Opinion
No. 92-80
Submitted October 13, 1992 —
Decided December 9, 1992.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 91AP-80.
Appellee-claimant, Virgil Litten, sustained two injuries while in the course of and arising from his employment with Warren-Trumbull County Public Library. The first, in 1981, was assigned claim No. PE677033 and was allowed for "[i]njury to little toe[,] right foot." The second, PEL33016, occurred in 1984 and was recognized for "[c]hip fracture right wrist; fractured thoracic disc; pulled ligament in right shoulder." Claimant never returned to work after the last injury.
In early 1988, claimant sought permanent total disability compensation in claim No. PEL33016. He accompanied his motion with a report from Dr. D.A. Scharnecchia that found claimant permanently and totally disabled due exclusively to the back, shoulder and wrist injuries of PEL33016. Appellant Industrial Commission granted claimant's motion and, as to the award, specifically noted that "100% allocated in claim number PEL33016."
Claimant then sought permanent partial disability compensation in claim No. PE677033. A commission district hearing officer dismissed the application because "claimant was made Permanently and Totally Disabled on order dated October 10, 1987 [ sic March 9, 1989]." Claimant's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Claimant requested a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in denying permanent partial disability compensation. The appellate court agreed, finding that claimant's permanent total disability award in claim No. PEL33016 did not preclude permanent partial disability in his other claim, since the injuries were to different areas of the body.
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Green, Haines, Sgambati, Murphy Macala Co., L.P.A., Ronald E. Slipski and Steven L. Paulson, for appellee.
Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, and Dennis L. Hufstader, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
An award for permanent total disability in one claim does not bar permanent partial disability in another, so long as the injuries affect different areas of the body. State ex rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 147, 149, 16 O.O.3d 166, 167, 404 N.E.2d 141, 143, quoting State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 278, 282, 71 O.O.2d 255, 257, 328 N.E.2d 387, 389. The present claimant has two workers' compensation claims and argues that the one hundred percent allocation to a single claim represents a total attribution of permanent total disability to that claim, freeing him to seek permanent partial disability in the other. The commission counters that the one hundred percent allocation is unrelated to disability and does not establish that permanent total disability was attributed exclusively to the named claim. We disagree.
There must be a connection between disability and a claim in which compensation is paid. Fox v. Indus. Comm. (1955), 162 Ohio St. 569, 55 O.O. 472, 125 N.E.2d 1 (requires causal relationship between disability and injury), R.C. 4123.62 (requires relationship between injury and claim in which compensation is paid). Thus, the commission's claim that its allocation is totally unrelated to disability is unpersuasive. This mandatory causal relationship also undermines the commission's suggestion that the allocation was made to the claim in which claimant would receive the highest weekly rate of compensation. The commission, for whatever reason, cannot assign the cost of the award to a particular claim without that claim's allowed conditions, to some degree, contributing to the permanent total disability.
The commission's present order is not ambiguous — it expressly assigned one hundred percent of the cost to a single claim. It could just as easily have designated a fifty-fifty split (or any other combination) between the claims but it did not. Therefore, where the commission allocates one hundred percent of an award's costs to a single claim, it must be assumed that the commission found the claim to be the sole cause of the claimant's permanent total disability. The commission thus abused its discretion in dismissing claimant's application for compensation for permanent partial disability in claim No. PE2677033.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.
HOLMES, J., dissents.