State ex Rel. School District v. Jones

25 Citing cases

  1. State v. City of St. Robert

    424 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 21 times

    In other cases, it was said that the alternative writ "should set forth all the matters stated in the petition" [State ex rel. Hathaway v. State Board of Health, 103 Mo. 22, 26, 15 S.W. 322] or "should [contain], by way of recital, the allegations of the petition" [Bell v. County Court of Pike County, 61 Mo.App. 173, 176(2)]; but, in each instance, the court nevertheless considered the allegations of the petition for the writ. State ex rel. Brooks v. Crain, Mo. (banc), 263 S.W.2d 368, 369(1); State ex rel. Eggers v. Brown, 345 Mo. (banc) 430, 437, 134 S.W.2d 28, 31; State ex rel. Dilliner v. Cummins, 338 Mo. (banc) 609, 92 S.W.2d 605, 607(1); State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 1, Mississippi and New Madrid Counties v. Jones, 320 Mo. (banc) 353, 8 S.W.2d 66, 67 (2); State ex rel. Hathaway v. State Board of Health, 103 Mo. 22, 26, 15 S.W. 322; State ex rel. Foster v. Griffin, Mo.App., 246 S.W.2d 396, 397(1); State ex rel. Sharp v. Knight, 224 Mo.App. 761, 26 S.W.2d 1011, 1016(8); State ex rel. Wagner v. Fields, 218 Mo.App. 155, 263 S.W. 853, 856(1); State ex rel. Thomas Cusack Co. v. Shinnick, 208 Mo.App. 284, 232 S.W. 1053, 1054(1); State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer, 183 Mo. App. 463, 479, 167 S.W. 1123, 1127; State ex rel. Huebler v. Board of Police Com'rs., 108 Mo.App. 98, 82 S.W. 960, 961(1). Brown, supra, 345 Mo. at 437, 134 S.W. at 31; State Board of Health, supra, 103 Mo. at 26, 15 S.W. at 322; Knight, supra, 26 S.W.2d at 1016(8); Fields, supra, 263 S.W. at 856(1); Board of Police Com'rs., supra, 82 S.W. at 961(1).

  2. Pugh v. St. Louis Police Relief Assn

    179 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944)   Cited 21 times

    The legal remedy must be as practical and efficient as is the equitable remedy in rendering justice and as prompt in its administration. 32 C.J., p. 60; Pickel v. Pickel, 243 Mo. 641, 664; Roberts v. Stoner, 18 Mo. 481; Errissmann v. Errissmann, 25 Ill. 119; Draper v. Draper, 68 Ill. 17. (3) Appellant did not put into issue, by affidavits filed with the pleadings, that it was not a corporation and hence, in the appellate court this defense cannot be urged. Sec. 1116, R.S. Mo. 1939; State ex rel. v. Jones (Mo.), 8 S.W.2d 66; Flynn v. Neosho, 114 Mo. 567; Meyer Bros. v. Insurance Co., 73 Mo. App. 166; Walker v. Point Pleasant, 49 Mo. App. 244. (4) Under the law of Missouri any moneys due the husband may be sequestered.

  3. White v. City of Columbia

    461 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. 1971)   Cited 9 times
    Holding property owners and taxpayers could not bring declaratory judgment action attacking regularity of annexation proceedings because exclusive remedy was quo warranto

    It is our opinion that the facts alleged in the petition show a de facto annexation which can only be questioned by the proper State authority in a direct proceeding for that purpose. Fly v. Jackson, 226 Mo. App. 203, 45 S.W.2d 919; School District No. 35 v. School District No. 32, Mo.App., 247 S.W. 232; Bonderer v. Hall, Mo.Sup., 205 S.W. 542; State ex rel. Consolidated School District No. 2, Clinton County v. Hunt, Mo.Sup., 199 S.W. 944; State ex rel. Consolidated School District No. 1, Mississippi and New Madrid Counties v. Jones, 320 Mo. 353, 8 S.W.2d 66; State ex inf. Barker v. Smith, 271 Mo. 168, 196 S.W. 17; Black v. Early, 208 Mo. 281, 106 S.W. 1014. "[2] The foregoing cases deal with the organization of consolidated school districts and hold that a private individual cannot attack the legality of the corporate existence of such school districts on account of any irregularity in their organization, but that such action can only be brought by the State in a quo warranto proceeding.

