Summary
In Marks, claimant's initial allowance was denied by the district hearing officer, granted by the regional board and denied by staff hearing officers.
Summary of this case from State ex rel. St. Francis—St. George Hospital v. Industrial CommissionOpinion
No. 90-1874
Submitted December 3, 1991 —
Decided March 11, 1992.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 89AP-661.
In late 1978, appellee-claimant, Judy C. Marks, filed an occupational disease claim with appellant Industrial Commission ("the commission"), alleging that she had contracted an occupational disease in the course of her employment as a University of Cincinnati librarian. A commission district hearing officer denied claimant's workers' compensation application.
On appeal, a regional board of review ("the board") vacated the district hearing officer's order and allowed the claim. The board also awarded temporary total disability compensation, but did not specify the exact payment period. Instead, the board held:
"[T]emporary total compensation is to be paid according to proof of file; additional compensation is to be paid upon submission of sufficient medical evidence."
In June 1980, commission staff hearing officers vacated the board's order and reinstated the district hearing officer's order denying the claim. Shortly thereafter, claimant's counsel contacted appellant, Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, seeking payment of compensation pursuant to the regional board's earlier order. A bureau employee informed counsel that temporary total disability compensation had never been paid because "no exact date of disability or diagnosis was given, nor was sufficient medical proof in file." The bureau also stated that it was too late to now consider payment since the original board order had been vacated.
Claimant timely appealed the staff hearing officers' order to the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court. For reasons unknown, claimant's appeal sat dormant for the next seven years. No decision has yet been rendered in that case.
On October 26, 1987, claimant moved the commission to:
"[I]mmediately pay all outstanding temporary total disability compensation and medical bills which were ordered to be paid by the Dayton Regional Board of Review in their [ sic] order of January 28, 1980."
Staff hearing officers ultimately held claimant's motion in abeyance:
"[U]ntil such time that the appeal pending under [R.C.] 4123.519 on the question of the original allowance of the claim is adjudicated.
"The Staff Hearing Officers find that this claim was allowed by the Dayton Regional Board of Review by order dated 1-28-80. The Staff Hearing Officers further find that the Dayton Regional Board of Review order was subsequently vacated and this claim was disallowed by Industrial Commission order dated 6-25-80.
"The Staff Hearing Officers find that Industrial Commission policy provides that the appeal on the issue of original allowance must be resolved before the processing of a request for compensation in a disallowed claim."
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County to compel payment of compensation and medical bills. The court of appeals granted the writ and ordered the commission:
"[T]o enforce the June 1980 order of the Dayton Regional Board of Review and to determine relator's entitlement to temporary total disability compensation and payment of medical bills to June 25, 1980, based on the medical evidence contained in the file."
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Clements, Mahin Cohen and Edward Cohen, for appellee.
Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, and Hilla M. Zerbst, for appellants.
Under R.C. 4123.515:
"* * * [W]here the regional board rules in favor of the claimant, compensation and benefits shall be paid * * * whether or not further appeal is taken. * * *"
In the case before us, the board allowed claimant's workers' compensation claim, granted medical bill payment and ordered temporary total disability compensation "to be paid according to proof of file. * * *" Compensation and benefits, however, were never paid. Claimant's attempt to now enforce the board's order raises several questions, the first of which involves the possible existence of an adequate remedy at law. Appellants contend that R.C. 4123.519's appeal provisions constitute such a remedy. We disagree that an R.C. 4123.519 appeal is available, but find that an adequate remedy exists nonetheless.
Afrates v. Lorain (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 22, 584 N.E.2d 1175, paragraph one of the syllabus, recently declared appealable only those decisions involving a claimant's right to participate in workers' compensation benefits. The present commission decision does not involve claimant's right to participate. It merely holds in abeyance claimant's motion for interim compensation pending a final determination of her claim. An appeal, therefore, will not lie.
The unavailability of appeal, however, does not foreclose the possibility of other adequate remedies. R.C. 2721.02 provides:
"Courts of record may declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. * * * The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect. Such declaration has the effect of a final judgment or decree."
R.C. 2721.03 additionally provides that:
"Any person * * * whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a constitutional provision [or] statute * * * may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under such * * * constitutional provision [or] statute * * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder."
Claimant in essence seeks a declaration of her rights under R.C. 4123.515. The nature of this controversy falls within that contemplated by the declaratory judgment provisions of R.C. Chapter 2721. Under these facts, declaratory judgment provides an adequate remedy at law which precludes the issuance of a writ of mandamus. State, ex rel. Berger, v. McMonagle (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 28, 6 OBR 50, 451 N.E.2d 225.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.