Opinion
NUMBER 2012 KJ 1535
02-22-2013
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF M.P.
Sean Collins Assistant Public Defender Baton Rouge, LA Attorney for Appellant M.P. Hillar C. Moore, III District Attorney Allison Miller Rutzen Assistant District Attorney Baton Rouge, LA Attorney for Appellee State of Louisiana
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
Juvenile Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Trial Court Number 101,554
Honorable Pamela Taylor Johnson, Judge
Sean Collins
Assistant Public Defender
Baton Rouge, LA
Attorney for Appellant
M.P.
Hillar C. Moore, III
District Attorney
and
Allison Miller Rutzen
Assistant District Attorney
Baton Rouge, LA
Attorney for Appellee
State of Louisiana
BEFORE: PARRO, WELCH, AND KLINE, JJ.
Hon. William F. Kline, Jr., retired, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
WELCH, J.
A fourteen-year-old child, identified herein as M.P., was alleged to be delinquent according to a petition filed by the State on January 10, 2012, pursuant to the Louisiana Children's Code. The petition was based upon the alleged commission of armed robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:64. After an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated M.P. a delinquent based on a finding that he committed the offense of armed robbery. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court committed M.P. to the secure custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (DPSC) for not less than nine months and not more than fifteen months, with credit for time served, to be determined by the DPSC and certain conditions. On appeal, M.P. argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that he did not meet his burden of proving compulsion or justification. After a thorough review of the record and the error assigned, we affirm the adjudication and the disposition.
M.P.'s date of birth is January 12, 1997.
Allegations of possession of marijuana and misdemeanor theft were dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 4, 2012, at approximately 10:00 a.m., the victim, attorney Robert Hairford, was walking toward his vehicle that was parked near his office located on Europe Street in Baton Rouge. As Hairford unlocked his vehicle and placed his briefcase in the passenger side, he observed two teenagers walking nearby. As the teenagers approached, including one later identified as M.P., Hairford observed them struggling for control over a pistol. The perpetrators demanded Hairford's wallet and money. M.P. reached in the victim's vehicle, grabbed his briefcase, and snatched the victim's cell phone from his hand. The perpetrators then fled and Hairford chased them, demanding they drop his briefcase. As they approached St. Louis Street, Hairford yelled to a bystander that he had just been robbed, instructing him to call the police. After they circled back toward Europe Street, Hairford ultimately lost sight of the other perpetrator, but continued to pursue M.P., who, at that point, still had possession of the victim's briefcase. Hairford got into his vehicle and pursued M.P. while bystanders continued to pursue him on foot. As M.P. approached Mayflower Street, the bystanders closed in on him, and the victim was able to block M.P. with Ms vehicle. Hairford jumped out of his vehicle, and he and three other individuals surrounded M.P. The victim unsuccessfully attempted to locate the other perpetrator while the others held M.P. until the police arrived. Hairford immediately regained possession of his cell phone and the police later recovered his briefcase, which had been discarded.
This particular street name is misspelled in the record but corrected herein based on the described location.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In the sole assignment of error, M.P. contends that the court erred in finding that he failed to meet his burden of establishing the defense of compulsion or justification by a preponderance of the evidence. M.P. argues that the State failed to present witness testimony or other extrinsic evidence to rebut his testimony. The juvenile notes that he testified that the other perpetrator (whom he knew only as "J") ordered him to take the gun and rob the victim and that he committed the robbery in fear after being threatened. The juvenile contends that his testimony was in part corroborated by the victim. M.P. stresses that he did not have the gun during the offense or threaten the victim and that there was evidence that he was compelled to commit the offense. The juvenile contends that the juvenile court should have concluded that he was under a threat of imminent bodily harm during the commission of the robbery.
The constitutional standard of review for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude that the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See La. Ch.C.art. 883; La. C.Cr.P. art. 821; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also La. Ch.C.art. 883; La. C.Cr.P. art 821. However, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, an appellate court is constitutionally mandated to review the law and facts. La. Const, art. V, § 10(A) & (B); see also State in the Interest of L.C., 96-2511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/20/97), 696 So.2d 668, 670. The testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to prove the elements of an offense. In a juvenile case, when there is evidence before the trier of fact that, upon its reasonable evaluation of credibility, furnished a factual basis for its finding, on review the appellate court should not disturb this factual finding in the absence of manifest error. Reasonable evaluation of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review. State in the Interest of Wilkerson, 542 So.2d 577, 581 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
Armed robbery is defined as the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:64(A). M.P. does not contest that an armed robbery took place and that he participated in the offense, but argues that his participation was compelled and that the offense was justifiable on that basis. Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:18(6), in pertinent part, the defense of justification can be claimed when any crime, except murder, is committed through the compulsion of threats by another of death or great bodily harm, and the offender reasonably believes the person making the threats is present and would immediately carry out the threats if the crime were not committed. This defense must be proved by the offender by a preponderance of the evidence. State in Interest of White, 411 So.2d 537 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
The victim testified that both perpetrators, including M.P., made verbal demands for his wallet and money. The victim further testified that M.P., on his own initiative, reached into his vehicle and took his briefcase after stating, "let me in there" and after pushing past him. The victim also testified that the other perpetrator threatened to kill the victim if he did not cooperate. The victim did not hear any communication between the two perpetrators or witness any threats against M.P. (R. 90). Grant Guillot, one of the bystanders who held M.P. as they waited for the police to arrive, testified that when asked about the commission of the offense, M.P. stated, "I need money." After M.P. was advised of his Miranda rights, he told the arresting officer, Officer Leslie Harry of the Baton Rouge City Police Department, that he needed money, he did not have a job, he owed two hundred dollars for marijuana to someone who he only identified as "J," and that "J" agreed to give him credit toward the debt for his participation in the robbery.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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M.P. testified that he knew the co-perpetrator as "J," he did not know him that well, but occasionally saw him around his neighborhood before the offense. On the morning of the offense, "J" stopped M.P. and initially only stated that he wanted to "hang out" with M.P. According to M.P., when "J" saw Hairford, he stated that he was going to rob him, but M.P. tried to persuade him not to do so. "J" gave M.P. the gun and told him to rob the victim, but M.P. gave the gun back and stated that he would not do so. "J" told him, "I'm gonna punch you in your face, if you don't take whatever he got." M.P. further testified that "J" was taller than him and that he was nervous and scared and believed that "J" would hurt him.
In State in Interest of White, the juvenile offered only his own unsupported and self-serving testimony to prove his defense that he was compelled or coerced into participating in an armed robbery. This court affirmed the juvenile court's finding of delinquency. State in Interest of White, 411 So.2d at 538. Similarly, in the instant case, M.P. only offered self-serving testimony to prove that the armed robbery was justified. Further, M.P. grabbed the victim's cell phone and briefcase on his own volition and still had possession of the cell phone after the robbery. Based on the testimony presented by other witnesses, M.P.'s actions and statements immediately following the offense were inconsistent with the defense of justification. It is well settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a juvenile court's findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong. See State in the Interest of D.H., 2004-2105 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/11/05), 906 So.2d 554, 559-60. We agree with the finding of the juvenile court that M.P. did not prove his defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Based on our careful review of the record, the juvenile court's finding that there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that M.P. had committed the offense of armed robbery was not manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Considering the foregoing, the sole assignment of error lacks merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's adjudication and disposition are affirmed.
ADJUDICATION AND DISPOSITION AFFIRMED.