  4. State ex rel. Priest v. Gunn

    326 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1959)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that the statute fixing a maximum police force for the City of St. Louis and the salaries of its members constitutional

    These sections prescribe that such pleadings shall be filed. Ordinarily, the alternative writ is taken as the first pleading (State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 1, Mississippi and New Madrid Counties v. Jones, Banc, 320 Mo. 353, 8 S.W.2d 66, 67), but here the petition has been treated as the alternative writ. Some confusion may have been caused here by the names given to certain pleadings; they are: (1) The petition for the Writ; (2) The Answer and Return; and (3) The Response to Respondents' Return.

  5. State v. Crain

    263 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1953)   Cited 4 times

    Respondent contends he is vested with full jurisdiction to determine mandamus actions, to enforce the election laws and to punish relators for contempt, subject only to relators' right of review under writ of habeas corpus, and that prohibition is not the proper remedy. Both under our statutes, Sections 529.010- 529.100, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., and at common law, the alternative writ in a mandamus action is merely the first pleading. State ex rel. Hambleton v. Town of Dexter, 89 Mo. 188, 1 S.W. 234; State ex rel. Consolidated School District v. Jones, 320 Mo. 353, 8 S.W.2d 66, 67; State ex rel. Dilliner v. Cummins, 338 Mo. 609, 92 S.W.2d 605, 607; State ex rel. Foster v. Griffin, Mo.App., 246 S.W.2d 396, 397. On the other hand, the peremptory writ is the writ of enforcement and constitutes both a judgment and an execution.

  6. State v. Johnston

    249 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. 1952)   Cited 2 times

    Mo. Sup., 245 S.W.2d 13. Therefore, such a collateral attack is not a valid ground for refusal of a public officer to perform a mandatory statutory duty. See State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 2, Clinton County v. Hunt, Mo.Sup., 199 S.W. 944; State ex rel. Consolidated School No. 1, Mississippi and New Madrid Counties v. Jones, 320 Mo. 353, 8 S.W.2d 66; See also as to constitutional questions State ex rel. State Board of Mediation v. Pigg, Mo.Sup., 244 S.W.2d 75 and cases cited. Moreover, the questions raised by the return have been decided; the constitutional question in State ex rel. Reorganized Dist. No. 4 of Jackson County v. Holmes, 360 Mo. 904, 231 S.W.2d 185 and the questions of notice and voting place in that case and in State ex inf. Stipp ex rel. Stokes Mound School Dist. No. 7 v. Colliver, Mo.Sup., 243 S.W.2d 344; See also State ex inf. Latham ex rel. Dawes v. Allen, 361 Mo. 963, 237 S.W.2d 489. Furthermore, the action of the County Board in fixing the area and boundaries of the district, as authorized by Section 165.677, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., after approval by the voters, is not subject to judicial review.

  7. Utt v. Oster

    245 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1952)   Cited 6 times

    State ex rel. v. Wilke Land Co., 162 S.W.2d 846; State ex rel. Black v. Taylor, 208 Mo. 442; Sec. 1782, R.S. 1939. (7) Whether Consolidated District C-4 of Caldwell County, Missouri, was legally organized and whether the individual respondents were legally elected as directors can only be questioned by the state in a direct proceeding by quo warranto. State ex rel. v. Gardner, 204 S.W.2d 319; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. v. Hunt, 199 S.W. 944; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. v. Jones, 320 Mo. 353, 8 S.W.2d 66; State ex rel. Frank v. Goben, 167 Mo. App. 613; State ex rel. Musser v. Birch, 186 Mo. 205. (8) Relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act is unnecessary when a full and adequate remedy is provided by another well known form of action. O'Mera v. New York Life Ins. Co., 169 S.W.2d 116; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S.W.2d l.c. 953; Koenig v. Koenig, 191 S.W.2d 269; Brindley v. Meara, 198 N.E. 301, 101 A.L.R. 687; Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Terte, 131 S.W.2d 587; Finley v. Smith, 178 S.W.2d 326. (9) A finding in the case at bar would not necessarily stabilize or settle the relations between the parties because the Attorney General or Prosecuting Attorney could file a quo warranto proceeding regardless of the pendency of the case at bar or a decision therein.

