State ex Rel. Phillips v. Smith

12 Citing cases

  1. MYER v. GOVT. OF NASHVILLE

    No. M2009-01644-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2010)

    In the meantime, under its general power to control its highways, the state has authority to authorize any use of the right-of-way consistent with the purpose of the highway and not in derogation of the rights of the public or those of the abutting landowners.Id. at 797 (quoting State ex rel. Phillips v. Smith, 241 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950)). Under this legal authority, the State can allow Metro to have vehicular access from the courthouse area to the bridge and vice versa.

  2. McNeely v. Jacks

    526 So. 2d 541 (Miss. 1988)   Cited 10 times

    Nevada and Tennessee courts have stated that an unlawful encroachment placed on a public roadway will not constitute abandonment. Anderson v. Richards, 96 Nev. 318, 608 P.2d 1096, 1099 (1980); State v. Smith, 34 Tenn. App. 608, 241 S.W.2d 844 (1950). The Anderson court went on to state that a public road is not abandoned when it is used by only a few members of the public or because of a substantial reduction in the members of the public who continue to make use of rights previously acquired.

  3. Anderson v. Richards

    608 P.2d 1096 (Nev. 1980)   Cited 11 times
    Finding that the facts supported a right-of-way under Nevada law after multiple maps unquestionably demonstrated that the road in question existed

    Obstruction of a public road is unlawful (NRS 405.230(1)) and cannot aid appellants' position. An unlawful encroachment placed upon a public roadway will not constitute an abandonment of the public easement and cannot divest the public of its right to traverse. King v. Corsini, 335 N.E.2d 561 (Ill.App. 1975); State v. Smith, 241 S.W.2d 844 (Tenn.App. 1950). NRS 405.230:

  4. Chesney v. Moews

    147 N.E. 497 (Ill. 1925)   Cited 5 times

    Neither the allegations of the petition nor any fact not contained in the record returned can be considered. It is essential that the record returned show the existence of every fact necessary to authorize the respondent to act. ( Commissioners of Highways v. Smith, 217 Ill. 250; Southworth v. Board of Education, 238 id. 190.) The statute requires as the basis of the county superintendent's authority to call an election a petition signed by at least fifty legal voters.

  5. Bakersouth, LLC v. Green Hills Mall TRG, LLC

    No. M2018-02129-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    Rather, "[t]he failure to use must be accompanied by some act of the owner of the dominant estate clearly indicating his purpose to set up no further claim in order to work abandonment." State ex rel. Phillips v. Smith, 241 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950). "'[T]here must be some clear and unmistakable affirmative act indicating a purpose to repudiate the ownership.'"

  6. Custom Land Develop. v. Town of Coopertown

    168 S.W.3d 764 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that "the mere granting of site plan approval [by the local planning commission] and issuance of a business license by the County does not grant a vested property right" to develop land in violation of local zoning ordinances

    Custom advocates a standard under which the owner of a nonconforming business cannot be deprived of his right to engage in the nonconforming use of his property unless he demonstrates an intent to abandon the nonconforming use, citing the common law principle that an interest in property is not considered abandoned unless there is proof of intent to abandon and an overt act evidencing the intent to abandon. State ex rel. Phillips v. Smith, 34 Tenn.App. 608, 241 S.W.2d 844 (1950); Phy v. Hatfield, 122 Tenn. 694, 126 S.W. 105 (1909); Boyd v. Hunt, 102 Tenn. 495, 52 S.W. 131 (1899). In support of its argument, Custom cites Boles v. City of Chattanooga, 892 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994), involving a City of Chattanooga discontinuance ordinance with a time limit of 100 days.

  7. Moore v. Devault

    No. M2001-02225-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002)   Cited 3 times

    This intention may be proved with evidence of acts clearly indicating that the easement holder desires to lay no further claim to the benefits of the easement. See State ex rel. Phillips v. Smith, 34 Tenn. App. 608, 612-13, 241 S.W.2d 844, 846 (1950).Hall v. Pippen, 984 S.W.2d 617, 620-21 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998).

  8. Hall v. Pippin

    984 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 38 times
    Holding that owners of property abutting once public road continue to have private access easement over that road to their property even after road loses its character as public road.

    This intention may be proved with evidence of acts clearly indicating that the easement holder desires to lay no further claim to the benefits of the easement. See State ex rel. Phillips v. Smith, 34 Tenn. App. 608, 612-13, 241 S.W.2d 844, 846 (1950). Abandonment may be proved by either a single act or a series of acts.

  9. Hall v. Pippin

    Appeal No. 01A01-9609-CH-00439 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sep. 23, 1998)

    This intention may be proved with evidence of acts clearly indicating that the easement holder desires to lay no further claim to the benefits of the easement. See State ex rel. Phillips v. Smith, 34 Tenn. App. 608, 612-13, 241 S.W.2d 844, 846 (1950). Abandonment may be proved by either a single act or a series of acts.

  10. Edminston Corp. v. Carpenter

    540 S.W.2d 260 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 9 times

    Boyd v. Hunt (1899) 102 Tenn. 495, 52 S.W. 131. The abandonment of an easement like the abandonment of any property right, must be accompanied by the requisite intent to abandon. State ex rel Phillips v. Smith (1950) 34 Tenn. App. 488, 241 S.W.2d 844; Cottrell v. Daniel et al (Tenn. App. 1947) 205 S.W.2d 973. The proof totally fails to establish an abandonment of the thirty-foot easement. To the contrary, the easement has been continuously used for the purposes for which it was created in 1916.