[¶ 6] The upland owners argue the district court erred in deciding the State owns the mineral interests under the shore zone. They argue the court's decision is contrary to this Court's decision in State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537, 542–43 (N.D.1994), which they claim held that upland owners next to navigable waters have “full interests” in the shore zone under N.D.C.C. § 47–01–15, subject to the State's obligation to protect the public's right to use the navigable waters. The upland owners assert the State's public trust and equal footing obligations relate to the public's use of waters for “navigating, boating, fishing, fowling and like public uses” and do not relate to the proprietary privileges of ownership of subsurface mineral interests under the shore zone.

Thus, at statehood, North Dakota acquired title to the beds of the navigable rivers up to the ordinary highwater mark pursuant to the equal-footing doctrine. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537, 539 (N.D.1994). In its sovereign capacity, North Dakota has authority to allocate property interests in navigable riverbeds to riparian landowners.

We construe statutes to avoid constitutional infirmities. State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537, 540 (N.D. 1994); Froysland v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bur., 432 N.W.2d 883, 889 (N.D. 1988). See N.D.C.C. § 1-02-38(1).

The disputed land constitutes approximately 62 acres of "shore zone," the area between the ordinary high watermark and ordinary low watermark of the river. See State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537, 538 (N.D. 1994) (" Mills I"). The land is bounded on the east by Riverwood Drive and by the river to the west. Mills owns the land above the ordinary high watermark.

[¶24] To avoid a statutory interpretation raising constitutional doubt, Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537 (N.D. 1994), we have interpreted the entry statute to authorize only surveys and examinations that are "minimally invasive" or "limited." In re 2015 Application, 2016 ND 165, ¶ 14; see also Aaland, 2021 ND 57, ¶ 14; Square Butte Elec. Coop., 219 N.W.2d at 883-84.

To protect the public interest in sovereign lands, the State may have to litigate a quiet title action to determine the extent of its sovereign lands along navigable waters when the boundaries are disputed. State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537, 540 (N.D. 1994). The State's act of responding to the quiet title action is insufficient to be the "something more."

The State may not abdicate its legitimate claims to sovereign lands. State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537, 540 (N.D. 1994). To protect the public interest in sovereign lands, the State may have to litigate a quiet title action to determine the extent of its sovereign lands along navigable waters when the boundaries are disputed.

Whenever possible, statutes are construed in harmony with the constitution to avoid constitutional infirmities. N.D.C.C. § 1–02–38(1); Reep v. State, 2013 ND 253, ¶ 24, 841 N.W.2d 664;State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537, 540 (N.D.1994). [¶ 17] Section 12.

[¶ 2] This dispute centers upon the mineral acres underlying the Little Missouri River in a section of land ("Section 21") in Billings County. Prior to 1992, it had not been conclusively determined whether the Little Missouri River was a navigable waterway at the time of statehood in 1889. If it was a navigable waterway, all rights, including mineral rights, to the land underlying the river belonged to the State of North Dakota under the "equal footing" doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. See 43 U.S.C. § 1311; State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537, 539 (N.D. 1994); J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v. Sun Exploration and Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 132 (N.D. 1988). If the river was not navigable, however, ownership of the land underlying the river and the accompanying mineral interests belonged to the owners of the adjacent land. See N.D.C.C. § 47-01-15; Kim-Go v. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc., 460 N.W.2d 694, 696-97 (N.D. 1990); Amoco Oil Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 262 N.W.2d 726, 730 (N.D. 1978).

The prohibition of advisory opinions requires there be an "actual controversy to be determined" before a court can properly adjudicate. Bies, 1997 ND 18, ¶ 9, 558 N.W.2d 855 (citing State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537, 544 (N.D. 1994)). When the occurrence of related events makes it impossible for a court to render effective relief, or when the issue has been mooted by lapse of time, no "actual controversy" exists.