  8. Spiking Sch. Dist. v. Purpor. Enl. Sch. Dist

    362 Mo. 848 (Mo. 1952)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that the existence of a municipal corporation must be challenged by the state

    In other words, a common school district, alleged to be non-existent as a corporate entity, or whose existence is alleged to be doubtful or in dispute, cannot maintain a declaratory judgment action in its own name, or in the names of those alleged to constitute its board of directors and officers, for the purpose of establishing its non-existence. See Parker v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 358 Mo. 365, 214 S.W.2d 529, 534; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 1 v. Jones, 320 Mo. 353, 8 S.W.2d 66, 67 (5). The case of School Dist. No. 1, Multnomah Co. v. School Dist. No. 45, 148 Or. 554, 37 P.2d 873, does not aid appellants.

  9. State ex Rel. Consolidated School Dist. v. Smith

    353 Mo. 840 (Mo. 1945)   Cited 4 times

    (1) Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the State Auditor to register the bonds of relator. State ex rel. City of Jefferson v. Hackmann, 287 Mo. 156, 229 S.W. 1082; State ex rel. Webster Groves Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Smith, 337 Mo. 855, 87 S.W.2d 147. (2) The qualified voters of any community in Missouri may organize a consolidated school district for the purpose of maintaining both elementary schools and high schools under the provisions of Sections 10493-10500, inclusive, R.S. 1939; State ex inf. Thompson ex rel. Kenneppe v. Scott, 304 Mo. 664, 264 S.W. 369; State ex inf. Carnahan ex rel. Webb v. Jones, 266 Mo. 191, 181 S.W. 50; State ex rel. Consolidated Dist. No. 9 of New Madrid County v. Thompson, 325 Mo. 1170, 30 S.W.2d 603; State ex rel. Buckley v. Thompson, 323 Mo. 248, 19 S.W.2d 714; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 1 of Mississippi and New Madrid Counties v. Jones, 8 S.W.2d 66; State ex rel. Clements v. Clardy, 267 Mo. 371, 185 S.W. 184. (3) The act of the Legislature (Laws 1941, p. 545) does not repeal, amend, or in any way abrogate directly or by implication the Sections of the 1939 statutes under which relator was organized. It simply attempts to provide a way whereby adjacent city, town, or consolidated school districts without limitations as to size or enrollment and adjacent common school districts, all of whose boundaries are already definitely fixed, may be attached to each other and become Consolidated School District. Laws 1941, p. 545; Hull v. Baumann, 345 Mo. 159, 131 S.W.2d 721; State ex inf. Thompson ex rel. Kenneppe v. Scott, 304 Mo. 664, 264 S.W. 369; Nomath Hotel Co. v. Kansas City Gas Co., 204 Mo. App. 214, 223 S.W. 975. (4) Statutes providing for organization of school districts are liberally construed in favor of organization. State ex inf. Carnahan ex rel. Webb v. Jones, 266 Mo. 191, 181 S.W. 50; State ex rel. Fleener v. Consolidated Sc

  10. State ex Rel. Howe v. Hughes

    123 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. 1938)   Cited 25 times
    In State v. Turner, Mo., 123 S.W.2d 105, a sentence of three years and one day was held not to be illegal, though unusual.

    The motion to quash is waived. State ex inf. v. Kansas City Gas Co., 254 Mo. 515; State ex rel. v. County Court, 277 S.W. 934; State v. Jones, 8 S.W.2d 66; State v. Cummins, 92 S.W.2d 605; Long v. Towl, 41 Mo. 398; Taber v. Wilson, 34 Mo. App. 89; State v. Reynolds, 178 S.W. 468; State v. Gordon, 233 Mo. 383. (2) In a mandamus proceeding a motion to quash performs the same function a demurrer does in an ordinary civil proceeding, and like a demurrer admits all facts well pleaded. State v. Darby, 64 S.W.2d 911; State ex rel. v. Haid, 38 S.W.2d 44; State v. County Court, 277 S.W. 934. (3) Rule 32 of this court has no application and is not grounds for quashing an alternative writ that has issued, but the court will, having once taken jurisdiction, proceed to determine the question presented.