The same Legislature passed a separate appropriation bill, appropriating funds specifically for salaries, traveling and other expenses of the members and employees of the Conservation Commission up to June 30, 1935, and from July 1, 1935, to June 30, 1936, but did not make any such appropriation for the fiscal year 1936-37, and for that reason the state officers declined to allow and pay plaintiff's claim pending determination of this action. As we view the matter, this case is controlled by the former decisions of this court in Edwards v. Carter, 167 Okla. 287, 29 P.2d 610, and State ex rel. Telle v. Carter, 170 Okla. 50, 39 P.2d 134. It was there determined, in substance, that when the Legislature, by valid legislation, creates a state office and fixes the tenure of office and salary, then, under section 17 of the Schedule of the Constitution, it is the law that such officer shall receive the fixed compensation, and it was held that by such legislative enactment, together with the Constitution of the state, there resulted an appropriation by law of a sufficient portion of the state revenue to pay the state officer for his services at the rate fixed by law.

We stated the following in Fortinberry . In State ex rel. Telle v. Carter , 170 Okl. 50, 39 P.2d 134, 140, it was said: It was clearly the intention of the framers of the Constitution that any party claiming any portion of an appropriation, setting apart for some purpose or uses a definite sum of money, must make claim for same within two and one-half years after the appropriation is made, and if claim is not so made, thereafter the Legislature is authorized to make whatever disposition of the balance of such appropriation as it may determine is for the best interests of the state. Fortinberry Co. v. Blundell , 242 P.2d at 434, quoting State ex rel. Telle v. Carter , 1934 OK 702, 170 Okla. 50, 39 P.2d 134, 140.

A statute providing that the Justices of the Supreme Court elected at the general election in 1934 should compile certain procedural statutes and annotate the same, fixing an annual salary or compensation for the same, created the offices or positions named therein, and the failure of the Legislature to appropriate in a separate measure money for the payment of the salary so fixed does not defeat the right of such Justices to recover for the same. (Telle v. Carter, 170 Okla. 50, 39 P.2d 134; Battles v. Childers, 177 Okla. 589, 61 P.2d 253.) 5. Statutes — Validity of Enactment — Conclusiveness of Enrolled Bill on File in Office of Secretary of State.

This ruling was upon the theory that when a state official wrongfully refuses to perform an act necessary to secure payment, such payment will be enforced by mandamus and will relate back to and be considered as made when it should have been made, and the fund provided for payment shall be considered as encumbered by the claim. In State ex rel. Telle v. Carter, 170 Okla. 50, 39 P.2d 134, it was said: "It was clearly the intention of the framers of the Constitution that any party claiming any portion of an appropriation setting apart for some purpose or uses a definite sum of money, must make claim for same within two and one-half years after the appropriation is made, and if claim is not so made, thereafter the Legislature is authorized to make whatever disposition of the balance of such appropriation as it may determine is for the best interests of the state."

Sections 15, 16, and 17 of the Schedule to the Constitution have been considered and their language interpreted and applied by this court in numerous cases. Notable among these decisions are: Riley v. Carter, State Auditor, 165 Okla. 262, 25 P.2d 666; Edwards v. Carter, State Auditor, 167 Okla. 287, 29 P.2d 610; State ex rel. Telle v. Carter, State Auditor, 170 Okla. 50, 39 P.2d 134; and Battles v. Childers, State Auditor, 177 Okla. 589, 61 P.2d 253. It has been the uniform holding of this court that where a state office has been created by constitutional provision or by legislative enactment and an annual salary therefor has been fixed, the salary so fixed is a constitutional appropriation from current revenues of the amount required to pay such salary.

We would prefer the latter construction since we have found that the plaintiff here had the right to commence and maintain this action to cancel the purported lien of this judgment which definitely ceased to be any lien on the 20 acres of land here involved. Actions to enforce fixed legal rights were considered in Riley v. Carter, 165 Okla. 262, 25 P. 666; Edwards v. Carter, 167 Okla. 287, 29 P.2d 610; State ex rel. Telle v. Carter, 170 Okla. 50, 39 P.2d 134, and Carter v. Miley, 187 Okla. 530, 103 P.2d 933. Actions maintainable to establish and enforce rights under statutory provisions are observed in United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 27 L.Ed. 1015; Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382; United States v. Hellard, 138 F.2d 985, 322 U.S. 363, 88 L.Ed. 1326. See, also, Kiefer and Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U.S. 381, 83 L.Ed. 784, and especially the extensive annotation following at pages 794 et seq.

