I find it significant that the Florida Legislature expressly gave the Secretary of State a cause of action, particularly a mandamus action—an "extraordinary remedy"—to compel an election supervisor to follow the Department of State's rules. State ex rel. Perkins v. Lee , 142 Fla. 154, 194 So. 315, 317 (Fla. 1940). After all, it is well-established under Florida law that a writ of mandamus is available only when the duty sought to be coerced is "ministerial in nature" and the "respondent is under a clear legal duty to act ."
I find it significant that the Florida Legislature expressly gave the Secretary of State a cause of action, particularly a mandamus action—an "extraordinary remedy"—to compel an election supervisor to follow the Department of State’s rules. State ex rel. Perkins v. Lee , 142 Fla. 154, 194 So. 315, 317 (1940).
It is well settled that mandamus is a discretionary writ that is awarded, not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion and upon equitable principles. "It is an extraordinary remedy, which will not be allowed in cases of doubtful right, and it is generally regarded as not embraced within statutes of limitations application to ordinary actions, but as subject to the equitable doctrine of laches." State ex rel. Perkins v. Lee, 1940, 142 Fla. 154, 194 So. 315, 317. See also State ex rel. Long v. Carey, 1935, 121 Fla. 515, 164 So. 199, 206, in which it was held that, even though Relator had a clear legal right for which mandamus was an appropriate remedy, the writ would not be issued when to do so would result in disorder, confusion and disturbance.
In the case of State ex rel. Dixie Inn v. City of Miami, 156 Fla. 784, 24 So.2d 705, 706, 163 A.L.R. 577, we in part said: "It is well established that mandamus is a legal remedy which is not awarded as a matter of right but in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, and then only when based upon equitable principles. It is not used to enforce or determine equitable rights. State ex rel. Perkins v. Lee, 142 Fla. 154, 194 So. 315. It may issue to coerce the performance of official duties where officials charged by law with the performance of a duty refuse or fail to perform the same.
We will not make further notation of them. Other later like decisions are: Allen v. City of Lawrence, 318 Mass. 210, 61 N.E.2d 133, 160 A.L.R. 486; Jones v. City of Scranton, Pa. Com. Pl., 46 Lack. Jur. 165; Watson v. Lee County, 224 N.C. 508, 31 S.E.2d 535; Fisher v. Lane, 174 Or. 438, 149 P.2d 562; Hansen v. Cheyenne County, 139 Neb. 484, 297 N.W. 902; Jefferson County v. Case, 244 Ala. 56, 12 So.2d 343; Reed v. Jackson County, 346 Mo. 720, 142 S.W.2d 862; State ex rel. Perkins v. Lee, 142 Fla. 154, 194 So. 315; Schwarz v. City of Philadelphia, 337 Pa. 500, 12 A.2d 294. The defendant does not seriously contend that the authorities generally do not support the ruling of the trial court.
It is well established that mandamus is a legal remedy which is not awarded as a matter of right but in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, and then only when based upon equitable principles. It is not used to enforce or determine equitable rights. State ex rel. Perkins v. Lee, 143 Fla. 154, 194 So. 315. It may issue to coerce the performance of official duties where officials charged by law with the performance of a duty refuse or fail to perform the same. Overstreet v. State ex rel. Carpenter, 115 Fla. 151, 155 So. 926. The relator must establish a clear right to its issuance and further show that no other adequate remedy exists.
Towle v. State, 3 Fla. 202; State v. Barnes, 25 Fla. 298, 5 So. 722, or to require an illegal act to be done, State v. Gray, 125 Fla. 445, 170 So. 137; State v. Stewart, 49 Fla. 259, 38 So. 600. If the officer or board has no discretion in paying salaries of officers or performing other definite statutory duty, failure or refusal to perform the required duty may be remedied by mandamus. State ex rel. Weeks v. Gamble, 13 Fla. 9; State v. Lee, 142 Fla. 154, 194 So. 315. See also State v. Barker, 113 Fla. 865, 152 So. 682, 94 A.L.R. 1481; Cone v. State, 144 Fla. 738, 198 So. 689.
It is well settled that on a demurrer or motion to quash an alternative writ of mandamus, the allegations of the said alternative writ are admitted to be true for the purpose of testing the legal sufficiency, if not contradicted and denied by the respondents. See State ex rel. Harrington v. City of Pompano, 132 Fla. 820, 182 So. 290; State ex rel. Peacock v. Latham, 125 Fla. 69, 169 So. 597; State ex rel. Waldron v. Wilkinson, 117 Fla. 463, 158 So. 703; State ex rel. Perkins v. Lee, 142 Fla. 154, 194 So. 315. It is contended that the relator was not an employee of said city or a member of the Civil Service on the effective date of the Act and therefore not subject to the several provisions of Chapter 20197. It is further suggested that while Section 8 of the Act makes all regular employees of said city on June 1, 1939, members of the Civil Service and required the Civil Service Board to register the names of all officers and employees who were members of the Civil Service and to set opposite each name the respective office, rank or employment of said employee on June 1, 1939, and all of said employees' names by the terms thereof confirmed in said office which each thereof held on June 1, 1939, does not mean or should not be construed to mean that the Legislature intended to make employees of said city members of the Civil Service and confirm them as such as of June 1, 1939, because the Act did not become effective as a law until ratified by a majority vote of the electors of said city on
Mandamus, therefore, cannot be used “ ‘to compel a public agency to exercise its discretionary powers in a given manner,’ ” Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Burton, 802 So.2d 467, 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (quoting Williams v. James, 684 So.2d 868, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)), or in “cases of doubtful right.” State ex rel. Haft v. Adams, 238 So.2d 843, 844 (Fla.1970) (quoting State ex rel. Perkins v. Lee, 142 Fla. 154, 194 So. 315, 317 (1940)). Central to mandamus relief is the ministerial character of the compelled action—a situation arising where there “ ‘is no room for the exercise of [the respondent's] discretion, and the performance being required is directed by law.’ ”
Mandamus, therefore, cannot be used “ ‘to compel a public agency to exercise its discretionary powers in a given manner,’ ” Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Burton, 802 So.2d 467, 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (quoting Williams v. James, 684 So.2d 868, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ), or in “cases of doubtful right.” State ex rel. Haft v. Adams, 238 So.2d 843, 844 (Fla.1970) (quoting State ex rel. Perkins v. Lee, 142 Fla. 154, 194 So. 315, 317 (1940) ). Central to mandamus relief is the ministerial character of the compelled action—a situation arising where there “ ‘is no room for the exercise of [the respondent's] discretion, and the performance being required is directed by law.’ ”