A child under eighteen years of age shall not be committed to a jail or police station, except that . . . a child over fourteen years of age who is charged with a crime which would be a violent felony if committed by an adult, may, upon an order of the circuit court, be housed in a juvenile detention portion of a county facility, but not within sight of adult prisoners.See Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. R.C.F. v. Wilt, 162 W. Va. 424, 252 S.E.2d 168 (1979). The relators assert that West Virginia Code § 49-5-16(a) applies.

Without the assent of both, no transfer is authorized under the statute. This Court has previously noted this clear meaning in State ex rel. R.C.F. v. Wilt, 162 W. Va. 424, 428, 252 S.E.2d 168, 170 (1979), where we stated that under West Virginia Code § 49-5-16(b), a "child cannot be transferred from a secure juvenile facility to a penitentiary after he attains the age of eighteen, unless in the judgment of both the court which committed the child and the commissioner of the department of corrections such transfer is appropriate." (emphasis added.)

Finally, as this Court stated in Syllabus Point 2, of Terry v. Sencindiver, 153 W. Va. 651, 171 S.E.2d 480 (1969): "The word `shall,' in the absence of language in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the legislature, should be afforded a mandatory connotation." See also Syl. pt. 7, Hodge v. Ginsberg, 172 W. Va. 17, 303 S.E.2d 245 (1983); Syl. pt. 1, Nelson v. West Virginia Public Employees Insurance Board, 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982); Cooper v. Gwinn, 171 W. Va. 245, 298 S.E.2d 781, 789-90 (1981); Killen v. Logan County Commission, 170 W. Va. 602, 295 S.E.2d 689, 705 (1982); Syl. pt. 2, United Mine Workers of America v. Miller, 170 W. Va. 177, 291 S.E.2d 673 (1982); Perry v. Miller, 166 W. Va. 138, 272 S.E.2d 678, 679 (1980); State ex rel. R.C.F. v. Wilt, 162 W. Va. 424, 252 S.E.2d 168, 170 (1979); Syl. pt. 2, Woodring v. Whyte, 161 W. Va. 262, 242 S.E.2d 238 (1978); Syl. pt. 3, Bounds v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 153 W. Va. 670, 172 S.E.2d 379 (1970); Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension or Relief Fund of City of Huntington v. City of Huntington, 142 W. Va. 217, 246, 96 S.E.2d 225, 242 (1957). As in United Mine Workers of America v. Miller, 170 W. Va. at 181, 291 S.E.2d at 677, the petitioners in the present mandamus proceeding are representatives of the class which the provisions of Chapter 22 of the Code are designed to protect.

In addition to the legitimate diagnostic value of the procedure legislated in W. Va. Code § 49-5-13a, were we to find that the section allowed status offenders to be sent to a secure, prison-like facility for diagnosis, the diagnostic commitment becomes, at least potentially, a "shock therapy" approach. It should be obvious that such a procedure cannot be used as a sanction against juveniles who would not otherwise be eligible for incarceration. We specifically disapproved the "shock therapy" approach in State ex rel. R.C.F. v. Wilt, 162 W. Va. 424, 252 S.E.2d 168, 171 (1979): The loss of liberty and the exposure of juveniles to adult offenders even for a short time can do but ill for the child.

On that same day, the court appointed J. Wendell Reed to represent the petitioner. Petitioner devoted a major portion of her argument to her detention in a common county jail for a combined period of almost 40 days. Petitioner would have us reverse the disposition on this basis alone for the court's blatant denial of the mandate in our law that juveniles are not to be housed in common county jails as set forth in State ex rel. R.C.F. v. Wilt, ___ W. Va. ___, 252 S.E.2d 168 (1979); however, we have chosen to reverse on the errors at trial. We condemn the actions of the circuit court in housing the juvenile in a common county jail and reserve the right to reverse for this illegality in the future.