, is conclusive and will not be interfered with by the courts. Compare Dallas Inv. Co. v. Peace, 190 So. 607 (Fla. 1939); Bailey v. City of Tampa, 111 So. 119 (Fla. 1926); Town of Riviera Beach v. State, 53 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1951); Griffis v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 104 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1958); and Crowe v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 167 So.2d 753 (1 D.C.A. Fla., 1964). Further, I am unaware of any constitutional or statutory limitation on the power of the municipalities to acquire and dispose of property or interests in property, for municipal purposes, by way of an exchange of property.

Cf. State ex rel. Dallas Inv. Co. v. Peace (1939), 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607. See, also, 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §§ 20.04-20.

There is a long line of Florida cases upholding the constitutionality of distance requirements between gasoline stations. See State ex rel. Dallas Inv. Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607 (1939); Harz v. Paxton, 97 Fla. 154, 120 So. 3 (1929); City of Miami v. Walker, Fla.App. 1965, 169 So.2d 842; City of Miami v. Stegemann, Fla.App. 1963, 158 So.2d 583; and Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, Fla.App. 1962, 143 So.2d 58. See North Bay Village v. Blackwell, Fla. 1956, 88 So.2d 524.

This opinion finds strong support in the case law of our state. State ex rel. Dallas Investment Co. v. Peace, 1939, 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607; Ross v. City of Miami, Fla.App. 1968, 205 So.2d 545; Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of City of Pompano Beach, Fla. App. 1962, 143 So.2d 58. We note parenthetically that the record itself reflects considerable conflicting testimony on the need for ordinance No. 339. It would seem that the heated debate and extensive litigation spawned by filling station spacing ordinances indicate that this is precisely the type of situation in which courts must not substitute their judgment for that of the local zoning authorities.

"Extensive testimony was taken before this Court, and this testimony, all pleadings and exhibits, and argument of counsel, have been carefully considered. The validity, vel non, of this particular provision was established by the Supreme Court of Florida in State ex rel. Dallas Investment Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607, followed by the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, in City of Miami v. Stegemann, Fla.App. 1964, 158 So.2d 583, and most recently in the cases styled City of Miami v. Thompson, 169 So.2d 838, and City of Miami v. Walker, 169 So.2d 842. "The Court has considered the fact that the City has permitted numerous filling stations within the distance prohibitions of the ordinance and has granted numerous variances from this requirement.

The chancellor after hearing testimony from the parties, entered a decree in which he adjudicated that the distance provisions of ordinance #6871 relating to filling or service stations were, as applied to appellees' property, discriminatory, unreasonable and unconstitutional, and authorized the use of the property for a service station subject to setback, wall erection, fire safety and building code regulations. On appeal the City of Miami contends that since the validity vel non of the distance provisions of ordinance #6871 was established by the Supreme Court of Florida in State ex rel. Dallas Investment Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607, and followed by this court in City of Miami v. Stegemann, Fla.App. 1964, 158 So.2d 583, the only question to be decided is whether or not there was sufficient evidence before the chancellor to support his conclusion that as applied to appellees' property the ordinance was discriminatory and unconstitutional. We agree with the appellant's contention and hold that the chancellor was in error in nullifying the distance requirements of the questioned ordinance.

Under all the circumstances as enunciated here, we conclude that the able chancellor was in error when he premised his decree in the case at bar upon the assumption that the decree in the former case of City of Miami v. G. S. Realty Corporation, supra, was a declaration of the invalidity of the zoning ordinance in toto. As to the validity vel non of the ordinance, we observe that such question appears to have been placed at rest by the Supreme Court of Florida in State ex rel. Dallas Inv. Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607. Inasmuch as the chancellor in the case at bar was of the view that the portion of the ordinance attacked was "fairly debatable" and on that premise the appellant should prevail but for the decision in the former case, we reverse the decree appealed, and remand the cause with directions to enter a decree in favor of the appellant.