There is no duty devolving upon the present holder of the deed herein assailed, to wit Tennessee-Cumberland Corporation, to prove that the assessment was valid, although the petitioner seems to be of opinion that it does. "The presumption that an assessment of taxes is valid, regular and correct will stand until overcome by satisfactory evidence to the contrary." State ex rel. v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 23 S.W.2d 897. The tax suit, assailed in this cause, was a proceeding against the land, i.e. an action in rem.

Sec. 67-1804. In State ex rel. v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 436, 23 S.W.2d 897, 908, the Court stated: "In an action in rem the court acquires jurisdiction of the property by its seizure and all those having an interest in the property are deemed to have constructive notice of its seizure and are considered parties to the suit.

Section 17(4), Article 5932, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St.; 11 Am.Jur.2d, Bills and Notes, § 158. it is our opnion that the reasons for the rule are sound and that the same rule applies and should apply to non-negotiable instruments. State v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 23 S.W.2d 897, 901 (1930); Duvall v. Clark, 158 S.W.2d 565 (Tex.Civ.App. 1941, writ ref. w. o. m.); Wallace v. Cook, 190 Ky. 262, 227 S.W. 279, 281 (1921); Romine v. Haag, 178 S.W. 147 (Mo. 1915); 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 311. When there is a variance between unambiguous written words and figures the written words control, and the trial court erred in giving judgment based upon the figures.

"The bill shall be in substance and form as other bills of complaint for the enforcement of liens". In State ex rel. v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 23 S.W.2d 897, this Court, at 437 of 160 Tenn., held that the jurisdiction acquired by the seizure of the property is, not to pass upon the question of forfeiture absolutely, but to pass upon that question after an opportunity has been afforded to its owner to appear and be heard upon the charges. The Court, in the Collier case, at 437 and 438 of 160 Tenn., at 908 of 23 S.W.2d stated:

We fully agree with the rule: "`In support of an assessment of taxes, it will be presumed that it is valid, regular and correct and that various officers charged with the making of the assessment all performed their duties in good faith and at the proper time and in conformity with the statutes and that other various Acts were legal and proper; and this presumption will stand until overcome by satisfactory evidence to the contrary.' 37 Cyc. 1069." State ex rel. v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 432, 23 S.W.2d 897, 906, quoted and approved in State ex rel. v. Rowan et al., 171 Tenn. 612, 625, 106 S.W.2d 861. In this case, however, it appears from the testimony of the complainant and several witnesses that there was positive evidence to rebut the presumption.

It must be conceded that to sustain the contention for repeal by implication of these Code Sections, an irreconcilable conflict must appear between the old and the new legislation. State ex rel. v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 443, 448, 23 S.W.2d 897 and cases therein cited. This and our other cases all hold that repeals by implication are not favored.

This is analogous to the rule that objections to the sufficiency of service of process must be made prior to appearance of the defendant and his defending on the merits. State v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 23 S.W.2d 897 (1930); Title Guaranty and Trust Company v. Johnson, 485 S.W.2d 764 (Tenn. App. 1972). The juvenile judge must be given the opportunity to correct any defects of notice and conduct the hearing free from error.

It is true that these actions are in rem and that the Court acquires jurisdiction of the property by its seizure and all those having an interest in the property are deemed to have constructive notice of its seizure and are considered parties to the suit. State ex rel. v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 435-436, 23 S.W.2d 897. What is the necessity of the County seizing property that it already owns? The State is not going to sue the County for its pro rata of taxes that the County collects or should collect. If such a situation arose the State would just withhold from monies coming from elsewhere that go to the County and would not give them to the County. So, as we see it, a suit of this character should not and could not be maintained by Lawrence County against itself in the first instance. If we are right in this premise clearly the judgment under which the deed to the appellant was made was void and this being true then anything based on this void judgment would likewise be of no effect when properly brought to the attention of the Court.

Such practice is recognized as permissible in repeated decisions of this Court, indeed, so far as we are advised, has not heretofore been seriously challenged. Wright v. Cunningham, 115 Tenn. 445, 453, 91 S.W. 293; Cole Mfg. Co. v. Falls, 92 Tenn. 607, 22 S.W. 856; Southern Ry. Co. v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S.W. 662, 41 L.R.A., N.S., 828; State v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 23 S.W.2d 897." Bell v. Town of Pulaski, 182 Tenn. 136, 139-140, 184 S.W.2d 384, 386.

Such practice is recognized as permissible in repeated decisions of this Court, indeed, so far as we are advised, has not heretofore been seriously challenged. Wright v. Cunningham, 115 Tenn. 445, 453, 91 S.W. 293; Cole Mfg. Co. v. Falls, 92 Tenn. 607, 22 S.W. 856; Southern Ry. Co. v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S.W. 662, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.), 828, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 153; State v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 23 S.W.2d 897. The next constitutional objection made to Chapter 98 of the Private Acts of 1941 is more serious.