Similarly, in interpreting a statute requiring a pattern of real estate sales be established, this court held: "`Pattern' suggests that, even though one be in the business of selling, more than an isolated instance or two of selling must occur before a broker's license is required." State ex rel. Real Estate Exam. Bd. v. Gerhardt, 39 Wis.2d 701, 712, 159 N.W.2d 622 (1968). ยถ 57. Hutson's claim of an ongoing violation may also be viewed as an attempt to re-characterize the "management decision" at issue in this case.
Wisconsin statutes are presumed constitutional by the court. See Laufenberg v. Cosmetology Examining Board, 87 Wis.2d 175, 181, 274 N.W.2d 618 (1979); State ex rel. Real Est. Exam. Bd. v. Gerhardt, 39 Wis.2d 701, 711, 159 N.W.2d 622 (1968); Courtesy Cab Co. v. Johnson, 10 Wis.2d 426, 432, 103 N.W.2d 17 (1960). However, a petitioner can overcome this presumption by proving that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
We repeat the ruling in Dane County v. McManus, 55 Wis.2d 413, 423, 198 N.W.2d 667 (1972), listing five criteria which a classification by the legislature must satisfy: "As regards the specific standards for examining the reasonableness of a statute's classifications, these are well expressed in State ex rel. Real Estate Examining Board v. Gerhardt (1968), 39 Wis.2d 701, 710, 711, 159 N.W.2d 622: "`Five standards for proper classification were promulgated by this court in State ex rel. Ford Hopkins Co. v. Mayor, and expanded in State ex rel. Baer v. Milwaukee. They are:
It is a basic maxim of statutory construction that ordinances, like statutes, enjoy a presumption of validity. State ex rel. HammermillPaper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis.2d 32, 46, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973); State ex rel. Real Estate Examining Bd. v. Gerhardt, 39 Wis.2d 701, 710, 159 N.W.2d 622 (1968). Consequently, the party challenging an ordinance bears the frequently insurmountable task of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the ordinance possesses no rational basis to any legitimate municipal objective.
son, 79 Wis.2d 120, 256 N.W.2d 139 (1977) (there is a strong presumption that legislature's acts are constitutional, and it is duty of court to so construe a statute if possible). Additional cases where the standard of proof for establishing unconstitutionality of a statute beyond the reasonable doubt is not clearly and definitively stated are: Bigelow v. The West Wisconsin Railway Company, 27 Wis. 478 (1871); State ex rel. Gubbins v. Anson, 132 Wis. 461, 112 N.W. 475 (1907); State ex rel. Scanlan v. Archibold, 146 Wis. 363, 131 N.W. 895 (1911); Milwaukee County v. Halsey, 149 Wis. 82, 136 N.W. 139 (1912); Minneapolis, St. P. S. S. M. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 183 Wis. 47, 197 N.W. 352 (1924); Malinowski v. Moss, 196 Wis. 292, 220 N.W. 197 (1928); State ex rel. Blockwitz v. Diehl, 198 Wis. 326, 223 N.W. 852 (1929); Barth v. Shorewood, 229 Wis. 151, 282 N.W. 89 (1938); Estateof Nieman, 230 Wis. 23, 283 N.W. 452 (1939); Estate of Ogg, 262 Wis. 181, 54 N.W.2d 175 (1952); State ex rel. Real Est. Exam. Bd. v. Gerhardt, 39 Wis.2d 701, 159 N.W.2d 622 (1968). The U-Haul Company in the circumstances of this case came forward with evidence showing the retroactive application of the dealership law had a substantial effect on the obligations of the contract between itself and Wipperfurth.
. ." State ex rel. Real Est. Exam. Bd. v. Gerhardt, 39 Wis.2d 701, 709-711, 159 N.W.2d 622 (1968). Appellant has not attempted to show that these two classes are not substantially distinct.
To overcome this presumption a challenger must bear the heavy burden of proving that no basis exists for the classification made by the legislature. State ex rel. Real Est. Exam. Bd. v. Gerhardt, 39 Wis.2d 701, 711, 159 N.W.2d 622 (1968). The petitioners here must prove the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
Insofar as the tax in jury suits is prepaid and larger than the tax in nonjury suits, a constitutional question of equal protection would be raised. Legislative classification, however, is presumed to be valid. State, ex rel. Real Estate Examining Board v. Gerhardt (1968), 39 Wis.2d 701, 710, 159 N.W.2d 622. The basic test is "not whether some inequality results from the classification, but whether there exists any reasonable basis to justify the classification." Omernik v. State (1974), 64 Wis.2d 6, 19, 218 N.W.2d 734. A review of sec. 299.21(3) (b), Stats., discloses that a jury trial in civil traffic forfeiture actions is equated with a jury trial in small claims actions. Sec. 271.21. Since the disparate length of trial time and preparation on the part of the court and its officers for jury trials is a reasonable distinction, the higher tax is valid.
(5) The characteristics of each class could be so far different from those of other classes as to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having regard to the public good, of substantially different legislation. See: Dane County v. McManus (1972), 55 Wis.2d 413, 198 N.W.2d 667; State ex rel. Real Estate Examining Board v. Gerhardt (1968), 39 Wis.2d 701, 159 N.W.2d 622; State ex rel. Ford Hopkins Co. v. Mayor (1937), 226 Wis. 215, 222, 276 N.W. 311; State ex rel. Baer v. Milwaukee (1967), 33 Wis.2d 624, 633, 148 N.W.2d 21. Is there a substantial distinction between dependent adult and unemancipated minor children and emancipated and nondependent adult children? The obvious distinction between the classes in question is the different degree of dependence which each would be presumed to have on their parents for their continued financial and emotional support.
Enforcement of these regulations in the face of petitioner's contrary intentions is a denial of equal protection only if it is shown that the legislature has no proper basis for the classification made, i.e., health care plans in existence via ch. 148. State ex rel. Real Estate Examining Bd. v. Gerhardt (1968), 39 Wis.2d 701, 709-711, 159 N.W.2d 622. The burden of such a showing is on petitioner, in the face of the presumption of constitutionality for such laws. Omernik v. State (1974), 64 Wis.2d 6, 18, 218 N.W.2d 734. There is a complete failure of proof as to how the legislative scheme surrounding the health care plan violates the equal protection clause.