By section 1 it was provided "the members of such board shall receive as compensation . . . $10 per day . . . and their actual and necessary expenses while engaged in the performance of their official duties", limited to $100 per year. The board may be entitled to its compensation under the rule stated in Riley v. Carter, 165 Okla. 262, 25 P.2d 666; Edwards v. Carter, 167 Okla. 287, 29 P.2d 610; Telle v. Carter, 170 Okla. 50, 39 P.2d 134. If so, no contingency or emergency existed. Otherwise, the Legislature had the matter before it and elected not to provide an appropriation for the purpose.

That adjudication of "The Legislature" provided by law has been found to be binding upon this court, and with that part of the judgment I am heartily in accord, notwithstanding that a future Supreme Court may not be bound by the dictum, so that in the future, by quo warranto or otherwise, the purported next Legislature and officers thereof may be required to meet the issue as to whether they collectively constitute the Legislature of Oklahoma (Simpson v. Hill et al., 128 Okla. 269, 263 P. 635, 56 A. L. R. 706), or whether this court should "enjoin the payment of legislative salaries," as has been done. Simpson v. Hill, supra, Farrelly v. Cole, State Auditor, 60 Kan. 356, 56 P. 492, 44 L. R. A. 464; Dixon et al. v. Shaw, State Auditor, 122 Okla. 211, 253 P. 500, 50 A. L. R. 1232; Dyer v. Shaw et al., 139 Okla. 165, 281 P. 776; Shaw v. Grumbine, 137 Okla. 95, 278 P. 311; State ex rel. Telle v. Carter, State Auditor, et al., 170 Okla. 50, 39 P.2d 134; Shaw v. Carter, State Auditor, 148 Okla. 57, 297 P. 273; State ex rel. Cloud v. State Election Board, 169 Okla. 363, 36 P.2d 20, 94 A. L. R. 1007. "The Supreme Court may determine if candidate for Legislature is eligible."

This contention is without merit and we have seen that there is a valid appropriation against which defendant is authorized to issue a warrant in payment of this claim. This is not a suit against the state in the nature of Love v. Filtsch, 33 Okla. 131, 124 P. 30, concerning a private contract for rent, but mandamus is available as shown by numerous decisions to compel the State Auditor to issue warrants, where plaintiff shows a clear legal right to such relief. Edwards v. Carter, 167 Okla. 287, 29 P.2d 610; State ex rel. v. Carter, 170 Okla. 50, 39 P.2d 134. Cost assessed in this action against a state officer is sought by plaintiff to be measured by Dickey v. State, 90 Okla. 106, 217 P. 145.

The other provisions of section 8 as to payment of said bonds are not questioned. Section 8 of article 1, chapter 27, supra, constitutes an appropriation, subject to the limitations therein contained, for the purpose of paying said bonds and is not violative of section 55, article 5 of the Constitution and until repealed, authorizes and requires the State Treasurer to set aside, monthly, out of the first state general fund revenues during the time said act is effective 1/12th of the sum sufficient to pay the interest on all of said funding bonds and any of said bonds maturing and due and payable during the fiscal year. Menefee v. Askew, 25 Okla. 623, 107 P. 159; Blakeney v. Lafayette, Chairman Board of Public Affairs, 95 Okla. 282, 219 P. 292; Edwards v. Childers, State Auditor, 102 Okla. 158, 228 P. 472; Rice v. State ex rel. Short. Attorney General, 108 Okla. 4, 232 P. 807; and State ex rel. Telle v. Carter, State Auditor, 170 Okla. 50, 39 P.2d 134. By the last clause of said section, as well as by section 1 of article 1 of said act, the full faith, credit, and resources of the state are irrevocably pledged for the payment of said bonds. The question of the right of the Legislature to repeal or modify the provisions of said section 8 is not before us in this proceeding.