Opinion
No. ED 82789
Filed June 17, 2003
Writ of Prohibition Circuit Court of St. Louis, County Cause No. 02CC000533.
Eric M. Trelz, 100 4th Street, Suite, 1100 St. Louis, Missouri, 63102, for relator.
Lisa D. Martin, 1 Metropolitan Square, 211 North Broadway, Suite 3600, St. Louis, Missouri, 63102, for respondent.
OPINION
Craig Leonardi and his corporation seek a writ to prohibit the trial court from denying a jury trial and exercising jurisdiction under the equitable clean-up doctrine over the legal issues in the underlying case without a finding that there has been an equitable violation. We issued a preliminary order in prohibition, and the respondent answered. We dispense with further briefing as permitted by Rule 84.24(j). The preliminary order is made absolute.
I. BACKGROUND
Radiant Research filed a petition for injunctive relief and damages against Leonardi following termination of his contract to consult on clinical trials for Radiant. Radiant claims breach of contract, anticipatory repudiation, tortious interference and civil conspiracy. On each count, Radiant seeks money damages and temporary and permanent injunctions to enforce a restrictive covenant in the parties' contract, which purports to preclude him from conducting clinical trials with other companies for one year after termination of the contract. Leonardi counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of the duties of good faith and fair dealing.
On its own motion, the court set a preliminary injunction hearing and took evidence. The court issued an order denying a preliminary injunction. The court was "not entirely persuaded that the restrictive covenant" is enforceable. It also found that Radiant could not demonstrate a threat of irreparable harm because most of the clinical trials Radiant sought to preclude Leonardi from participating in had ended, nearly ended, or were outside the one-year restriction. Further, the court found that injunctive relief is inappropriate where there appears to be an adequate remedy at law; the evidence adduced in this case, the court stated, showed a viable cause of action for breach of contract. The matter was set for trial during a certified jury week.
Before trial, Leonardi moved for a ruling on Radiant's claim for a permanent injunction, either after another hearing or on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. In opposition, Radiant argued that another hearing was unnecessary because the court had jurisdiction under the equitable clean-up doctrine to determine the claims for injunctive relief and for money damages at the bench trial. At the court's request, the parties briefed the applicability of the equitable clean-up doctrine and the availability of a jury trial. The court found that denial of the preliminary injunction did not dispose of the claim for permanent injunction and thus requests for equitable relief and money damages remained before the court. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to award money damages under the clean-up doctrine and that Leonardi was not entitled to a jury trial.
II. DISCUSSION
Under the equitable clean-up doctrine, a court of equity generally will retain jurisdiction of a cause once it has acquired it in order to afford full relief. State ex rel. Willman v. Sloan, 574 S.W.2d 421, 422 (Mo.banc 1978). This general rule does not apply, however, "when the facts relied on to sustain the equity jurisdiction fail of establishment." Id. at 422-23. Thus, a court of equity does not have jurisdiction to render judgment on legal issues in the absence of a finding that some equitable right has been violated. Id. at 423.
[A] plaintiff must establish his equitable cause of action both by pleadings and evidence before the [c]ourt may, in equity, proceed to consider and grant relief which would otherwise be legal; or, in other words, that the equity jurisdiction must first attach both under the pleadings and the proof.
. . .
[W]here a case for relief in equity fails, a court of equity is without jurisdiction to award other relief by way of disposing of the entire controversy; unless, indeed, it appears that the remedy at law will be inadequate. Otherwise, as the courts have frequently pointed out, a litigant, by a pretended claim for equitable relief, might deprive his opponent of advantages incident to an action at law.
Jaycox v. Brune, 434 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Mo. 1968) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Siesta Manor, Inc. v. Community Federal Savings Loan Ass'n, 716 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Mo.App.E.D. 1986) ("In order to decide the legal issues, the court sitting in equity must first determine that some equitable right of the plaintiff has been violated.").
In this case, there has been no finding of an equitable violation, and therefore equity jurisdiction has not yet attached. It is not enough that there are still equitable claims pending. A jury trial on legal issues may not be denied before equity jurisdiction attaches merely because there exist equitable claims for which there is no right to a jury. State ex rel. Wayside Waifs, Inc. v. Williamson, 3 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Mo.App.W.D. 1999). At this point in this case, there is no basis for denying a jury trial on the legal claims.
Radiant argues that Willman provides authority for the trial court to go forward without a jury to determine money damages in this case. Willman is distinguishable, and Radiant's reliance thereon is misplaced. In Willman, the trial court found, after a bench trial, that the restrictive covenant in the parties' contract was not enforceable and denied injunctive relief. 574 S.W.2d at 422. The Supreme Court, on direct appeal, disagreed and found that the covenant was enforceable. Id. (citing Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973) (direct appeal)). In discussing the manner of enforcement on remand, the Court stated that a court of equity may award money damages on an equitable claim where such relief is required, such as where, as in that case, an injunction would be ineffective. On remand, the trial court denied a request for a jury trial on the determination of damages. Willman, 574 S.W.2d at 422. On petition for writ, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's equity jurisdiction existed because there had been a finding on direct appeal that there was merit to the claim to enforce the restrictive covenant. Id. Thus, the court could issue relief for that violation in the form of damages, and there was no right to a jury trial. Id.
Here, there is no finding that Radiant's claim to enforce the restrictive covenant has merit. In fact, the only ruling on the issue so far suggests that it does not. Thus, unlike Willman, there is no equitable violation at this point for which this trial court has jurisdiction to grant any relief. If and when the claim to enforce the restrictive covenant is granted, then the trial court may have authority to determine the appropriate relief, and that may include damages. But without a finding that there has been an equitable violation, the court should not have denied a jury trial. "Prohibition will lie where a right to a jury trial is improperly denied." State ex rel. Estill v. Iannone, 687 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Mo.banc 1985).
All of the other cases on which Radiant relies are similarly distinguishable — in each of them, the trial court had authority to award money damages or rule on other legal issues because there had already been a determination that an equitable right had been violated. See Kopp v. Franks, 792 S.W.2d 413, 426 (Mo.App.S.D. 1990) (court's finding that defendants acted contrary to contract on claim for specific performance was sufficient to attach equity jurisdiction for purposes of awarding money in lieu of ordering specific performance); Straatman v. Straatman, 780 S.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Mo.App.E.D. 1989) (court's granting of equitable relief gave it jurisdiction to dismiss related incidental legal claims, but jury must try unrelated legal issues); Siesta Manor, 716 S.W.2d at 839 (finding that foreclosure sale was inequitable was sufficient to attach equitable jurisdiction to award relief in form of damages); Dunning v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 483 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Mo.App. 1972) (court's finding that defendant failed to perform contract gave it jurisdiction to grant damages in lieu of ordering specific performance of contract).
III. CONCLUSION
The petition for writ is granted. We make the preliminary order in prohibition absolute and direct the trial court not to deny a jury trial in the absence of a finding that there has been an equitable violation.
Mary K. Hoff, J. and Kathianne Knaup Crane, J. concurring.