The classification scheme must be reasonable and not arbitrary, Waybright v. Duval County, 142 Fla. 875, 196 So. 430 (1940), and must rest on some reasonable relation to the subject matter in respect of which the classification is proposed. State ex rel. Blalock v. Lee, 146 Fla. 385, 1 So.2d 193 (1941). A general law operates uniformly, not because it operates upon every person in the state, but because every person brought under the law is affected by it in a uniform fashion.
Moreover, not only must the classification be reasonable and not arbitrary but the classification must rest upon a difference which bears some reasonable and just relation to the subject matter affected or the act in respect of which the classification is proposed. State ex rel. Blalock v. Lee, 146 Fla. 385, 1 So.2d 193; State ex rel. Baldwin v. Coleman, 148 Fla. 155, 3 So.2d 802. Where a statute treated by the legislature as a general law does not conform to these principles, and a court can determine from its obvious purpose or legal effect as gathered from its language that it is in fact operative only as a special or local law, the court is under the duty to treat it as a special or local law, regardless of the guise in which it may have been framed or whether or not the particular county or locality intended to be affected by it is in terms named or identified. State ex rel. Baldwin v. Coleman, 148 Fla. 155, 3 So.2d 802.
The sole question urged for consideration is the constitutional validity of Chapter 20361, Acts of 1941. Appellant contends that Chapter 20361 is violative of Section 20, Article III of the Constitution in that it is a local act and attempts to regulate appeals from civil courts of records to the circuit courts and affects only the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. Ex Parte Porter, 141 Fla. 711, 193 So. 750; State ex rel. Blalock, et al., v. Lee, 146 Fla. 385, 1 So.2d 193; and State ex rel. Baldwin v. Coleman, 148 Fla. 155, 3 So.2d 802, are relied on to support this contention. These cases have been examined but for reasons of difference in factual basis, they do not rule the case at bar.
Since it was invalid ab initio, the code provision could not be "revived" by any subsequent legislative activity. State ex rel. Blalock v. Lee, 146 Fla. 385, 1 So.2d 193 (1941); see also Niesel v. Moran, 80 Fla. 98, 85 So. 346 (1920); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 428, n. 42 (1974); compare Butler v. Goreley, 146 U.S. 303, 13 S.Ct. 84, 36 L.Ed. 981 (1892). This is all the more clearly the case because Sec. 95.08 was, simultaneously with its repeal, replaced by Sec. 768.28(6), which also conflicts with and thus invalidates § 2-2. That provision has therefore never enjoyed a period of validity.
An ordinance like a statute must be valid at the time it becomes effective. State ex rel. Blalock v. Lee, 146 Fla. 385, 1 So.2d 193 (1941). Section 7.01(7) of the County Charter states: