Specifically, Ford asserted that the Department of Corrections (Department) failed to approve housing in a community in which he could be supervised. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that the Department failed to adhere to the law announced in State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian , 755 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. App. 2008), and granted Ford’s petition for a writ, ordering the Department to either approve housing for Ford or modify the terms of his conditional release. The court of appeals vacated the district court’s order as moot.
Browneagle's petition also implicates the caselaw that governs the commissioner's discretion to revoke a person's conditional release and continue to imprison him. In State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian , 755 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. App. 2008), the habeas petitioner, a risk-level-II sex offender, was placed on ISR after serving two-thirds of his sentence. Id. at 793.
Because the issues raised in Young's appeal are capable of repetition but may evade review, we reverse the court of appeals’ conclusion that this appeal is moot. Reaching the merits of Young's claims, we further hold that: (1) the Department's use of review hearings is lawful; (2) the Department did not violate Young's substantive due process rights when it revoked Young's conditional release and extended his reincarceration through review hearings; (3) the Department did not violate the rule of law set forth in State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian , 755 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. App. 2008) ; and (4) a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, cannot be asserted in a habeas petition. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals.
This court has addressed the problem of the offender whose release plan requires an approved residence but the offender reaches his release date without an approved residence. See State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn. App. 2008) (concluding that department of corrections had obligation to consider restructuring offender's release plan because there was possibility of available residence in neighboring county). The statute defining the length of an offender's term of imprisonment does not define the term "release" or specify what must happen at the end of the term of imprisonment.
The state district court denied relief. On appeal, the Minnesota court of appeals remanded to the state district court without ordering his release. It nevertheless instructed the Department to “consider restructuring Marlowe's release plan” and to “seek to develop a plan that can achieve Marlowe's release from prison and placement in a suitable and approved residence, whether in Washington County or in a neighboring county.” State, ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn.Ct.App.2008). In September 2008 RS Eden placed Marlowe on its waiting list, anticipating that space would become available for him in December of that year. Ramsey County then changed its position and agreed to provide supervision.
Ford appealed the district court's decision to this court, and this court issued an order opinion which reversed and remanded the case in order for the DOC to develop the record regarding efforts made to find housing for Ford, in compliance with this court's decision in State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. App. 2008). State
When the commissioner exercises his authority, he must "fashion conditions of release that are workable and not impossible to satisfy." State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Minn. App. 2008). If a condition "becomes unworkable at the time of release due to circumstances largely outside the control of an offender, the DOC must consider a restructure or modification" of the condition.Id. at 796-97; see Minn. R. 2940.
After sanctions are imposed, an inmate's liberty interest is limited by the necessity of adhering to conditions of release. See State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792, 794-95 (Minn. App. 2008) (distinguishing an inmate's liberty interest in his initial supervised-release date from an inmate's continuing confinement because he cannot find approved housing). Martinez has at best a limited liberty interest in his release following violation of release conditions.
See Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 6. This court has held that, although there may be no duty to find a residence for an intensive-supervised-release offender, the DOC has an obligation to consider restructuring the offender's release plan when there is a possibility that an appropriate residence is available in a neighboring county. State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Minn. App. 2008). Bottomley, who was convicted in Kandiyohi County, was transported to the Kandiyohi County Jail for temporary housing upon his release.
Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 25-29. In his complaint, Evenstad cites Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792 (Minn.Ct.App. 2008), and Ford v. Schnell, 933 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 2019), for the proposition that the Defendants were required to find him agent-approved housing after he was terminated from his parole housing.